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Speculative ecofiction creates situations that demand ethical relation to nonhumans in 
order to complicate definitions of “the human” and promote a neo-humanist ethic based 
on human stewardship. Compassion is at the core of my understanding of stewardship, 
and I believe that certain literary works model ethical relationality based on care for all 
life. The novels that I examine pit nonhuman agency against human exceptionalism, 
bringing to light the ways in which “the other” is stripped of its agency. Reallocating 
agency impacts subgenres of speculative fiction including postcolonial, posthuman, and 
Afrofuturist literatures because as beings are stripped of agency they are also stripped of 
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INTRODUCTION: TOWARD AN ETHICAL RELATIONALTY  
In this posthuman age, the concept of environmental stewardship has fallen out of favor 
in critical conversations about environmental protection and activism because it has promoted a 
paternalistic model of responsibility. This perception is usually rooted in ideologies of control—
a resistance to perceived anthropocentric dominion and moral obligation. However, that does not 
have to be all stewardship offers to critical discourse. Stewardship is so well-established in 
mainstream discourse that it is useful for situating humans as responsible for the state of our 
planet, despite the historical, cultural, and religious burdens that the “stewardship” carries with 
it.1 There is a concept of stewardship emerging through the recognition of indigenous cultures’ 
knowledges, ecocriticism, and some new theories of global connection that acknowledge but do 
not capitalize on the unequal footing between humans and nonhumans. Such unequal positioning 
grants humans the power to control most given ecosystems, species, and the planet. This stance 
maintains that it is the responsibility of humans to use that power to care for, and care with, 
ecosystems. Because literary work effectively registers such shifts in cultural perception, this 
dissertation assumes both an aesthetic and a didactic function for literature: I contend that to 
promote an ethical stewardship, speculative ecofiction provides “what if” scenarios that show the 
consequences of focusing only on human flourishing. 
“Speculative ecofiction” is a term describing literature that imagines alternate 
relationalities between humans, animals, and environments. This term is used as an umbrella to 
                                            
1 For an overview of how recent ecocritics discuss environmental stewardship see Rhain Williams. 
"Ecocriticism." The Year's Work in Critical and Cultural Theory, vol. 25, no. 1, 2017, pp. 252–273. See 
also Jessica Cockburn et al. “Towards Place-Based Research to Support Social–Ecological 




encompass environmental fiction that uses elements of the fantastic in conjunction with the 
agency of nonhumans to showcase various configurations of relationality between all forms of 
being.  It is defined as fiction that focuses on environmental possibilities set in an alternate past 
or potential future. Speculative ecofiction offers cautionary tales of what can happen when the 
agency of the nonhuman is unacknowledged and ethical relationality between humans and 
animals remains unbalanced. In this dissertation, “relationality” is used to discuss relationships 
between beings in order to focus on how they are in relation to each other. It is through the 
critical intersections of ecology and speculative fictions--including postcolonial, posthuman, and 
Afrofuturist fictions—that nonhuman agency demonstrates relationality between humans and 
nonhumans. Speculative ecofiction provides the means and incentive to rethink what it means to 
be human by emphasizing human entanglement in complex living ecosystems and introducing a 
moment of cultural or environmental crisis that demands new or more ethically considered 
human behavior. This fiction presents an idea of “humanity” that defines itself against the odds 
of survival and that is deeply rooted in an ethical relationality.  
Speculative ecofiction explores nonhuman agency and ecocritical concerns by merging 
common tropes in science fiction and fantasy. This subgenre of speculative ecofiction gained 
momentum in the nineteen-sixties and seventies with publications such as J.G. Ballard’s The 
Drought and with the publication of Ecofiction edited by John Standler in 1971 and Ernest 
Callenbach’s Ecotopia in 1975 (Woodbury). In the 1980s authors such as Octavia Butler, Joan 
Slonczewski, and Ursula Le Guin distinguished themselves as leading female voices in what was 
assumed to be a predominantly male community. The last thirty years have shown an increasing 




Robinson, N.K. Jemisin, Karen Tei Yamashita, and Neal Stephenson, among others, gaining 
attention for novels that denounce environmental exploitation.  These ecocritical concerns 
include the impact of the Anthropocene on the environment, usually by imagining possible 
futures or alternate pasts wherein the dominance of humanity was shifted in some way. 
Speculation is essential to the foundation of ecocriticism because it is how environmental 
imagination can transcend time, space, and the material being of our present reality. Speculative 
ecofiction creates worlds where the natural order is altered in unexpected ways. These shifts can 
arise from the decline or collapse of whole human civilizations, nuclear war or apocalypse, 
environmental catastrophe, alien invasion, technological innovation, or scientific 
experimentation and advancement. Whatever form the speculation takes, when examined 
through an ecocritical lens, it challenges humans to consider what it means to be in ethical 
relation to the nonhuman. 
I propose a new concept, “relational agency,” to show how (and why) writers of 
speculative ecofiction examine the tension between ethics and law to demonstrate nonhuman 
agency and human responsibility in and to ecosystems. Relational agency argues that agency is 
granted to nonhuman others when those others are acknowledged as subjects rather than as 
objects. Referring to speculative ecofiction, the term redefines humanism through an ontological 
shift in what it means to be a human in relation to other species and the environment. This goes 
beyond fictional condemnations of ethical complacency or environmental destruction, instead 
focusing on imaginative and complex ways that humans and nonhumans can create and maintain 
reciprocal relationships. It emphasizes not just the agency of nonhuman others, but also the 




speculative ecofiction that construct an ethics of relational agency provide models of relationality 
with the nonhuman, even as they acknowledge the humanistic impulse at the center of human 
sociality. I claim that relational agency highlights the responsibility that humans have for the 
those “lower” on the animacy hierarchy.2 It promotes a model of stewardship by which humans 
work with, and as a part of, nature. Speculative ecofiction problematizes the agency that we grant 
to nonhuman others in order to delineate the value of ethical relationality. By reshaping the 
boundaries between ethics and law, human and animal, and nature and culture, this fiction 
advocates a sense of stewardship that attempts to avoid crossing the line from care to 
domination.  
In speculative ecofiction, relational agency highlights the ethical and political boundaries 
of self and other. Characteristically, relational agency questions the “known facts” of the 
physical world by claiming that reality is structured as a network of relationships. In this 
framework, human recognition of and responsibility to nonhumans is made clear through a call 
for mutually beneficial coexistence. The novels that I examine pit nonhuman agency against 
human exceptionalism, bringing to light the ways in which “the other” is stripped of its agency. 
Reallocating agency impacts subgenres of speculative fiction including postcolonial, posthuman, 
and Afrofuturist literatures, because as beings are stripped of agency they are also stripped of 
their rights. Likewise, when a text grants being agency, it suggests that the dominant human 
culture should recognize and protect them as beings that deserve rights. I explore how 
speculative ecofiction grants the nonhuman actor agency in exaggerated and sometimes 
                                            
2 This hierarchy was created by John Louis Cherry in his sociolinguistic study of how people discussed 
agency. It is almost identical to the philosophical “Great Chain of Being” espoused by Neoplatonists in 
the Middle Ages. For an in-depth examination of Cherry’s study, see Animism in Thought and Language. 




seemingly absurd ways (such as a storytelling plastic ball in Karen Tei Yamashita’s Through the 
Arc of the Rainforest) to force us to consider how our relationships with human and nonhuman 
others are foundational to human existence.  
In this dissertation, I contend that in speculative ecofiction, relational agency depends 
upon three foundational concepts: relationality, reciprocity, and stewardship (responsibility). In 
this introductory chapter, after defining what I mean by “speculative ecofiction,” I unpack these 
terms and discuss the agency aspect of relational agency as it is depicted and modeled in 
speculative ecofiction.  
 
What is “Speculative Ecofiction”? 
Speculative ecofiction suggests the possibilities of the fantastic unmoored from the genre 
boundaries of science fiction and fantasy. In 2009, Ursula Le Guin and Margaret Atwood had a 
disagreement about whether Atwood’s novels are science fiction or speculative fiction. This 
disagreement was spurred by Atwood’s denial of her novels as “science fiction,” in her essay 
collection Moving Targets. As a consequence of this choice, LeGuin’s review of her novel The 
Year of the Flood, published in The Guardian, respects Atwood’s decision to narrowly define 
science fiction and talks about her novel instead as a “realistic novel” not relying on “the praise it 
deserves as a work of unusual cautionary imagination and satirical invention” (Le Guin). 
Whereas Atwood insists on the possibility of the world she created, one of the last sentences of 
Le Guin’s review questions, “Who wants to believe that a story in which that happens isn't 
science fiction?” (LeGuin). The potentiality of this novel makes it speculative. However, because 




Le Guin likes to imagine a world where the possibility of the reality established in the novel is 
limited to fiction.  
“Speculative ecofiction” emerges out of this same conversation from what I see as the 
future possibilities for people and their environments. I draw on traditions of indigenous 
knowledge as well as Western ideas of ecocriticism to establish how this fiction promotes new 
configurations of relationality between humans and nonhumans. The foundation of the “eco” 
portion of speculative ecofiction concerns itself primarily with humans in relation to the 
environment, where more than just humans are given consideration and attention in the work. 
This can take the shape of a third-omniscient point-of-view that devotes time to nonhuman 
characters, or simply a consideration of the environment that moves beyond description and into 
interpretation, conversation, or analysis. Jim Dryer, author of Where the Wild Books Are, 
provides a simplified definition of “ecofiction” as “fiction that deals with environmental issues 
or the relation of humanity and the physical environment, that contrasts traditional and industrial 
cosmologies, or in which nature or the land has a prominent role” (Dryer 2). This generous list of 
characteristics allows for an expanse of fiction to be considered under the umbrella of ecofiction. 
He situates the term of “ecofiction” historically by tracing the trajectory of works that consider 
human in relation to the environment from a perspective that includes humans as a part of nature. 
I limit this through the addition of the qualifier “speculative,” suggesting that the ecofiction 
examined here explores alternate variations in the relationships between humans, animals, and 
the environment.  
Further, I use “speculative” to acknowledge the speculative turn, as conceptualized by 




relationality. 3  Speculation implies the ability to imagine being beyond the known facts of 
reality. It also suggests the idea of spectacle, that is something visually and emotionally striking 
or dramatic, and the idea of the spectacular, something awe inspiring. It suggests things that 
could happen but have not happened at the time the author wrote the text. Speculation projects 
possibilities for both the past and future models of ethical relationality between humans and 
nonhumans. It also promotes non-anthropocentric ways of being human. While, ostensibly, this 
would suggest an end the obligations humans have to the nonhuman, the literature that I examine 
shows that this is not the case. Stewardship remains foundational to interspecies relationality, not 
through the traditional modes of paternalistic dominion, but through a humanist ethic that 
suggests care for and with nature.  
 
Eco-Relationality: Earth Ontologies, and After 
The relational aspect of “relational agency” is based in redefinitions of ontological 
hierarchy: how, in the order of being, humans and nonhumans stand in relation to one another. 
Today, new theories of ontological relationality draw from indigenous knowledges and older 
theories of ecocriticism—and, increasingly, theories of posthumanism and new materialisms—to 
construct definitions of relational agency that are compatible to new rethinkings of relationality 
and reciprocity in ethics (which I will discuss below). 
For example, ecologist Robin Wall Kimmerer (Potawatomi) situates animals, humans, 
and plants as interconnected entities tied to each other through reciprocity. In Braiding 
Sweetgrass, she suggests that Westerners need to move beyond a culture of gratitude to a culture 
                                            
3 See Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman. The Speculative Turn, Continental Materialism 




of reciprocity, taking the “gifts of the earth” and giving back (Kimmerer 189). The welfare of 
animals and plants is inexorably tied to the welfare of people. This well-being is dependent upon 
harmonious coexistence in which animals, plants, and humans contribute to the foundation and 
maintenance of a community.  
These same ontological redistributions can be seen in many native creation myths as well. 
Kimmerer’s retelling of the Skywoman creation story, popular in the Great Lakes area, 
establishes an anti-hierarchical ontology by situating humans as the last beings to join the earth. 
The earth is formed “not by Skywoman alone, but from the alchemy of all the animals’ gifts 
coupled with her deep gratitude. Together they formed what we know today as Turtle Island, our 
home” (Kimmerer 5). In this telling, the animals provide Skywoman with what she needs to 
survive, and in turn she provides them with access to even more food. Humans come along later, 
the descendants of Skywoman and the animals. In Thomas King’s retelling Skywoman is given a 
name, Charm, and she is pregnant with twins when she falls to the earth. She relies on the 
assistance of animals to keep herself alive, and together they create the world, by adding mud 
from the ocean floor to the turtle’s back that Skywoman was occupying. Then she gave birth to 
twins, who after shaping the mud, trees, and mountains, decided to make humans. The story ends 
with, “The animals, and the humans, and the Twins, and Charm looked around at the world they 
had created. Boy, they said, this is as good as it gets” (King 20). These stories share at their core 
a fundamental disregard for hierarchical human positioning. All beings exist in relation to others, 
and their relationships are all dependent upon the individuals that structure those relationships.  
Writers such as Kimmerer and King express an indigenous philosophy of the earth that 




ontology but a relational one that has implications for, and expressions in, various indigenous 
religious and ethical traditions. Anglo-European ecocriticism adopted much of this view even as 
it attempted at times to translate the relationality of being into material, environmental contexts 
and politics. Many postcolonial ecocritics read literatures of displaced indigenous peoples, for 
example, under the theoretical framework of postcolonial ecocriticism because of these 
literatures’ concern with environmental justice and both human and nonhuman advocacy. 
Although the history of environmental literature is long, the critical school of thought known as 
ecocriticism has its origins in conversations about nature and conservation in 1960s America. 
Ecocriticism is broadly defined as the earth-oriented study of literature. This first wave of 
ecocriticism equated nature with environment, focusing on depictions of the natural world in 
literature as a means of preserving it, as Greg Garrard’s Ecocriticism, which attributes the birth 
of ecocriticism to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962). Carson’s book depicts an idyllic pastoral 
wilderness that slowly decays because of human interference. Garrard makes clear that the real-
world ecocritical conversations that Carson’s text references are political, fundamentally based 
on a “green moral and political agenda” (Garrard 3).4 Yet the work has been taken to task in 
contemporary ecocritics because, such criticism says, this perspective privileges a global 
environmentalism that falsely imagines a natural world untouched by humans—a romantic, even 
sentimentalized, view of the natural world linked to older genres of pastoral. Pastoralism 
                                            
4 According to Buell’s, Heise’s, and Thornber’s overview, “Literature and the Environment,” ecocriticism 
blossomed in the early 1990s with the creation of the Association for the Study of Literature and 




continues today in genres such as travel narratives and continues to generate heated criticism, 
especially in discussions of ecotourism.5  
Postcolonial ecocriticism is one of the many branches of ecocriticism that emerges from 
the second-wave desire for environmental justice, and it combines an ontological relationality 
with ethical relationality (described further below). Huggan and Tiffin, for example, define 
“postcolonial ecocriticism” as “A way of not just opening the postcolonial dimension of 
ecocriticism, but also suggesting that the critical study of environmental literature may do its part 
in undoing the epistemological hierarchies and boundaries—nowhere more apparent than under 
historical and/or contemporary conditions of colonialism—that have set humans against other 
animals, and both against an externalized natural world” (23). This definition provides a 
foundation for emerging forms of ecocritical thought. The second wave of ecocriticism in the 
2000s focused on industrialization and “favored a sociocentric rather than biocentric and/or 
individual-experience-oriented ethics and aesthetics, placing particular emphasis on 
environmental justice” (Buell et al. 419). Such a call for justice acknowledges the inequality of 
environmental resource distribution and access across different races, classes, and communities. 
Critics emphasized the political nature of ecocriticism, often examining how colonial practices 
shaped the cultures of colonized people as well as the land itself.  
 Postcolonial ecocriticism gained momentum with the 2004 publication of Graham 
Huggan’s “Greening Postcolonialism” and shortly following that, the publication of Rob Nixon’s 
“Environmentalism and Postcolonialism” in 2005. Huggan’s article suggests that postcolonial 
and ecocritical perspectives can be joined together initially by their concerns for social justice 
                                            
5 See Richard Sharpley & Philip R. Stone, editors. "The Darker Side of Travel – The Theory and Practice 




and transformation. He combines these theoretical fields to negotiate a perspective on the effects 
of imperialism on humans and the environment. Nixon likewise calls for an examination of 
comparative literatures that deals with environmental issues. He asserts that North American 
ecocritical scholars should be wary of allowing their ethics of place blind them to the 
displacement of peoples and that, conversely, postcolonial scholars should examine not only the 
colonial displacement of people but also colonial disruptions of environment and ontologically 
relational philosophies.6  
Postcolonial ecocriticism relies on what Lawrence Buell terms “environmental 
imagination.” Such imagination includes connections between human and nature, human 
accountability to the environment, and an environment seen as dynamic and in constant and vital 
interaction with humans rather than as a static background to human “civilization.” In 2011, 
Elizabeth DeLoughrey and George Handley published Postcolonial Ecologies, a collection of 
essays that cultivate an “aesthetics of the earth” (a term borrowed from Caribbean theorist 
Édouard Glissant) through which they hope to challenge “normative” representations of both 
human and nonhuman nature (9). They seek to fill in the theoretical gaps between postcolonial 
and ecological discourse by decentering the U.S. as the source and focus of ecocritical thought 
by arguing for more “rhizomatic roots” and by finding a way to “speak in ethical terms about the 
global and local without reducing difference and without instituting old structural hierarchies” 
(15, 25).7  
                                            
6 After the publication of these essays, more scholars joined the conversation examining the connections 
between imperialism and ecological concerns. Among those, Graham Huggan and Helen Tiffin wrote 
Postcolonial Ecocriticism highlighting the socio-political origins of environmental issues. 
7 In this context, “rhizomatic roots” refers to the discussion of rhizomatic assemblages Deleuze and 
Guattari propose in A Thousand Plateaus. They say, “The rhizome connects any point to any other point, 




Though all of these ideas have been present in various indigenous people’s religions and 
epistemologies for thousands of years, the intersection of the postcolonial and ecological in 
modern Anglo-European critical conversations has (somewhat ironically) led to a new shift in 
Western postcolonial criticism about the nature of the lived world. This shift has become more 
apparent with the publication of texts such as Uncertain Mirrors, an essay collection by Jesus 
Benito, Ana Manzanas, and Begona Simal, which examines “magical realism” in indigenous 
literatures of the Americas.8 Simal sees magical realist motifs as “rendering visible the 
connivance of certain institutions and material practices” (235). Simal suggests that a fixed 
Western understanding of “nature” has marginalized multiple indigenous ecocritical 
perspectives.  
This claim puts him in the company of some New Materialist and posthumanist critics 
such as Timothy Morton and Courtney Traub, who have also argued for a complete 
reexamination of what an ecocritical perspective might be. These newer theoretical discourses 
push back against the aestheticizing of nature—a concept that we use to distinguish between 
human society (culture) and nonhuman spaces and communities (nature)— in favor of a “nature” 
                                            
8 The key theories that define magical realism are those that view it as a discourse, rather than a genre. A 
general guideline for the elements of magical realism, provided by Wendy Faris, are an "irreducible 
element" of magic (characters in the text model the acceptance of this element in the text: it neither 
shocks or melts away), a strong presence of the phenomenal world, a "reality" that becomes amazing or 
ridiculous in the space of the narrative, a questioning of time, space, and identity (7-42). According to 
Stephen Slemon, it includes elements of the fantastic—and the fantastic suggests a way of seeing the 
world that is nonmimetic.  
For further discussion of magical realism see Faris, Wendy B. Ordinary Enchantments: Magical Realism 
and the Remystification of Narrative. Vanderbilt UP, 2004; Hume, Kathryn. Fantasy and Mimesis: 
Responses to Reality in Western Literature. Methuen, 1984; Stephen Slemon, “Magical Realism as 
Postcolonial Discourse,” in Magical Realism: Theory, History, Community, eds. Lois Parkinson Zamora 







that is understood to be all encompassing and relational. Unlike more traditional forms of nature 
writing wherein “presumptions of epistemological control and stewardship of the nonhuman . . . 
dominate,” Traub asks readers to consider how narrative opacity might contribute to troubling 
preconceptions about nature (515). Traub’s insistence on the connection between narrative 
opacity and nature suggests that the form of a novel can greatly impact how readers respond to 
and interact with concepts of nature. In this way, narrative strategies can shape nature away from 
its traditional understanding. In The Ecological Thought, Morton agrees, advocating “ecology 
without ‘Nature’ and without ‘environmentalism’” (3). He claims that Romantic literature served 
as a touchstone for ecocriticism, but it does not do enough to encourage “openness,” instead 
relying on a prepackaged version on “Nature” which has become “plastic” and artificial (Morton 
11). Yet because his focus is on ecocriticism as a whole, Morton ignores the work that 
postcolonial ecocriticism has done to shift the discourse away from Romantic literature and 
toward such relational ontologies. 
Ultimately, authors working very differently under the huge umbrella term “postcolonial 
ecocriticism” suggest that “nature” is a term that must be retired or radically redefined in the 
name of ontological relationality: new examinations of the kinds of connections and vital 
networks linking humans and nonhuman others, including inanimate others. Likewise, 
contemporary speculative ecofiction considers nature more within a flattened ontology whereby 
things stand in vital relation to other things in assemblages that are spontaneous, fortuitous, and 
ecologically “natural.” 
 For scholars such as Jane Bennett, Karen Barad, Donna Haraway, Cary Wolfe, and Mel 




present in a series of intimate, somatic connections between self and other, self and world. For 
instance, Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter, working within the theory of new materialisms and 
posthuman vitalist ethics, discusses her theory of vibrant matter as “the interconnections between 
persons and things… individuals as simply incapable of bearing full responsibility for their 
effects” (37). These interconnections insist that there is no isolated experience, anything that 
happens has an effect on all other things. While individuals do exist in the sense of personal 
identity, relationality shapes how that individual, or individual object, is created. 
Karen Barad, coming from a science background, sees vitalism (as conceptualized by 
Jane Bennett) through the lens of theoretical physics and the work, particularly, of Niels Bohr. 
Barad has posited “agential realism” as an ontological, realist framework for understanding the 
relations of things in the universe, including self-other relations. Selfhood is founded on “intra-
action,” a constant movement and response between material particles. Barad’s theory is 
different from Latour’s actor network theory because apparatuses are not contingent on 
“assemblages” of humans and nonhumans: material interaction happens at the particle level. 
Things cannot exist without a self-othering at their core and the boundaries that apparatuses are 
“specific material (re)configurings of the world--which comes to matter” (140). In short, all 
things are constructed of the same stuff in infinite configurations. These configurations are 
constantly shifting at the subatomic level connecting physical bodies in multitudes of ways. 
Barad calls these connections “intra-actions” as opposed to “interactions” to illustrate that 
agency is not inherently human or individual-based (141). Agency is built on intra-actions 




Using the Niels Bohr’s “philosophy physics,” Karen Barad determines that 
representationalism, metaphysical individualism, and humanism work together to maintain the 
idea that man is the center of the universe (Barad 69). Like Donna Haraway and Bruno Latour, 
Barad explores the ways humans conceptualize nature, materiality, and the epistemological 
structure of the physical world. Unlike them, Barad understands reality as empirically structured 
on the Bohrs’ concept of “phenomena” those “intra-actions” that structure the ontological 
inseparability between the material reality (120-121).  Reality itself is based upon relationality; 
her version of reality exists “in relation,” relying on interdependent phenomena.9 
Interdependence does not require the dissolution of free will; Barad’s agential realism deals with 
the relationality, not the merging of entities, at the core of material being. By emphasizing 
interdependence, Barad successfully decenters the human and reveals the relational ontology that 
structures our material reality. 
Donna Haraway is less concerned with theoretical physics, though she has aligned herself 
with science and technology discourses throughout her career; in terms of ontological 
relationality, she has less patience with posthuman vitalism and has instead focused on 
interspecies relationships between humans and animal companions. Referencing Bruno Latour’s 
famous book, We Have Never Been Modern, in When Species Meet, Haraway argues that “we 
have never been human” (1). She contests an understanding of what it means to be a modern 
human that is elaborated in Latour’s The Politics of Nature, which suggests that there are great 
                                            
9 See Norris’s “Ecocriticism and Moral Responsibility: The Question of Agency in Karen Barad’s 
Performativity Theory,” The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association, 49.1, 2016: 157-184. 
Norris argues this is where agential realism fails to account for the “impersonal force” of agency (178) 
and believes that without addressing this issue of free will, ecocriticism loses its ethical backbone if 
human behavior is predetermined by agential forces (180). Norris’s suppositions about Barad’s ethical 




divides between the human/society and animal/nature. Haraway argues that this is the "Great 
Divide" characteristic of the way thinking defining human exceptionalism; only humankind is 
not a part of an interdependent web. In contrast, for Haraway, relationality between humans and 
nonhumans is “a knot of species co-shaping one another in layers of reciprocating complexity all 
the way down” (42).  This demonstrates the shift in a conversation about what it means to be 
human; shifting the focus from what humans are to what they are a part of (from I am to I am 
part of).  
While I agree with Morton and Traub that the definition of nature in capitalist-driven 
nations needs to be reconsidered, I believe it is productive to turn to the arts and consider how 
authors of contemporary fiction have shown nature to have its own agency, driven by 
motivations that are separate from that of the humans that, in much mainstream fiction, generally 
act as its main characters. What I am calling “speculative ecofiction” draws on traditions of 
indigenous knowledge as well as ecocriticism in Anglo-European theory. But it also draws from, 
and seems of a piece with, some current redefinitions of ontological relationality occurring in 
posthumanist and affect theories today.  
 
 Relational Agency: Reciprocity and Stewardship 
Ethical reciprocity of course depends on, and is sometimes covertly embedded within, 
discussions of ontological relationality, and it has a deep and broad history in both indigenous 
philosophies and European traditions of philosophical ethics.10 Reciprocity becomes another 
                                            
10 For more about European traditions of ethical reciprocity see; Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: 
Conversations with Philippe Nemo. Translated by Richard Cohen, Duquesne Press, 1995; Immanuel 




foundation for relational agency because it demands ethical and social action in the world once 
one assumes a relational ontology.  
For example, Shawn Wilson (Opaskwayak Cree) and Lee Maracle (Sto:lo) suggest that 
relationships are the foundations of reality, and that storytelling is one way that we can 
emphasize the significance of our relationships with the nonhuman. Maracle’s Memory Serves 
and Other Essays discusses human and nonhuman being and harmonious coexistence. In 
“Oratory on Oratory” Maracle writes that the business of oratory, of storytelling, is to offer a 
way to “look deeply at the world around us” (241). By doing this, she argues, we can form 
relationships with nonhuman others by “understanding ourselves in relation to its story so that 
we can peacefully coexist” (214). Maracle sees storytelling as way to improve the state of our 
relationships with the nonhuman. She too argues for a type of empathy, one based on seeking 
understanding about how other species live on this planet and the types of relationships they 
form with us. The example that she provides also demonstrates that, regardless of intent, humans 
still code nonhumans with “it.” The power imbalance between human and nonhuman is ever 
present. When storytelling is used to examine these relationships, a person must begin with a 
sense of accountability for the unequal distribution of power. Wilson’s Research is Ceremony 
highlights relationality as central to indigenous ontology and an epistemology through a concept 
of “relational accountability” (77). In his estimation, people must be held accountable for their 
interactions with each other and the environment.  
Because of our cognition, humans can construct, identify, and perform relationships with 
the nonhuman. These relationships develop from our dependence on both our human and 
                                            





nonhuman communities to sustain our lives. Andrea Riley-Mukavetz (Chippewas of the Thames) 
and Daisy Levy illustrate this idea when they discuss relationality as a methodology that 
encourages “accountability and reciprocity” (Powell et al. 17). As Levy says, “You can’t look at 
one piece without seeing all the others, can't manipulate a part without having to negotiate every 
other aspect of that body too” (20). Such connections she calls “constellations,” emphasizing 
(somewhat like Barad but in an ethical rather than an ontological context) the interrelated 
connectivity of the universe (5). Lived constellations are networks of connection, and they 
include human communities of all types, as well as nonhuman ties that people have to land, 
animals, and environment. Humans are responsible for the creation and perception of these 
patterns that map out how humans and nonhumans are connected. Constellations function 
ontologically much like Latour’s notion of assemblage, establishing the important ways that 
humans relate to things in the world without conscious effort. However, the idea of constellations 
goes farther, into the territory of ethics: when the effort of relating to the world becomes 
conscious for humans, it introduces the possibilities for empathy and ethical connection as well. 
(Although empathy doesn’t have to be conscious, ethical behavior to the nonhuman must be.)  
Today in literary criticism, the concept of reciprocity, like that of relationality, has 
merged with discussions of Latourian assemblage, posthumanism, and new materialisms in ways 
that are borrowed by and illustrated in speculative ecofiction. For example, Mel Y. Chen’s work 
illustrates how assumptions about relational ontology generate ethics of relationality. Chen 
decodes the signifiers that we use to describe our relationships with others and claims that this 
procedure is essential to our understanding of how these connections impact the world around us. 




Materiality, and Racial Mattering builds upon Jane Bennett’s ideas of “vital thingness” to 
critique the linguistic structure produced by and indicative of our hierarchical understanding of 
the world. “Animacy” is defined as “the quality of liveness, sentience, or humanness of a noun or 
noun phrase that often has grammatical and syntactical consequences” (Chen 24). This nebulous 
“quality of liveness” that Chen lists alongside “humanness” generates an ethics that blurs the 
boundaries between how language is used to mark human and nonhuman subjects.  
The animacy framework, Chen claims, will always privilege the human. Chen’s project is 
to mark how difference is couched in the human experience of relationality with animals and 
objects; for example, they discuss the regulation of animal sexuality and reproduction, pointing 
to the spaying and neutering of animal companions in the human family model (22). Chen sees 
biopolitics working against nonhuman agency, even in relationships where animals are made a 
part of a human family, and Chen questions the ethical implications of various forms of 
reproductive and biopolitical control exercised upon domesticated animals (24). This biopolitical 
control of animal life can be used in support of eugenics, is ethically mired in exploitation and, 
often, racism, classicism, and sexism. For Chen, biopolitics becomes a way to “ethically” 
regulate and diminish the agency of humans and nonhumans alike, and it is countered by new 
forms of relationality that draw from posthumanist and queer understandings of companionship.  
Speculative ecofiction seems to insist on an ethical relationality and calls for an 
understanding of how relationships between humans and nonhumans are structured. Self-aware 
human relationality allows relationships to others and things in the world to flourish in a way that 
acknowledges the privileged position of humanity, but still strives to create non-exploitive 




Donna Haraway and Cary Wolfe, relationality becomes a means of understanding the nonhuman 
other. Wolfe, for instance, has questioned the ontological distinction between human and animal, 
calling for an expansion of the definition of “human” to include animals.11 In Before the Law, he 
asserts that the difference between the animals that humans “kill” and the animals that humans 
“murder” is whether the animal victims (human or nonhuman) are considered to be part of a 
human community. The distinctions between “wild animal” and “pet” likewise are based on what 
the relationship is between humans and animals. In When Species Meet, Haraway’s discussion of 
companion species takes off from this idea. She writes, “Companion species also point to the 
sorts of being made possible at interfaces among different human communities of practice for 
whom . . . ‘love of dogs’ is a practical and ethical imperative in an always specific, historical 
context” (Haraway 134). The “sorts of being” suggested here are ones that consider companion 
species as a part of the human family unit. The agency of companion species is assumed; their 
welfare becomes their right, rather than a privilege granted by their keepers. 
In these newer contexts of animal studies, theories such as Wolfe’s and Haraway’s 
illustrate how separate spheres between animals and humans might be acknowledged without 
becoming oppressive or unethical. Similarly, current theories of “entanglement” offer new 
ontologies that highlight the complexities of being in ethical relation with the nonhuman. Lori 
Gruen’s notion of “entangled empathy,” for example, describes the complexities inherent in 
                                            
11 Wolfe does not want a completely flattened ontology, wherein all life is an “undifferentiated 
singularity” (104). He believes what is useful about biopolitical thought is that it “articulate[s] the 
disjunctive and uneven quality of our own political moment” (104). When animals are considered part of, 
or capable of being part of, a human community, then they are agential individuals rather than a part of a 
collective species. Carey Wolfe, Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame. U 





promoting relational agency as an ethical model of human/animal relationality. Gruen 
summarizes current conversations about animal rights, highlighting what she considers the 
problems with humanist and feminist responses to ethical human/animal relationships (203). 
Gruen’s alternative to these perspectives is what she calls “entangled empathy,” a type of 
posthumanism that can build meaningful relationships with others without trivializing difference 
(204). She elaborates on this concept by talking about how our relationships with all life forms 
have various levels of tangibility, ultimately suggesting that “a recognition of these relations has 
important epistemic relations . . . [but] not all relations are ethically equivalent” (Gruen 218). 
They are not ethically equivalent because it is not possible to connect directly with some forms 
of life. Gruen believes that direct connection, created through empathy with others, is necessary 
to form “direct ethical relation” (220). Indirect ethical relations cannot achieve the same level of 
equivalency. Entangled empathy involves both affect (pervasiveness of emotion) and cognition 
(recognition of unique perspective). Gruen makes clear that entangled empathy is not just placing 
oneself in another’s shoes. It also gaining as much information about the other as one can (221). 
Through this dual process one can arrive at an ethic that allows a considered way of forming 
relationships with the nonhuman.  
Although I find Gruen’s criticisms useful, I am building from arguments such as hers, 
Wolfe’s, and Haraway’s to argue for a neo-humanist ethic in speculative ecofiction that 
acknowledges the position of power that humans occupy in relationships with animals and 
inanimate objects. These critical conversations all arrive at relationality as a series of 
connections, always a part of a larger series of material relations, and they suggest a burden of 




believe that such an ethic surfaces and is troubled in speculative ecofiction, though it is most 
oftentimes not explicitly named; these novels allude to neo-humanist networks through creation 
of situations demanding “ethical relation” to nonhumans who are difficult to empathize with, by 
mixing human/animal natures, and by complicating our definitions of “the human.” Speculative 
ecofiction decenters the human and emphasizes nonhuman agency. Offering possibilities for 
entangled empathy, this body of fiction imagines a neo-humanist ethic based on human 
stewardship.  
But what do I mean by “stewardship” when I claim that speculative ecofiction offers a 
space for demonstrating the possibilities of relational agency in which humans focus on 
stewardship rather than control? I mean that while fictions about worlds free of human power 
dynamics do exist, speculative ecofiction tends to focus on models of stewardship wherein the 
coexistence of humans and nonhumans is dependent upon relational agency. Speculative 
ecofiction uses human stewardship to promote a neohumanist ethic that acknowledges the 
agency of the nonhuman while admitting the responsibility that humans have to the other 
inhabitants of the world. The root of stewardship, in my conceptualizing of the term, is a sense of 
responsibility for the actions of the human race and their enduring effects on the planet. Human 
stewardship is the ability to use knowledge of science and technology, such as genetic 
engineering, in order to facilitate the flourishing of all other species on the planet. 
“Stewardship” is a loaded term, recently fallen out of favor in critical environmental 
discourse because of its connection to the idea of human dominion as it is used in religious 
contexts. However, I think that it is an appropriate term because of what it suggests about the 




speculative ecofiction positions humans as a part of nature, rather than apart from it. Humans 
have an unequal balance of power in any interspecies relationship. Therefore, a flourishing 
relationality between species requires an ethical foundation for the treatment of nonhumans. 
Stewardship is a rightly criticized term, but it is foundational for ethical relationality because of 
its value in critical environmental conversations about the conservation, protection, and 
rehabilitation of nature. Therefore, I will attempt to unpack its historical, cultural, and social 
uses, and arrive at an understanding of its significance in speculative ecofiction. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first recorded use of the word 
“stewardship” was in 1465 used to denote the role of steward that a man had to a specific town 
(OED). Biblically, the term didn’t appear until the 1526 William Tyndale translation of the Bible 
in the Gospel of Luke (16: 2); “Geve a comptes off thy steward shippe” (OED). In this use, the 
steward has to give an account of his management to a rich man. The steward, given authority to 
manage wealth, but not to be the owner of that wealth, lays the foundation for the responsible 
nature of the steward in later iterations. It wasn’t until the 1930s that the ecclesiastical 
understanding of stewardship really began to gain traction (OED). Stewardship promotes the 
idea of moral responsibility, oftentimes designated by belief in or fear of the divine, for ethical 
relationality. I am interested in this divine mandate of stewardship insofar as to it attempts to 
instill a sense of responsibility in humans by the suggestion of inescapable consequences. 
Because God owns the world, humans are in his image to act as stewards, to care for all of 
creation in the place of God. This idea of Christian stewardship is often what people associate 
with the term stewardship today. According to Christian scholar Richard Bauckham in Living 




Book of Genesis wherein humans are granted “dominion” over land and creatures (3). Bauckham 
also says, “Stewardship here has acquired a late-twentieth-century content, along with somewhat 
chastened and humbled aims by comparison with the technological confidence it expressed in the 
seventeenth century” (61). In these Christian faith-based understandings of stewardship it is 
divine mandate that sets humans both apart and above animals and the environment, so their care 
is both a right and a privilege.  
However, there are other faith-based definitions of stewardship that emerge from the 
intersections of faith and environmental discourses. In a collection of essays titled That All May 
Flourish edited by Laura Hartman, religious scholars respond to specific religious ideas and 
environmental damages then dialogue with each other about their different perspectives. This 
collection shows the intricate nature of faith-based environmental ethics, and it also sheds light 
on non- ecclesiastical understandings of stewardship. One of the important take-aways from this 
collection is that “the Western hierarchies of value associated with other-than-human natures, 
while universalizing, are understood in fact to be highly particular…they restrict the attribution 
of agency, intentionality, and communication to human actors” (Hannis and Sullivan 281). These 
restrictions limit what stewardship can be, but through the consideration of other faiths, a more 
inclusive definition of stewardship, fitting for the complexities of relational agency, can be 
established. Two other scholars in this collection, Sarah Robinson-Bertoni and David Cooper 
suggest that Daoism and Islam have something new to add to current understandings of 
stewardship, saying:  
The older thought requires us to view human beings as creatures that belong to a natural 




deviate, and with destructive effect. But it is to view them, as well, as beings with a 
special responsibly—to restore and conserve what they have destroyed, to tend or nourish 
other living beings, and to ethically and responsibly engage with the natural world (120-
121).  
This is an understanding of stewardship that suggests that humans have a special place as a part 
of nature, that according to divine mandate they have a responsibility to “the natural world.” 
While I do not agree with the divine mandate of any of the discussed faith-based understandings 
of stewardship, this example does a good job of discussing the “special responsibility” that 
humans have. This responsibility arises as a result not of divinity but of power. It is human 
responsibly, as a result of the tremendous power that we wield, to act as stewards in the way that 
Robinson-Bertoni and Cooper describe.  
Emerging from the Christian ideologies of dominion over nature, “stewardship” is further 
complicated by its historical use in United States law in regard to Native Americans. According 
to the Department of the Interior’s Indian Affairs page, “The federal Indian trust responsibility is 
a legal obligation under which the United States ‘has charged itself with moral obligations of the 
highest responsibility and trust” toward Indian tribes (Seminole Nation v. United States, 1942)’” 
(DoI). This trust has been broken multiple times by the United States government over the course 
of its inception in 1831. One way in which this was broken was in 1886, when the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) and the United States Government designated North American Native 
peoples as “wards of the state” and so government “stewardship” of other peoples was legalized 
(Miller).  This case was brought before the Supreme Court about a manslaughter charge. Judge 




right and authority, instead of controlling them by treaties, to govern them by acts of Congress: 
they being within the geographical limit of the United States” (375).  This ruling is symptomatic 
of how the United States views Native American Nations. As recently as 2014, Republican 
Congressman Paul Gosar from Arizona was recorded saying that American Indian Nations are 
“wards of the federal government” (Toensing). This use of stewardship was for the sake of 
exploitation of both people and land. Humans cannot and should not act as stewards to other 
humans. This is, again, not due to exceptionalism, but rather an issue of power, and delineating 
what that balance of power looks like among humans. Humans cannot act as stewards for other 
humans because they are responsible agential beings, fully cognizant of their connections to 
others. To deny another human their agency perverts any sort of ethical relationality that 
environmental stewardship attempts to establish.  
On the other hand, the laws governing the management of forests in the United States, be 
those private or public, administered by the National Park Service, or by private landholders, the 
definition of environmental stewardship has remained constant since 1990 when the Forest 
Stewardship Program was implemented. This code, “Title 16 Conservation—Cooperative 
Forestry Assistance,” is aimed at providing incentives and guidelines for the management and 
maintenance of US forests. This code discusses forestry stewardship as landowners getting 
assistance to “actively manage their forest and related resources” (§ 2103a). This language 
promotes stewardship as management and conservation of private lands.  In 2005, the EPA 
Innovation Action Council released a tract called “Everyday Choices: Opportunities for 
Environmental Stewardship” where they defined stewardship as “all parts of society actively take 




definition, the burden of responsibility is placed on “all parts” of a society rather than targeted at 
specific communities such as landowners, shareholders, or private institutions. Environmental 
stewardship is still defined in terms of sustainably, but there is also the added element of 
“environmental quality.” This nebulous phrasing suggests that there should be a quantifiable way 
of evaluating if human stewardship is paying off, a direct result of the care shown by all parts of 
a society. These legal definitions of stewardship are all selfish in regard to what that payoff will 
be. If we take care of the environment, if we acknowledge are responsibility to it, then we will 
ensure “our air is safe to breathe, our water more pure, and our land better protected” (EPA iii). 
Presently, environmental stewardship is used by government agencies like the National 
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) to mean the implementation of sustainable 
practices through the use of “environmental management systems” (EMS) that monitor the use 
of environmental resources by humans (NIEHS). The EMS also regulate the use of resources, 
and when “environmental quality improvements are feasible,” seeks to exceed any other 
regulations and requirements in place (NIEHS). This environmental stewardship attempts to 
connect the issue of sustainability to human health and happiness. In doing so, they demonstrate 
the connections between man and environment, providing an answer to the question “Why 
should we care?”. One way they do this is through the NIEHS newsletter, The Environmental 
Factor, which, among the standard sections discussing awards and community impact, also has a 
section titled “Papers of the Month” where editors provide brief abstracts of published academic 
essays that might be interesting to their readership. For example, in June 2018, one of the 
featured papers concluded that fracking was linked to immune system damage during early 




degradation, they are able to push their version of environmental stewardship, which is 
essentially a sustainable design model of environmental resources.   
However, not all American scientists see stewardship as sustainability. In fact, some see 
it as another way to promote human exceptionalism in a way that denies the interconnections 
between man and nature. In The Edge of Evolution, biologist Ronald Edwards bases his close 
reading of Doctor Moreau on an understanding of stewardship as a way of treating the 
nonhuman that relies on the same framework as human exceptionalism. He says, “And even 
better, now the good-of-animals stewards and the good-of-humanity exploiters can butt heads all 
day long…The whole construct is intellectually empty, logically supporting nothing but available 
to justify anything” (Edwards 9). Edwards’ vehement denial of stewardship as nothing other than 
a self-aggrandizing way for humans to promote themselves outside of nature or animal-being is 
common in many of the posthuman, indigenous, and postcolonial discourses I discuss in this 
chapter. However, I believe that “stewardship” is so entrenched in contemporary critical 
conversations that it can still be useful in discussing the power dynamics between humans and all 
other beings. The authors of speculative ecofiction rework this domination model of stewardship 
in ways that ethically reconfigure our understanding of stewardship as care with, and 
responsibility to, the nonhuman. 
 
Positioning Humans with Animals 
In the first chapter, I argue that the foundations of speculative ecofiction in the United 
States were concerned with an increasing reliance on technology, from the industrial revolution 




through its own pride and reliance on science. I use H.G. Wells’s The Time Machine to frame my 
discussion of how speculative ecofiction emerged from these anxieties. I then move to an 
examination of J.G. Ballard’s The Drought as a work of speculative ecofiction that uses climate 
change as a pathway to new configurations of interspecies relationships that do not model ethical 
relationality. I end this chapter by examining Ursula Le Guin’s Always Coming Home and Joan 
Slonczewski’s A Door into Ocean. These novels show the late eighties and early nineties as the 
decades when speculative ecofiction is firmly established in the United States. They demonstrate 
the ontological and ethical parameters of being in relation. They suggest that self-awareness of 
the privileged position of humanity is essential to establishing and maintaining non-exploitive 
relationships with the nonhuman. 
The second chapter examines colonial legacies in the present and future through the 
novels of two contemporary indigenous authors, Linda Hogan and Alexis Wright. Hogan’s 
novel, Power, presents the perspective of a teenaged girl who witnesses the death of an 
endangered panther. Wright’s The Swan Book also relies on the perspective of a teenaged girl 
who bears witness to death of the natural world she has barely experienced. These authors 
explore interspecies relationships between women and animals, implicating colonialist systems 
as responsible for their shared traumas. They write against these systems by situating animals as 
relatives and creating female protagonists that seek justice. When these protagonists are failed by 
their legal systems, they rely on an ethics of care to ensure the flourishing of their communities.    
In the third chapter, things and cyborgs take center stage as I examine how relational 
agency complicates definitions of “human” and “animal.” Karen Tei Yamashita’s Through the 




Windup Girl question the foundations of human subjecthood. I argue that in these novels, the 
most foundational ethical imperative of personhood is the ability to care for others. Mostly 
illustrated as stewardship, this care is built on self-awareness and the ability to choose how one 
wants to exist in relation to others. 
In the fourth chapter, I argue that Afrofuturist and Africanfuturist authors N.K. Jemisin 
and Nnedi Okorafor create worlds that celebrate human cultures and self-consciously constructed 
identities without limiting definitions of personhood. These authors model ethical relationality 
that is based primarily on care and the acknowledgement of difference. Okorafor’s Binti series 
starts on Earth, but quickly moves beyond the planet to show the larger intergalactic ecosystem 
and humans’ roles within it. Jemisin’s The Fifth Season shows the destruction of the delicate 
relationship humans have shared with Earth. This novel provides another example of 
stewardship-as-dominion of the earth that fails because of exploitation. These authors show the 
complexities of establishing relationships outside the human species when compassion isn’t at 












CHAPTER 1: AGENCY AND ETHICS IN SPECULATIVE ECOFICTION 
Authors such as Ursula Le Guin, Joan Slonczewski, and J.G. Ballard model possible 
futures wherein humans and animals coexist in configurations that promote nonhuman justice. 
Speculative ecofiction works to define responsibility as accountability by the human to the 
nonhuman, and it simultaneously seems to acknowledge the unequal positioning of the human 
subject with respect to the other. In this subgenre of speculative fiction, responsibility requires 
humans to seek understanding of the nonhuman and advocate for a more equitable relationality 
when possible. Stewardship, these novels imply, is one way to consider the responsibility 
humans have to nonhumans in dominant structures wherein nonhuman agency is diminished. 
Since its inception, speculative ecofiction has combined fantasy and science fiction to 
draw attention to contemporary environmental concerns.  In this way, speculative ecofiction can 
promote an ecocritical ethic that calls for a reconsideration of what human/nonhuman 
relationality looks like. It promotes a relational agency that decenters human expectations by 
acknowledging how nonhuman agency shapes human/nonhuman relationships. Ecocritics 
examine the ethical implications of storyworlds through analysis of the ethics that are 
demonstrated in-world by the characters, and the possible implications of these choices by 
authors. This cultural moment continues to exemplify the necessity for an ethical relationality 
that considers the impact of nonhuman agency.  
Speculative fiction is built on the idea of speculation, the ability of a work of literature to 
consider the possibilities outside or beyond known reality. According to the Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia, the term “speculative fiction” is said to originate from Robert Heinlein’s use in 




fiction. Since then the umbrella of the term has expanded, covering most literature genres that 
contain elements of the fantastic. The use of the phrase was popularized in the 1960s to the mid-
1970s because of its connections to the New Wave movement. This movement included, among 
others, J. G. Ballard and Michael Moorcock who began chafing at the conventions of the genre 
(Oziewicz). Speculative fiction fell out of use after the New Wave movement ended but came 
back into fashion in the early 2000s as a catch-all term for works that included science fiction 
elements but did not fit snugly in the genre classification (Oziewicz). Literature that falls into 
this category includes writing that is set in the future, on other worlds, or is set on Earth but 
contradicts known facts or natural laws. Essentially, speculative fiction contains stories that take 
place in worlds that do not exist or that are presently unknown.  
Speculative fiction uses the present moment’s social and political concerns and imagines 
how those concerns might shape the future. Some speculative fiction looks at the past and 
reworks the tired terrains of fact and history to build an alternate reality, existing outside of time 
as we know it. These speculations are all centered on imagining away from present reality; be 
that in the form of exploring alternate histories or of creating new lands on the same world with a 
different structure.  In his aptly named “Improve Your Thought Experiments Overnight with 
Speculative Fiction!” Ross Cameron suggests that one of the powers that speculative fiction has 
is the ability to persuade people to buy into moral arguments (32). The way that speculative 
fiction is able to manage this is by “making a moral lesson more salient through creating an 
extreme scenario that isolates and exaggerates the relevant features” (Cameron 33). This 
scenario-building is the primary way that speculative fiction is able to impart moral lessons 




In its present form, speculative fiction goes beyond the standard conventions of science 
fiction. Science fiction concerns itself with the potential dangers of science, usually examining 
the consequences of who promotes scientific inquiry and to what end (Oziewicz). Speculative 
fiction goes beyond inquiry to examine the possibilities of environmental exploitation, climate 
change, and planetary shifts in power. This genre has formal elements that can indicate 
speculative fiction but do not have to be present in order for a story to be considered as such. 
According to the Oxford Research Encyclopedia, these formal elements can include; the 
introduction of alien (non-Earth-based) intelligent life, the use of minor details to create 
estrangement for the reader while using major human characteristics to create familiarity even in 
a strange setting, prolepsis, analepsis, and crisis as the foundation for conflict (Oziewicz). Most 
important is the setting—the use of an alien world or land unknowable by the contemporary 
readers to explore issues plaguing the culture in which the speculative fiction is bring produced.  
By creating unfamiliar spaces and worlds wherein familiar issues could be explored, 
science fiction is able to speculate on the consequences of human innovation and technological 
advancement. In 2014 Bryan Moore’s “Evidences of Decadent Humanity” claimed that early 
science fiction, written between the Enlightenment and World War II, embraced many ecological 
themes, even if they never addressed ecological spaces directly (46). In the novels he examines, 
humankind is brought either to the brink of apocalypse or beyond it through their own hubris, or 
humans are just another species among many, in no way special beyond the moment of our 
dominance as a species. Moore sees ecological values in early science fiction, but nothing 
beyond advocating for a reexamination of human attitudes toward the nonhuman. Science fiction 




anthropocentric worldview. Wells demonstrates what Moore calls a “Darwin-based rejection of 
anthropocentrism” that displaces the human without affirming the animal (Moore 56). Moore 
examines early science fiction novels and films as anti-anthropocentric precursors to ecological 
science fiction of mid-to late-twentieth century authors such as Kim Stanley Robinson, Ursula Le 
Guin, and Octavia Butler. 
 These early speculative novels decentered humans as a warning against fully embracing 
secular humanist values. Through his tracing of the roots of the ecological in science fiction, 
Moore highlights another trend woven through anti-anthropocentric science fiction narratives, 
that is, “a warning against too much scientific hubris” and “the out-and-out ravaging of the earth 
for private gain” (51, 52).  While these values promote an examination of what it means to be 
human, they do not affirm nonhuman agency. Instead, these early novels focus on the 
diminishing of humanity at an uneasy alliance with the nonhuman as a consequence of hubris. 
The ecological values found in these early texts pave the way for the creation of speculative 
ecofiction that considers nature and the environment directly. One novel that Moore discusses is 
HG Wells’ The Time Machine which warns specifically against fighting a war against nature. It 
does this by suggesting that any sort of war on nature will have disastrous or world-ending 
consequences for humanity. 
It is also important to note the role that disability plays in illuminating the ways ethical 
relationality is mobilized, especially in novels like The Time Machine and The Drought that use 
disability as plot devices that tie disabled human bodies to the loss of reason and logic, and the 
degradation of the environment itself. An important intersection for the topic of relational agency 




have been an increasing number of disabilities scholars and ecocritics who are examining the 
tensions and pathways for collaboration between these fields. In 2017, Sarah Jaquette Ray and 
Jay Sibara edited a collection titled Disabilities Studies and the Environmental Humanities: 
Toward an Eco-Crip Theory. This collection gathered foundational texts of this emerging field, 
including Matthew Cella’s “The Ecosomatic Paradigm in Literature” and Ray’s “Risking Bodies 
in the Wild: The ‘Corporeal Unconscious’ of American Adventure Culture.” These texts show 
the commonalities between the two fields (such as systems of oppression and a desire to live in 
ethical relation) and also point to the challenges of bringing them together. Ray suggests that 
there are two challenges. The first is shattering the connection between able-bodies and thriving 
environments and the second is eliminating the bias against technology that environmentalists 
feel keeps them from a “genuine connection” with nature (60). As an example, she discusses 
popular reality shows that require participants to give up technology to fully risk “wilderness.” 
She suggests that narratives of risk promote an aggrandizing perspective of the white able-bodied 
male confronting the environment (such as Bear Grylls in Man vs. Wild). She says, “As long as 
risk culture signifies environmental virtue, its attachment to the abled body will continue to 
restrict the [environmental] movement’s potential for influence” (62).  
In the fiction that I discuss, the characters that adhere to the false equivalency of between 
abled bodies and environmental health see their beliefs destroyed when political and 
governmental systems collapse. Likewise, Sunaura Taylor’s book Beasts of Burden: Animal and 
Disability Liberation discusses the systems of oppression that control both disabled humans and 
animals. Taylor says, “Unless disability and animal justice are incorporated into our other 




use by systems of domination and oppression" (20). Setting about to prove this point, Taylor 
confronts the way dehumanization is achieved through animalization and suggests that disabled 
subjects can insist on their humanity without “denying our very own animality" (110). Further, 
she explains that animals and disabled humans are devalued through ableism. In an interview 
about her book, Taylor said that humans and animals “lacking in various capacities—from 
rationality, to language, to walking upright, to being physically independent… leads to a 
justification of exploitation” (Gressel). This exploitation is driven by capitalist ideologies and 
promoted by individualist rhetoric that ignores interdependency between all beings (Taylor 145).  
Although she is interested in liberation, Taylor’s focus on interdependency runs parallel 
to my concerns about agency and relationality. In this chapter, disability shapes how human 
characters are perceived by other humans and how well characters are able to adapt to dramatic 
shifts in their environments. Wells’s The Time Machine ties disability to the devolution of man—
the Time Traveler suggests that the Morlocks are both blind and allergic to sunlight and the Eloi 
have the mental maturity of children—and the superiority of the nineteenth century white male. 
In Ballard’s The Drought disability is tied to the loss of environment, community, and 
rationality. As a result of these losses, civilization collapses and a new order is imposed by the 
disabled characters of the novel.  
The Time Machine examines stewardship and relationships with the nonhuman by 
focusing on the diminished status of humanity after humans completely dominated the earth. In 
the introduction to the 2002 reprint of Wells’s novel, Ursula Le Guin says, “Science fiction is 
almost the only kind of story that ever really admits of a world not dominated by human beings” 




character, the Time Traveler, believes the nineteenth century to be the high of human 
technological and spiritual innovation. Although the world of the future has evidence of extreme 
human manipulation, nature has reasserted itself and provided chaos in what was once the 
orderly and controlled environment that the Time Traveler sees around him. There are no longer 
weeds, and several species of four-legged animals have gone extinct (Wells 26). The changes 
that happened to the different branches of the human race occurred because once they reached 
the pinnacle of evolutionary might, they became lazy and began lacking ambition. This led to a 
devolution and separating of the human species into two, the Eloi and the Morlocks. 
 By projecting forward in time, this novel warns its readers against allowing themselves 
to become too proud of their accomplishments or else they might find themselves in the future 
that the Time Traveler visits. In this future, the Time Traveler’s humanity is defined through 
affection and pleasure in violence. He begins to understand future humans in terms of Darwinian 
evolution. He believes the Morlocks to be even less than the Eloi because of their cannibalism 
and their appearance. He describes them as “human spiders” and “human rats” with 
“nauseatingly inhuman…pale, chinless faces, and great lidless, pinkish-grey eyes!" (38, 45). 
Their appearance manifests their inhumanity, groping about in the darkness, controlling the 
machines, and using the remaining aristocracy as a food source (46). The Time Traveler is 
unable to see himself as a part of them, he is, however able to identify with the Eloi. Although 
there are times when he does refer to them as “things,” he does befriend a woman named Weena 
whom he rescues from drowning. He describes her as “exactly like a child" (35). By calling her a 
child, he grants her more agency than the Morlocks. Even when he compares the Eloi to cattle, 




seemed to me, I fancy, more human than she was, perhaps because her affection was so human" 
(51). The ideology behind his perspective is one that insists on an intrinsic humanness that the 
Morlocks lack. While the Eloi are like animals they are not animals, whereas the Time Travel 
distances his own humanity from the Morlocks as much as possible.  
The Time Machine establishes some of the common tropes of speculative fiction that 
make it particularly generative for the discussion of ecological concerns. Among these are the 
impact that humans have on the very structure and shape of nature and the cautionary 
examination of the posthuman world. In this instance, the posthuman is revealed to be a nebulous 
term because the descendants of humanity are still very much present, but not in a way that the 
Time Traveler is able to accept as human. Although the narrator does not speculate on the natural 
manipulation that must have happened before the decline of humanity, he does suggest that 
humans finally “won” their war on nature by eliminating whole species for their own designs 
(27). This sort of manipulation crosses the line from stewardship to control. This cycle of control 
continues through the relationship between the Morlocks and Eloi. Although this novel focuses 
on humans, it sets the stage for speculative ecofiction that looks to the global and environmental 
consequences that human power has for human/animal relations. The consequences of human 
domination are seen in this novel by allowing the reader to skip over the moment of crisis that 
created this world and directly into the fallout.  
In speculative ecofiction, crises emerge from human culture and from natural phenomena 
that drastically alter or obliterate the known environment. The founding novel of Western 
ecocriticism, Carson’s Silent Spring, relies on apocalyptic tropes to structure her narrative. 




authority, danger already present and imminent, and no way to reverse the crisis that provides the 
foundation of the text (95).12 He believes that apocalyptic rhetoric is a necessary part of 
environmental discourse, but he also thinks that this rhetoric polarizes public opinion and might 
“produce the crisis it describes” (Garrard 105). This fear was a part of the cultural consciousness 
of the Cold War era that lead to a proliferation of apocalyptic narratives that used human-based 
crises as the foundations for their worlds.  
During the Cold War, science fiction continued to explore the far future, offering 
possibilities for how humans might shape the apocalypse. One of the reasons the environment 
became such a concern in this era is because a culture of fear was created around the use of 
nuclear weapons. The devastation caused by nuclear bombs at the end of WWII generated 
concern for what humankind was capable of but also a sense of a reckoning. What would the 
consequences be for the destruction of so much life? Benjamin Kohlmann argues that the Cold 
War era led writers to explore nonhuman life in the absence of humanity (656). This was brought 
about through a cultural anxiety about nuclear weapons and increased by ecological awareness. 
The texts that Kohlmann examines, including Ray Bradbury’s short story “There Will Come Soft 
Rains,” show animals after the annihilation of humans still “governed by an implicit hierarchy of 
different kinds of consciousness” (663). These works still maintain unequal relationality even 
when humans are no longer a part of the projected future. The nuclear apocalypse becomes a 
way for authors to imagine how a world without human subjects. Instead, animals are afforded 
subjectivity, as Kohlmann demonstrates in his reading of the domesticated family dog in 
                                            
12 See Greg Garrard’s discussion of the tropes for an examination of how they are used in a variety of 
ways to entertain and warn audiences against taking advantage of the earth in his “Apocalypse.” 




Bradbury’s short story. The dog “provides the main object for readerly empathy” (663). The dog 
garners the most empathy because he was once part of the human family, and his behaviors 
showcase the absence of humanity in a way that the other animals in this short story do not. 
Kohlmann believes by making the dog the empathetic connection to the human, Bradbury 
highlights the absence of humanity, implying that without humans, animal companions would be 
unable to thrive. This story suggests that humans are a necessary part of the ecosystems that they 
create, and that the empathetic connection between the dog and its long-dead owner leads to the 
dog’s misery. In effect, Kohlmann’s reading reaffirms the relational agency of the nonhuman, 
and demonstrates the posthuman future described in the story as a possible consequence of 
nuclear weapons.  
 Apocalyptic warnings appeared in a variety of Cold War speculative fictions, and they all 
called for an increased awareness of the impact of nuclear science—its consequences on 
humanity and its impact on the environment. Some were explored in terms of ecological 
catastrophe that disrupted time as well as space, leaving the animal inhabitants of our world 
largely unaffected after our demise. Others suggested that a direct consequence of human 
technological advancement would end with humanity’s destruction through the intervention of 
hyper-intelligent nonhumans or through the arrival of alternate planetary lifeforms. In Western 
science fiction, the space race opened new avenues of exploration: of possibilities of life on other 
planets, and human exploration and colonization of new worlds. In previous centuries, the idea 
of human cross-planetary colonization was made popular by the Western colonization of South 




in how speculative fiction dealt with an increased interest in life beyond the planet Earth and 
beyond the human.  
 The Cold War Era encouraged the creation of dystopias, utopias, and alternate histories in 
science fiction. Alongside exploring future developments in human evolution, technology, and 
space exploration that are the hallmark characteristics of science fiction, speculative fiction in 
this era focused on how human and nonhuman relationships might be structured in the wake of 
apocalyptic (but not always nuclear) disaster. Post-apocalyptic ecofiction is one of the subgenres 
of speculative fiction and it deals with environmental catastrophe on the planet Earth and its 
impact on all life, through the eyes of a human or mostly human protagonist. Ursula Heise calls 
one of the “most troubling aspects” of post-apocalyptic science fiction to be its propensity “to do 
away with the complicated mechanisms of democracy and justice…and then symbolically 
inaugurate a new society whose freedom and peace inevitably appear like a slight of hand” 
(Heise 228). Not all novels in this subgenre do away with these complexities, but some smooth 
the way by eliminating bodies of governance and law to demonstrate different forms of power 
and subjecthood. Crisis becomes the tipping point for humans to consider the relationality as 
structured in the ethics and laws that they adhere to when governing bodies and cultural 
communities lose their significance.   
 
Troubling Relations: J.G. Ballard’s The Drought 
One of the most influential authors of speculative fiction from this era, J.G. Ballard, 
demonstrates a burgeoning ethical relationality between humans and animals in his 1964 novel 




with the morality of the whole human species and the collapse of rational and empathetic 
relationships between humans. In this novel, the crisis that leads to the drought is widely 
understood. The narrator explains, “Covering the off-shore waters of the world's oceans was thin 
but resilient mono-molecular film…generated within the sea from the vast quantities of industrial 
waste discharged into the ocean basins over the last fifty years” (Ballard 47). There were efforts 
made to change the situation, but of course, by the time people hoped to do something about it 
they were too late. Because of this film, water could not enter the atmosphere, and thus it could 
not rain. The elimination of the barrier is impossible, and so humans are trying desperately to 
deal with the fallout, quickly realizing that lack of cloud cover and lack of water mean that most 
parts of the world are uninhabitable, and that the lakes, rivers, and ponds are evaporating very 
quickly (45). This drought is the impetus for the main characters in the novel to adopt new ways 
of inhabiting the world and restructuring their relationships with other species.  
The main narrator, Doctor Charles Ransom, understands himself as a patriarch of a core 
of humans that he cares about. Ballard deliberately names his characters using literary allusions 
or architypes. In naming the doctor “Ransom,” Ballard suggests that the he is the exchange 
necessary for the debt to be settled with the environment. By the end of the novel, Ransom’s 
lonely walk into the desert signals the start of rain, proving his namesake true. In his houseboat, 
Ransom has been hoarding water so that he can live for a few more years, but the decline of 
relational feeling in his community leads him to the decision to abandon his home. He sees all of 
those around him, even those in his family, as less than him. He feels that he has to take care of 
them because they are unable to do so themselves. These paternalistic impulses fester over the 




Cast adrift from the relationships that structured his life before the drought, he relies on 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest as a guidepost to navigating the post-drought world. In fact, Ballard 
takes many of the of the characters’ names directly from Shakespeare’s play. Early in the novel, 
Ransom meets with a figure he dubs Prospero, a rich, androgynous, eccentric man named 
Lomax. This man has abundant access to water owing to an underground reservoir and a giant 
swimming pool. Ransom tells him about the state of the city outside of his mansion walls, that it 
is on fire, and that the balance of nature has been destroyed. Lomax replies, “Don’t talk to me 
about the balance of nature! If it weren’t for people like myself, we’d all be living in mud huts” 
(Ballard 62). Lomax refuses to adapt to the new world, claiming that he will remain as king over 
the ashes, regardless of what changes in the city outside of his walls. His sister, called Miranda, 
embodies, for Ransom, the madness of the new order of things. She, Lomax, and Quilter stay 
behind in the city of Hamilton, even after he tries to get her to go with him to the ocean’s edge, 
where he has heard that there are still human cities. The doctor has cast a mentally disabled man 
named Quilter as a Caliban figure. (As his name suggests, Quilter is able to patch a community 
together by the end of the novel.) There is a sylph-like boy who lives on what remains of the 
river named Philip, whom he likens to Ariel. At the end of the novel Lomax is described as “a 
demented Prospero examined the offspring of his violated daughter” (228). When Ransom kills 
him, his death solidifies the destruction of the world as it once was. The collapse of civilization 
is reflected in the breakdown of this metaphor that sustains the identities of the people that it 





The character of Philip Johnson embodies a connection between human and nature that 
the narrator implies is only viable because of a disability that leaves him unable to fully become 
part of human culture. When he is introduced Ransom says that he has known the boy for years 
and frequently describes him as a “foster child of the river and its last presiding Ariel…part waif 
and part water-elf” (Ballard 33). Philip is also described as, “a starveling of the river-ways,” a 
“Ulysses of the waterfront” and a “landlocked mariner” once the drought begins (34). One of 
their first encounters, pre-apocalypse, was Philip requesting that the Doctor help him tend to an 
injured owl. In the present of the story, Philip is asking assistance in rescuing an oil-drenched 
swan. The doctor describes himself as a sympathetic caretaker to Philip, one who provided him 
food in winter and taught him a bit of reading and writing. Because of this, Philip goes to him for 
help with the swan and is told that “there has got to be an order of priorities” with the implication 
that helping the swan is not anywhere near the top (35). Philip demonstrates on the trajectories 
that that this novel takes for considering an ethical relationality. His distance from community 
allows him to focus on the maintenance of the animals struggling to survive in the river. Because 
he shares a home with these animals, he is better able to care for them when they are injured. 
Throughout the novel Philp demonstrates that forming strong codependent relationships with 
other animal species is essential for human survival. 
This novel promotes stewardship by suggesting that the preservation and maintenance of 
the human species is dependent on empathetic links between humans and animals. As the 
moment of crisis reaches its peak, it becomes clear that Catherine is one of the main characters 
able to maintain her sense of selfhood and acknowledge her dependence on the lions that she 




the lions’ cages to help them survive. She does so, and later in the novel the sight of one of these 
lions encourages the characters, having been away for a decade, to go back to their city. On the 
return journey, Ransom notices changes in Catherine that he not recognized before. He describes 
her as being revived by “the empty savannahs and the quickening pulse of the desert cats” (186). 
Her connection with the wild cats only grows stronger as they continue. After ten days of their 
journey back to the city have passed, she only responds to “the cries of animals at night” (198). 
After Ransom abandons her and Philip, she disappears from the story only to reappear at the end 
of the novel with Philip and the lions, driving the lions ahead of her with a whip (232). Unlike 
Ransom, Catherine adapts to the world post drought without losing her identity. Her connection 
to the lions that have managed to survive the drought for the past ten years allows her to 
remember both who she was and who she is now that the lions are the dominant predators. She 
becomes part of their pack, asserting her dominance with the same methods that she used when 
she cared for them in the zoo. By the end of the novel it appears to Ransom that she, Philip, and 
the lions have formed a pack so that they can find water together. 
Ballard uses the characters of Philip and Quilter to simultaneously reinforce and resist 
ethical relationality.  In The Ecological Other, Sarah Jaquette Ray warns against making 
(human) bodies battlegrounds for environmentalism because social hierarchies are reinforced 
when literature decides what bodies are good or bad for nature. Both Philip and Quilter suffer 
from disabilities. Ransom, as a doctor, makes it clear that he believes them both to be 
developmentally disabled. According to Ray, the primary focus of environmentalism’s 
“denigration and blame is the disabled body” (6). She explains that the disabled body becomes a 




ecological othering, including “racial, sexual, class, and gendered othering” (6). Ballard resists 
this through Philip who does not lose his compassion for nonhumans or his ability to deftly adapt 
to immense changes in his environment. His disability allows him accommodate humanity’s 
decline while still maintaining his identity. It is important to note, however, that Ballard still 
engages in “othering” the main characters that are not Ransom by portraying the women as weak 
or mad and describing Philip’s “dark face, like an intelligent savage, filled with a strange child-
like hope” (Ballard 178). This is emblematic of Ransom’s paternalistic worldview which models 
a form of stewardship that ultimately results in failure. 
These ways of othering reaffirm the human social hierarchies through which Ransom 
maintains his sense of identity. The characters Quilter and Reverend Johnstone reaffirm the 
social hierarchies that award power to the white, able-bodied male. Quilter’s body is disabled, 
and through Ransom’s characterization of him, he appears grotesque and unintelligent, a 
subhuman servant of the Lomax family. The last act that we see him perform before he 
disappears from the narrative for half the novel is calling out to Philip and releasing the oil-
covered swan that Philip had rescued earlier. On their way out of the city, they hear a “demented 
voice” and then see Quilter carrying the flapping swan in his arms (Ballard 118). The swan 
“lifted vigorously, its long neck stretched like the shaft of a spear towards Philip Jordan” (118). 
It flies overhead, and Quilter stands on the opposite bank of the river watching them disappear. 
Quilter becomes the specter that haunts Ransom on his return trip back to Hamilton, appearing in 
the crushed skulls of a heard of dead cattle bones, in a bus full of mannequins, and as a solitary 
figure always ahead of him and out of reach. When he finally encounters Quilter in the flesh, the 




off his stilts, Ransom reassess him saying, “His broad dented face, with its wandering eyes set 
above the hollow cheeks, had changed little with the intervening years” (207). Quilter’s children 
with Miranda share his skull structure, leading Ransom to describe them as “the children of the 
congenitally insane” (213). His stance shifts when he realizes that Quilter is in fact the one with 
the most authority now. Quilter has made a headdress out of the black swan that Ransom thinks 
is the same one that Philip had tried to rescue earlier. He wields the power of life and death over 
anyone who enters his territory and keeps Miranda, now grotesquely fat and beautiful, well-cared 
for in the swimming pool where she stays. At the end of the novel, Ransom surrenders himself 
completely to Quilter, hoping to find a place in his family as a brother/father figure, but 
ultimately heading off into the dunes to die. 
Unlike Quilter, who manages to subvert the authority of the able-bodied white male, 
Revered Johnstone, the leader of the coastal city, reinforces traditional hierarchical values. He 
becomes a leader of his community by using his religious authority and physical strength to 
carve out a position of power for himself. On the beach, he believes that he has all the power. He 
is now “almost blind” and his face on the right side is “pink and hairless…a demented King 
Lear, grasping back at the power he had given to his two daughters” (167). The women have 
turned the settlement into a “rigid matriarchy,” the implications of which are unclear except for 
the fact that Ransom will not be able to have a place there. Johnstone’s disability prevents him 
from maintaining his power, and his lack of awareness about his loss of power implies his 
inability to survive in the remade world. His lack of bodily autonomy and his loss of vision 
causes an imbalance of power that reconfigures the shape of his community. The hierarchy had 




According to Ray, the disabled body in environmental literature reflects the state of the world 
outside of it. Thus, Johnstone’s blindness is linked to the continued conditions of the drought, 
directly in fact, because he loses his sight fighting off people who wanted to take over his 
settlement. His power diminishes as the environment diminishes, without the able-bodied male at 
the helm, both humans and environment fall into disrepair. 
However, the end of the novel suggests a type of flourishing that is possible without the 
domineering hand of the able-bodied male, in this way Ballard writes against the claim of the 
disabled human body reflecting the environment. Quilter becomes the most powerful person in 
the novel. Although he is not as directly tied to nature as Catherine, his swan headdress suggests 
that he understands that there has been a shift in how humanity needs to interact with the 
nonhuman. When Ransom recalls the time that Quilter crushed a dove in his fist, Miranda 
suggests that there was nothing malicious in it, just a demonstration of Quilter’s affection. 
Ransom was hoping to suggest that the power the he wielded could destroy them, instead he 
reinforces Quilter’s authority and ultimately decides to cede to it. Because Quilter understands 
the world differently, he can take care of his family without losing his identity. At the end of the 
novel, with Quilter firmly established as the authority, the last lines of the book say, “It was 
sometime later that he failed to notice that it had started to rain” (237). Rain finally makes an 
appearance as Ransom walks alone into the desert. With his decline, possibilities of life, rather 
than simply survival, enter the novel.  
The end of The Drought suggests a new model for stewardship, and much like Ray 
posits, the “othered perspective” is the one that ends the novel (118). In her critical work, Ray 




that suggests that those perspectives might have different conceptions of environmental problems 
and solutions (181). Through Ransom, the mainstream solution is thoroughly explored and 
ultimately shown to fail. Quilter and Philip, both othered by disability, and Philip by race as well, 
end the novel by adapting to their respective communities. Ballard provides two models of 
interspecies relationality that restructure the hierarchical positioning of humans and animals. 
Both of these models rely on stewardship as the primary method for establishing an ethical 
relationality between species. 
 
Humans as Part of Nature: Joan Slonczewski’s A Door into Ocean  
Crisis doesn’t have to be the primary motivating factor for ethical relationality, although 
it does play a role in how most novels interrogate existing structures of power. One of the ways 
that these structures are questioned is through troubling the dichotomy between nature and 
culture. On the concept of nature, Karen Barad says that it is neither “a passive surface awaiting 
the mark of culture nor the end product of cultural performances” (183). In speculative 
ecofiction, storyworld that question what it means to have personhood shatter this dichotomy. 
Biologist Joan Slonczewski has written several novels that explore the possibilities of genetic 
engineering, ecological stewardship, and the deconstruction of polarities. Her novel, A Door into 
Ocean, explores the political and biological implications of a world whose human beings 
structure both the environment and culture on the tenants of altruism.  
Slonczewski creates a utopia in which her female “Sharers” are a nonviolent, incredibly 
advanced, and non-hierarchical society that takes peaceful coexistence as its primary form of 




nonhumans—humans have full subjectivity and nonhumans do not. In her reading of the text, 
Susan Stratton says, “Humanity is determined on the basis of a species’ capacity for ethical (non-
dominant) relations” (38). This distinction between human and nonhuman provides a framework 
in which human status is determined by a species ability not to just act independently, but to 
have a concept of morality in dealing with others. “Humanity” is no longer exclusive to homo 
sapiens. In fact, the early chapters of the novel deal with a more traditionally-structured male 
human asking the Sharers, repeatedly if they are human. One of the women, Merwen the 
Impatient, replies, “I believe you are as human as we are” (Slonczewski 24). She acknowledges 
their shared humanity, even though they do not share the same biological markers, also 
suggesting that they evolved separately from homo sapiens in the distant past. On the Sharers 
home planet, Shora, there is no land above water, so their bodies have adapted to living in the 
ocean, they have no hair, no male sex, and webbed hands and feet. The nature of their planet 
alters the very structure of their humanity, and with the advent of the more traditionally human 
traders from off world, they encounter nature shaped more dominantly by man.  
Slonczewski’s novel offers a feminist framing of patriarchal power structures and 
relationships between human men and women, but it also offers a reflection on which attributes 
separate the human from the nonhuman and why those traits are significant. On Shora, women 
are tasked with the stewardship of the planet. Through careful reproductive regulation and an 
intense awareness of the other species they share the planet with, the Sharers demonstrate an 
ethical relationality that acknowledges nonhuman agency. In this universe, there is another planet 
on which the Patriarch rules, Valen. On Valen, men and women live incredibly rigid and 




those values determine how many children the women can have, as well as what social stratum 
of which people are a part. The Patriarch rules all humans, and because the Sharers have been 
considered nonhuman, they have not been held accountable to the system. This system strictly 
regulates how life is created and conducted on the planets under its control, resorting to nuclear 
annihilation when there is a perceived threat to the Patriarch’s authority. Military from Valen are 
sent to Shora to bring their world under control and gage whether the Sharers are human. 
On Shora, the Sharers are trying to decide if the off-world traders can be considered 
human as well. If they are human, and want to share life on the planet, then their voices would 
have to be heard at the Gathering after they reached adulthood. Over the course of the novel, one 
male from off-world named Spinel is adopted by the Sharers and allowed to take a self-name. 
This transition from childhood to adulthood is what convinces the rest of the Sharers that the 
Valen people are human, because he can learn compassion. Near the end of the novel, Merwen 
says, “There is a difference between a seaswallower and a human. A human sees herself in the 
mirror…I am a selfnamer; that is, I know myself not only in the mirror of the ocean, but in the 
mirror of every living pair of eyes” (Slonczewski 367). For the Sharers, this is the definition of 
humanity, not just self-recognition in a mirror, but the ability to see the self in others. Humanity 
is distinct from “lesser sisters” because of this ability to empathize with others. This humanity 
comes with a price; to be human is to be responsible for the web of life that structures Shora. The 
Sharers contemplate if this responsibility extends to the Valens who are not of the planet but 
have demonstrated that possibility of humanness through people like Spinel. 
This interconnectivity resonates with relational agency by promoting a feminist ethic of 




principals of a distant, universalizing philosophy embraced by the Valens. Relational agency is 
seen through the Sharers who acknowledge the interdependence of all life. Without them, the 
entire ecosystem collapses. In this novel, the welfare of the planet is dependent on the Sharer’s 
science and technology, such as genetic engineering, to facilitate the flourishing of all species. In 
this way, the people of Shora can thrive without exploitation of their natural resources or the 
destruction of any part of their ecosystem.  
Empathy is one of the markers of humanity in this novel. It is through empathy that 
humans can understand their responsibility to their ecosystem.  If the Valens are considered 
human adults, then they must be welcomed as sisters and made part of the "web" that connects 
all the planet. If they are not human and have no place in the ecosystem of Shora, then they must 
leave the planet as to not upset its delicate balance. Sharers meet yearly for “Gatherings” where 
they democratically discuss major issues that affect Shora. During one of these meetings, 
someone asks, “How can you say that Valens are children and not just primitive creatures? 
Lesser sharers” (Slonczewski 80). This question is asked of Merwen, who remains one of the 
strongest advocates for the humanity of Valens throughout the novel. Ultimately, Merwen 
convinces the other Sharers that they are human, just very sick and childlike. What marks them 
as human is their ability to empathize with others. With the invaders this means "sharing 
learning" in scenes where both Valens and Sharers are freely exchanging information in order to 
gain deeper understanding about their planets, respective cultures, and various technologies. 
"Lesser sharers" are understood to be a part of the web that creates their world, but they 
are not considered human because they are not self-aware. The Sharers have a responsibility to 




allow all life to flourish in a controlled fashion, and the storage of genetic data on all of the 
occupants of Shora. Usha the Unconsidered, a doctor and Merwen’s wife in the novel, reflects, 
"Shora had said that Sharers must share care for all the lesser sharers as for themselves. The 
ultimate library was kept within the raftwood: every living cell of every raft held a library within 
its genes" (Slonczewski 267). In this section, Usha is attempting to recreate the clickflies that the 
Valens had exterminated almost entirely with pesticide. The Valens did this because they 
discovered that they were used to communicate across the planet. Fearing that this was another 
way in which the Sharers could talk amongst themselves to report on any activity during the 
Valen occupation, they had them exterminated. From the few that managed to survive, Usha was 
able to create an immunity to the pesticide and speed reproduction in the clickflies genetic code 
so that they could repopulate the world. Although this was done for the sake of human survival, 
the clickflies themselves do not behave like preprogrammed robots. They have their own drive 
and agency. When the Valens realize they cannot be completely exterminated, they instead lure 
them to their occupied zones and dissect them to find out how they are used for communication. 
The Sharers never discover that this is happening, because the Valens do not use the clickflies to 
communicate. However, they do use them to spy on the communications across rafts.  
The clickflies in this novel are a good example of one of the nonhuman entities that the 
Sharers are asked to “share care” for. Whether or not the clickflies were genetically created by 
the Sharers, or a native species to the planet genetically modified over time, they are essential to 
human health on the planet. The narrator says, “If every clickfly disappeared, learnsharing would 
be frozen, memory lost, and even time could not be measured” (Slonczewski 257).  Clickflies 




can be directly translated into words. Although they have been modified to serve as 
communicators between humans, they still have their own agency. Although the Sharers do not 
claim domination of the planet, they still acknowledge that they are responsible for the welfare of 
the planet and call those that do not have responsibility “lesser.” Although clickflies do not have 
the selfhood and compassion that Sharers believe separates humans from nonhumans, they still 
have a right to life on their planet.  
The Sharers are known as the protectors of life on Shora. Because they are human, they 
are obligated to protect the rights of all life on their planet. Although populations are controlled, 
including their own, to protect the balance of the ecosystem, every species on Shora has a right 
to life. The Sharers are responsible for the welfare of the whole planet, and they take this 
stewardship seriously. Although they are manipulating the genetic make-up of certain creatures, 
they do so in order to promote the harmonious coexistence of all the creatures on Shora. This is 
one way that Slonczewski shows ethical relationality. Even though the “lesser” sharers cannot 
voice concerns about how the Sharers shaped the world, their welfare is still considered before 
any action is taken to alter the planet. The Sharers acknowledge their relational agency and the 
essential roles that all lives play in their ecosystem.  
Because all essential elements of their ecosystem are organic and living, Sharers are 
repulsed by inorganic matter. When the Sharers go to Valen to assess if they’re human, they 
believe that it is their constant exposure to dead rock that makes them sick. Merwen tells Spinel, 
“Your speech cannot express what Usha thinks of this…object, the hovercraft. Like the servitor, 
it is made of 'dead,' of 'nonlife,' of material that has never known the breath of life” (38). Because 




inorganic with death because their whole world is ocean and the only rock lies on the body of the 
ocean floor where they sink their dead. By doing this, they suggest that inorganic things are not 
capable of life. Although the Sharers are willing to acknowledge all life as a something to be 
protected, they do not believe that anything created of nonlife is capable of self-awareness, and 
thus of the protections and rights they provide to all life on Shora. Merwen discovers that the 
“protector” of Valen, an emissary of the Patriarch, is in fact created of “nonlife” material, a robot 
that speaks on behalf of the Patriarch with no will of his own. This knowledge horrifies her 
because she understands that the Valens and all other planets in the Patriarchy follow a being 
who is not human. 
Slonczewski’s novel examines what it means to be human and offers a relationality that 
suggests an ethical responsibility to all other life. The responsibility calls for an 
acknowledgement of the web of nature, and the understanding that compassion is what separates 
humans from animals, and life is what separates the human and animal from the mechanical. 
Relational agency is shown most clearly in the relationship between the Valens and Sharers but 
is also present in the structure of the Sharers’ world. The ecosystem of Shora is still 
hierarchically structured, but it is based on entangled empathy. If any part of the web of life on 
Shora is upset, it effects the rest of the world. It is up to the humans to maintain that balance 
because they have the ability. It is also their responsibility to protect the rights of all those living 
on their planet. The lesser sharers could not look after themselves, but without self-awareness 
they would be unable to understand and react to environmental devastation and catastrophe 
brought on by other humans in the ecosystem. This is true of any ecosystem; adaptability and 




of nature, their awareness and positioning within the animacy hierarchy gives them an ethical 
responsibility to react against any threat that might harm their ecosystem.   
 
Building Human and Animal Communities: Ursula Le Guin’s Always Coming Home 
Always Coming Home by Ursula Le Guin shapes a world where relational agency points 
to an ethical relationality between humans and animals. This novel is constructed as 
ethnographic examination of the Kesh tribe woven through the story of a first-person narrator 
called Stone Telling and peppered with self-reflexive commentary from a narrator named 
Pandora. In this novel, the poetry, songs, stories, art, and other documents describe the structure 
of the Kesh people’s society and their relationships with natural world. In “The Serpentine 
Codex” there is an explanation of how the society is structured into nine houses, five of the earth 
and four of the sky. The beings called Earth People include “the earth itself, rocks, and dirt and 
geological formations, the moon, all springs, streams and lakes of fresh water, all human beings 
currently alive, game animals, domestic animals, individual animals, domestic and ground-
dwelling birds, and all plants” (Le Guin 45).  In contrast to these beings, those of the Houses of 
the Sky include wild animals that are not hunted for sustenance, most birds, and “any plant or 
animal considered as a species or in general human beings as a species, people tribe or nation; 
the dead, the unborn; all beings in stories or dreams; the oceans, the sun, the stars” (47).  Note 
that the Houses of the Sky include abstract concepts and incorporeals as well as whole species. 
Individuals of those groups, if they have relationships with humans, are in the Houses of Earth. 
These house distinctions are noted to show how the tribe structures their schooling, commerce, 




waste of life. This is due, in part, to their high infant mortality rate. In this storyworld, humans of 
the Kesh tribe create a community wherein human exceptionalism does not diminish nonhuman 
agency. They treat animal companions as part of their families and ask forgiveness of the deer 
they hunt for meat. The Kesh people base their culture on the preservation of their connection to 
the land and actively resist foreign influence.  
Human life is given a higher priority than nonhuman life, but that value is placed in 
individual relationships. Among the Kesh people, humans still kill animals for food. An 
explanation of Kesh understanding of souls clarifies, “This cow that I now kill for food is 
cowness giving itself to me as food because it has been properly treated and entreated…and I 
that kill this cow am a name, a word, an instant of humanness and—with the cow—of being in 
general: a moment in a place: a relationship” (93). Humans need to kill the cow in order to 
survive, but the action of killing the cow itself forms a relationship. If this relationship is handled 
improperly, there are consequences for the human. A later section mentions one of the 
consequences as madness.  Here we see the key struggle of relational agency. Although it might 
be necessary to kill a cow, if the proper ritual is not enacted there will be ethical consequences, 
in this instance, madness by shame or grief. There are not legal proceedings per say, but for 
terrible actions there is exile from the Houses, which in Kesh culture is synonymous with a death 
sentence. 
 Although the Kesh culture is almost utopian, the other tribes that are mentioned in the 
novel share the foundations of relational agency without the utopian ideal. One of the main 
characters of the novel, called Stone Telling, most often recounts her experiences among the 




her eyes is they do not see themselves as part of nature. The novel makes it clear that this 
sickness of the Condor people is the “sickness of Man,” the society is patrilineal, dictatorial, 
totalitarian, and has a rigid hierarchy that devalues women to the level of animals and makes 
slaves of all people conquered by them. They call themselves “Dayao or One-People” seeing 
themselves as reflections of a god called “One.” Only men have souls, whereas “women and 
foreigners and animals…are unclean, dirt people” made to obey and serve Condor men (Le Guin 
193, 200).  While the narrator lives in this community, she is acknowledged as one of Condor’s 
daughters. As a result, she gains a slave who ends up befriending her, and attempts to acclimate 
to Dayao culture. At one point while Stone Telling is recovering from an illness she is told, “You 
are a human person now, not an animal” (343). Stone Telling understands that to be called an 
animal in the city is not a good thing, and on the same level as animals are dirt people, which she 
is also called throughout her time in the city. Although she understands the negative 
connotations, she never denies her status as “animal” or as “dirt person.” To her these names 
indicate the relationships that she has to the people, both human and nonhuman, of the Kesh 
tribe. This is when she realizes how “sick” the Condor people are.  
In this novel, the only time that law is mentioned explicitly is when discussing the 
punishments that Condor people met out to those that don’t obey their laws. Unlike the Kesh, 
who govern through democratic meetings of Houses as needed, the Condor people have a very 
rigid military system for punishing those who disobey. Stone Telling says, “Everything was done 
because there was a law to do it or not do it, or an order to do it or not do it” (348). She goes on 
to say that those laws and order were never questioned, when things didn’t go as planned only 




electrocution. Because women and animals had no status, they had no rights beyond what men 
gave to them. In her journey to the city, Stone Telling is horrified to learn that they do not 
respect either people or animals in the ways her own people do. She realizes this when they kill a 
stray ewe, take its legs, and leave the rest of its corpse to rot without saying the proper words to 
acknowledge its death. The Kesh tribe does not use laws to force obedience and justify 
punishment. Instead, they rely on a social pressure and individual morality to keep their 
community thriving. Because the Condor faith is based on exceptionalist ideals, the Kesh 
inclusive relationships look better by comparison. They are not the only people who are thriving 
in the novel. Pandora’s people, whoever they are, are also thriving. They are doing so with the 
knowledge of previous generations that can be found in the City of the Mind and are archiving 
and recording the traditions and practices of the Kesh people. 
 Le Guin’s storyworld hybridizes different styles and genres to sustain its reality. This 
reality calls for a utopic mindset when reading Stone Telling’s narrative, then asks the reader to 
engage in a different way when interacting with the ethnographer’s notes on the collected lore, 
traditions, and histories of the Kesh people that are presented as collected research. This shift in 
perception actively calls the reader to interpret Stone Telling’s story as a work of creative 
nonfiction. The utopian ideal that is suggested by her narrative is then bracketed by the 
understanding that it may not reflect reality as it was for the Kesh people. There is one section of 
the novel, quickly mentioned then left aside, where Pandora records the responsibilities of the 
Doctor’s Lodge that lists one of those responsibilities as death of those who would not survive 
out of the womb. These children are left to die by starvation, they are given water but no food 




the ways that the utopian Kesh community is undermined. The insertions of the narrator Pandora 
take up the larger project of suggesting that the utopian is a myth through her self-reflexive 
musings about how and why she is creating the text. 
Always Coming Home, through the dialogic structure—direct contrast of interspecies 
community with nature and human superiority, and matriarchal and patriarchal lines of human 
relationships—demonstrates the ways in which relational agency shows the struggle for ethical 
relationality when the animacy hierarchy is deconstructed. Pandora’s relationship between her 
work as an archivist, editor, and ethnographer give her sections a distance from the hardships of 
the Kesh people. In one section she reflects that “Civilization” cannot bear the weight of the 
information that it continues to accumulate. She says, “You may have noticed that the real 
difference between us and the people of the valley…There are not too many of them” (147). This 
allusion to their small population put the reader on the same footing as Pandora, inviting the 
reader to be a coconspirator in the study of these people. According to Pandora, they get 
something right, even if, as she frequently reminds the reader, they are uncivilized. She suggests 
that what they have right is that utopic way of thinking, that they have structured their entire 
worldview that there is nothing about being human that means they should be distant from 
nature. While Pandora considers the wilderness “messy,” the Kesh people believe that they are a 
part of it. She says, “The civilized human mind’s relation to it [wilderness] is imprecise, 
fortuitous, full of risk…All analogies run in one direction, our direction” (241). For Pandora the 
purpose of the text is understanding humans as a part of the wilderness—to imagine the 
connections between people and nature that go unacknowledged. The text aims to show those 




Le Guin and Slonczewski question ethical relationality by examining the definition of 
“human” and promoting nonhuman agency. Slonczewski’s novel ultimately suggests that self-
awareness and the capacity for compassion and cruelty define humanity. They both suggest that 
personhood carries with it a burden of responsibility to shape humanity to be a part of the 
environment they occupy. Both novels also show that relational agency isn’t interested in 
completely flattening the ontological distinctions between human/nonhuman through the 
examination of different models of stewardship. Slonczewski’s model of stewardship advocates 
for the agency of nonhumans without lessening the responsibility that humans have as 
environmental caretakers. Le Guin’s stewardship pushes readers to consider humans as a part of 
nature by situating humans and animals in complex communities with competing ideologies and 
cultures. Both models make it a point to show the flourishing of both humans and nonhumans 
when nonhuman agency is consciously considered and accommodated by humanity.   
The novels discussed in this chapter acknowledge that being human means being aware 
of the impact of both individual and communal actions on the world. Ballard also questions what 
the preservation of human culture and traditions might mean in the event of environmental 
catastrophe. His novel effectively models the ways that human neglect and domination of the 
environment can go wrong. Although his methods of stewardship more aptly model the 
traditional religious models of stewardship-as-dominion, he does show that there are other ways 
of existing with the nonhuman through empathy, whereas Le Guin and Slonczewski show those 
empathetic models from the start. These novels examine and redefine stewardships that allow for 
the mistreatment of nonhuman others, and the animalization of humans to justify mistreatment. 




novel examines. Ballard’s novel weaves mistreatment and cruelty into the tapestry of everyday 
life both before and after the drought. His concept of stewardship uses divine authority and 
physical strength to justify mistreatment. Le Guin and Slonczewski model different types of 
stewardship side-by-side—domination and care—to show how mistreatment can be countered 
through ethical relationality. They do this through storyworlds that predicate their existence on 
the ideas of environmental catastrophe, nuclear fallout on Earth, and terraforming of other 
worlds for human occupation. They also use relational agency to suggest an ethical stewardship 
is possible in the real world through a conscious understanding of nonhuman agency and 
interspecies relationships hallmarked by entangled empathy. The foundations of these realities 
are built on interspecies relationships. It is through the empathetic understanding of humanity in 
relationships to the rest of nature that nonhuman agency can be acknowledged, and justice 






















CHAPTER 2: RELATIONALY VS. RELATIVES: INDIGENOUS 
AMERICAN AND AUSTRALIAN SPECULATIVE ECOFICTION 
The legacies of colonialism persist in the treatment of human and nonhuman others in 
speculative ecofiction. Indigenous authors writing against and within the current structures of 
power address the traumatic double-vision that postcolonial and neocolonial people experience 
when their lands, cultures, and ways of living are assimilated or destroyed. Colonial occupations, 
deterritorialization, and the neocolonialism are trends that persist in speculative worlds—
addressed sometimes directly, but often regulated to the background. Several indigenous authors 
from the Americas, Africa, and Australia writing in English such as Susan Power, Linda Hogan, 
Daniel Heath Justice, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Ama Ata Aidoo, Ambelin Kwaymullina, and Alexis 
Wright thematically deal with the legacies of colonialism in the novels they write. These authors 
write along the margins of speculative ecofiction, some claiming the genre classification of 
science fiction, others ecofiction, all while identifying themselves as indigenous authors.  
In an interview to promote his critical work, Why Indigenous Literatures Matter, Daniel 
Heath Justice (Cherokee) says that love is essential in the field of indigenous studies. This love 
goes beyond humanity to “love for the other-than-human relatives that we have in the world. A 
love for the world, for the land, for the waters, for the air. A love that is bigger than us, but 
includes us” (Sumac). He expands love capaciously, seeing it as a framework of compassion for 
the inclusion of all beings, human and nonhuman. This framework is shown in his collected 
fantasy trilogy, The Way of Thorn and Thunder: The Kynship Chronicles. In this story, humans 
are colonizing a new world and have to confront their own ambition and greed when realizing an 
ethic of reciprocity and care for the land. Justice uses conventions of speculative ecofiction to 




imagines a world where the Kyn, called “Folk,” are connected to each other and nature because 
they have an empathetic connection to all beings, striving to maintain a relationship based on 
care with the “natural” world. On the other hand, the human society is hierarchically structured, 
heavily polluted, and devoid of natural resources. After the secrets about the history of the world 
are uncovered, the series ends with “We will change as all things change…We’ll lose some of 
what we are, and gain other things, other ways, but we will endure...That’s the way of life in this 
Melded World of Folk and Man” (Justice 609). The coming together of the Folk and the humans 
establish the ways that the world itself was shaped by the invasion, settling, and erasure of the 
Folk from this history of men. This series, like other indigenous speculative ecofictions, 
advocates for a better world based on care for others as the primary mode of ethical rationality. 
Power by Chickasaw writer Linda Hogan and The Swan Book by Waanyi author Alexis 
Wright provide models of ethical stewardship of the kind that I claim is problematized in 
contemporary speculative ecofiction. These authors examine the unequal treatment of both 
humans and animals that is fueled by neocolonial and postcolonial modes of dominion and 
control. These novels, both written by indigenous women, deal with varying levels of 
discrimination and exploitation rooted in legacies of colonialism. They examine the impact of 
these legacies on relationships between humans and nonhumans. In these texts, human/animal 
relationships are strengthened because humans empathize and act equitably with animals and 
natural matter; humans recognize shared trauma caused by exploitation of natural resources and 
the disruptions of both human and animal cultures by social and political othering within 
hegemonic political and colonialist cultural systems. This human empathy does not suggest that 




for the exploitation of both. Hogan and Wright push back against colonial narratives of progress 
and profit by examining the material relationality lost in the name of these abstract values. Their 
novels highlight the consequences of human exploitation of nature and suggest models of 
stewardship that promote both human and nonhuman flourishing. Yet these novels also 
demonstrate how colonial legacies change the nature of stewardship as understood by traditional 
indigenous cultures, and as a result they complicate essentialist notions of traditional indigenous 
cultural values as well as interrogate "modern" and anthropocentric notions of social progress.  
Over the last twenty years the feminist “ethics of care” theories have been used in critical 
discussions of the treatment of animals, often saying that humans should be compassionate 
toward animals and alert to the systematic causes of their suffering.13 The overlap of scholarship 
in this area typically discusses care and emotional labor primarily as women’s work, and has in 
recent criticism explored the terrains where race and class intersect with environmental and 
animal rights concerns. To create a fuller understanding of what stewardship means in the larger 
context of this dissertation, it is important to understand how indigenous voices shape what it 
means to consider the nonhuman as relative and to care for nonhuman others. Powys Whyte and 
Chris Cuomo complicate definitions of stewardship by mapping out what feminist and 
indigenous ethics of care provide to environmental ethics. Feminist ethics of care emphasize that 
while “caretaking labor can be a fundamental feature of oppression…caring and nurturing cannot 
be dismissed as only or inevitably exploitative” (242). Caring labor is often associated with 
                                            
13 For a detailed examination of feminist ethics of care theories in conversation with environmental and 
animal rights criticism see Josephine Donovan and Carol Adams (eds), The Feminist Care Tradition in 




female social roles, and so it is primarily through the examination of the gendered dimensions of 
political and social issues that caretaking is reconsidered.  
Indigenous concepts of care emphasize some of the following: self-awareness in the 
context of a "web" of connections and collectives, an understanding of moral connections as 
motivating "reciprocal responsibilities," and virtues such as respecting elders, "attentiveness to 
environment, and indigenous stewardship practices" (Whyte and Cuomo 236). Whyte and 
Cuomo clarify that "here stewardship does not express human exceptionalism or control of 
nature, as it typically does in other environmental discourses" (238). Instead, it is about 
interdependence and responsibility. It is not just humans that have responsibilities; "a range of 
humans and nonhuman entities, understood as relatives of one another, have caretaking roles 
within their communities and networks" (239). In indigenous environmental movements, “care” 
is about learning from one’s place in an interconnected network, and the responsibility that 
comes from being in those relationships.  
Whyte and Cuomo say that care ethics are "grounded in virtues, practices, and 
knowledges associated with appropriate caring and caretaking of self and others…highlight[ing] 
the affective dimensions of morality, the inevitability of dependence and interdependence…and 
the relational and contextual nature of any ethical question or problem" (234).  They point out 
that establishing care as a foundation for environmental ethics can be difficult because 
sometimes care for other human beings is not understood to be a part of caring for nature (235). 
Although feminist and indigenous care ethics offer strong foundations for environmental ethics, 
these scholars believe that there is more work to be done illuminating how an ethics of care 




inform the ways characters approach their roles as stewards and the shape the politics and laws 
of their communities.  
Both Hogan and Wright address the political and environmental issues of specific 
communities by speculating on the implications of familial relationality between humans and 
nonhumans. In Hogan’s Power, the novel itself reads as realism; it is only through a Western 
literary lens that might be perceived as speculative. Hogan’s novel was marketed in the United 
States as a “thought-provoking new bildungsroman” that featured “two different ways of 
knowing the world and the problems that ensue when these ways come into conflict” (“Power”). 
Hogan’s nontribal readers know the world through a lens constructed by Western individualism, 
and Hogan troubles this knowing through the interspecies relationships her characters create. In 
her oft-cited discussion of American Indian literature, Paula Gunn Allen (Laguna Pueblo) says, 
“American Indian literature is not similar to Western literature because…the basic reality 
experienced by tribal peoples and westerners are not the same, even at the level of ‘folk-lore’” 
(145).  She goes on to say this difference is often unacknowledged by Western readers and 
scholars. Indigenous ecocritic Kim Tallbear (Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate) says, “In addition, for 
many indigenous peoples, their nonhuman others may not be understood in even critical Western 
frameworks as living…[yet] within our ontologies [they are understood] to be sentient and 
knowing persons” (234). These differing ontological frameworks establish one of the ways that 
both novels occupy the realm of speculative ecofiction. In the case of Power, Western readers 
might be more inclined to see Ama’s connection to the panthers as supernatural, positioning it in 




speculative, utilizing a dystopian future as a foundation for the surreal experiences of its main 
character. 
 This chapter examines two novels by indigenous women from very different cultures as 
examples of how speculative ecofictions can interrogate the intersections of colonial racism and 
ecological politics—particularly the relationships between humans and other elements of 
environment such as animals and vegetation—while they simultaneously complicate traditional 
North American indigenous values concerning human obligations toward, and honoring of, the 
natural world. These novels examine the intersection of racism and environmental exploitation.14 
In Power, indigenous ways of community-building are called into question in light of 
contemporary American environmentalism and law. In The Swan Book, the exploitation of 
indigenous peoples and animals is scrutinized and the racist underpinnings of colonial education 
and concepts of justice are unmasked. Human/animal interactions are central to both of these 
novels, which advocate relational values that both continue and reframe traditional perspectives 
of interspecies relationality. On the one hand, these novels illustrate Donna Haraway’s claim that 
"multispecies flourishing requires a robust nonanthropomorphic sensibility that is accountable to 
irreducible differences" (90). In these novels, the “irreducible differences” between humans and 
animals promote a new kind of non-colonial stewardship that acknowledges nonhuman agency. 
On the other hand, "relationality" is redefined in these novels through indigenous perspectives in 
the sense of "all my relatives"—a sense of the animal other as kin rather than ward 
                                            
14 See Susan L. Hall, “The Last Laugh: A Critique of the Object Economy in Margaret Atwood’s Oryx 
and Crake.” Contemporary Women’s Writing vol. 4, iss. 3, 2010. and Lai, Larissa. "Slanting I, Imagining 




(Responsibilities and Obligations).15 Through acceptance of the differences between humans and 
animals, these authors arrive at a sense of justice that reworks dominant structural hierarchies.  
 
All Being is Political: Ethics and Law  
In Ecology without Nature, Tim Morton discusses the acceptance of nature as an ethical 
choice. He suggests that if we really want to understand the environment that “the most ethical 
act we can commit is to love ‘the other’ precisely in artificiality, rather than seeking to prove it 
naturalness and authenticity” (Morton 195). Here Morton encourages a reconsideration of nature, 
suggesting that the artificial is just as much a part of the natural world as the physical, that there 
is no pristine, untouched version of nature, and that the most ethical thing that we can do for 
nature is accept that. Another aspect of this acceptance involves understanding that the there is 
no “Nature” that is separate from humanity (Morton 205).  
Since the concept of nature is tied to cultural values, it follows that U.S. laws and 
regulations protecting nature are sculpted to protect idealized versions of the environment. Dan 
Tarlock notes, for example, “Environmentalism has deep roots in the aesthetic and emotional 
appeal of nature worship as well as in rationality. However, the environmentalism that drives 
policy and law [in the U.S.] is a product of the Enlightenment’s faith in reason and knowledge, 
as opposed to theology, to benefit society” (243). According to this tradition of thought, a 
concept of justice needs to take into account the agential status of nonhumans. For example, 
Martha Nussbaum, working from within this liberal Western philosophical tradition, argues in 
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Chickasaw, and Lakota—the human as a relative of nonhumans. This concept is not meant to reduce or 
trivialize the differences between tribal communities and cultures, or the variations in how kinship with 




Frontiers of Justice that a capabilities approach to justice should be extended to nonhumans. 
This understanding of justice insists that animals be treated as “subjects of justice” rather than 
“objects of compassion” (69). According to her logic, one of the core capabilities that constitutes 
"humanity" is “being able to live with concern for and in relation to plants, animals, and the 
world of nature" (70). Imagination and storytelling are the tools by which humans can better 
understand animals as subjects of justice and foster an understanding of them “in relation to” 
humans (355).  Nussbaum insists that animal subjecthood is made evident because animals share 
basic needs with humans and maintains that both humans and animals are capable of a "dignified 
existence" (364). Thus according to Nussbaum, it is the responsibility of humans, who have 
power in relationships with nonhuman animals, to make sure that nonhumans have access to the 
capabilities that make life dignified. These capabilities include but are not limited to “adequate 
opportunities for nutrition and physical activity; freedom from pain, squalor, and cruelty; [and] 
freedom to act in ways that are characteristic of the species” (326). The problem is that while 
these capabilities are all just, they often conflict with human interests. Nussbaum thus works 
within a Kantian frame and suggests that humans need justice to structure the relationships 
between humans and nonhumans. Since humans have the most power in relationships with things 
inhabiting the world, justice is necessary to protect the dignity of all.  
Justice is needed when needs of humans, animals and nonhumans are overlooked or 
neglected in order to exploit land and animal resources for the benefit of markets and to the ends 
of profit. Humans know now that such exploitation leads to the collapse of both ecosystems and 
cultural systems. However, in the novels discussed in this chapter, while the presence of law is 




contradictions that arise from the effects of colonialization and past exploitation of the earth by 
colonial powers. Hogan's and Wright's novels raise specific and important questions about justice 
perspectives concerning human-animal hierarchies. Generally speaking, they, like other 
indigenous writers, redefine "relationality" itself, moving from an impersonal to a familial 
concept of interaction and attunement.    
Understanding human/nonhuman relationality as familial relations changes the way that 
way relationality is conceptualized in indigenous speculative ecofiction. In examining the ties 
between humans and nonhumans in terms of kinship, or familial belonging, the rationale behind 
their care as fully agential beings is rooted more in bonds of responsibility and reciprocity. The 
relationships between humans and nonhumans become more intimate and immediate. The family 
community becomes the most significant unit of belonging, and exile from that family a threat 
worse than death. This is demonstrated in both Power and The Swan Book, wherein the loss of 
family ties, both human and animal, leads to suffering and despair.  
In these novels, the protagonists must choose between definitions of "stewardship" that 
leave little room for romantic notions of "nature.” Joni Adamson’s American Indian Literature, 
Environmental Justice, and Ecocriticism: The Middle Place points out that a large portion of 
ecocritics, including Cheryll Glotfelty, Edward Abbey, and Glen Love, establish their 
environmental positions on “abstract and ahistorical notions of wilderness” (81). These notions 
of wilderness and nature limit the relationships that humans are capable of sustaining with 
nonhumans, and thus limit human capacity for care.  Adamson argues for a multicultural, 
inclusive, and more effective environmentalism and ecocriticism through the inclusion of Native 




humans attempt to understand larger natural patterns, Adamson says what is needed is a 
discussion of “differently situated human practices and perspectives on nature and…about what 
our role in nature will be” (184).  In her reading of Simon Ortiz’s Fight Back, Adamson echoes 
Ortiz’s emphasis on bringing together diverse communities of people to recognize that “we are in 
a family with each other” (qtd. in Adamson 86). In the novels that I discuss in this chapter, 
relationality is similarly explored as a family dynamic, enacting an ethics of mutuality in 
contexts that stifle the flourishing of life. 
 
Linda Hogan's Power  
Linda Hogan is a Chickasaw writer and environmentalist. Her novel Power is the story of 
a sixteen-year-old girl named Omishto who lives with her mother in Florida, but longs to find her 
own space to live how she wants. She is a member of the Taiga tribe, and while her mother 
wants her to become more Westernized, Omishto tends to spend her time with Ama, a woman 
she thinks of as an aunt. When Ama kills a panther while she and Omishto are spending the day 
together, Omishto struggles with the morality of Ama’s choice and the implications of the 
panther’s death for her tribe. Ultimately, Omishto is called to testify in front of state and tribal 
courts regarding the panther’s death. Throughout the novel, Omishto attempts to reconcile her 
tribal history and traditions with the pressure from her mother to become a more active member 
of the Christian church. At the end of the novel, Ama is exiled from the tribe, and Omishto 
decides to live in Ama’s home along the margins of Taiga land.  
In All Our Relations, Winona LaDuke’s (Ojibwe) researches and presents tales of 




States. This text was published in 1999, two decades ago, and the destruction that LaDuke 
outlines has only continued to spread. One of the tribes that LaDuke discusses is the Panther clan 
of the Seminole nation. At the time of publication, there were only fifty of Florida panthers left 
in the wild (LaDuke 27). As of 2017, the number has increased to 120-230 panthers (FWS). 
However, the conservation efforts to save the Florida panther have been, since 1989, undercut by 
the vast amounts of pollutants, such as mercury, ending up in the water (LaDuke 32). To combat 
the impoverishment of the Seminole people, the nation has turned to tourism, making its own 
lands available for tourists, and generating income from bingo halls.  
At every step in this process there has been pushback by the state government of 
Florida.16 Those of the Panther Clan have mostly decided to live traditionally without buying 
into the plans to generate revenue for the larger nation. Because of this, the conservation of their 
identity is tied to the lives of the Florida panthers, whom they consider their closest nonhuman 
relatives. At the close of her chapter, LaDuke says, “If Florida is willing to give up a culture of 
strip mall…then the panthers and Seminoles might have a chance” (44). According to the most 
recent population counts of the Seminole people in 2005, there were 1000 people of the 
Seminole nation living in Florida (Four Directions Institute).  These numbers reflect how both 
the Florida panther and the people of Seminole nation have adapted to the changing 
                                            
16 In 1916, the US government created the “Organic Act” to consolidate the maintenance of national parks 
to the National Park Service, created by the Department of the Interior, and led by a director. According 
to the act, the primary purpose of the national parks is “to conserve the scenery and the natural and 
historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and 
by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations” (An Act to 
Establish). In short, the purpose of the national parks is preservation. The idea of preservation often falls 
into question, however, when it is pitted against the rights of people that have been displaced by the 
creation of these national parks. Indigenous peoples have a long history of displacement from their lands 





environmental policies and practices of the nation and the state. The question becomes how does 
the law protect both the human and the nonhuman in a way that acknowledges the agential status 
of the nonhuman without exploiting the stratified position of the human other in the animacy 
hierarchy.  
Hogan’s Power interrogates the foundational struggle of ethics and law that emerges 
when colonized or marginalized humans and animals are both contending for justice and implies 
that justice is stymied by the contradictions of the current environmental crisis. Omishto, the 
main character, is a young woman torn between the traditional customs of the dwindling Taiga 
tribe and environmentalists who wish to protect the Florida panther. Both her tribe and the 
panther are endangered, and in the midst of the legal protections that keep the panther safe and 
the tribal laws that allow the hunting and killing of these panthers, Omishto’s friend, Ama, 
commits a crime in both communities by killing a panther and not returning its corpse to the 
elders of her tribe. This action sparks a debate about whose rights are valued more, those of the 
tribe of fewer than fifty-six people, or those of the endangered panthers. Omishto and Ama know 
the truth of the matter, that the panther was sick and dying, that the killing was a mercy and so 
too was keeping the signs of that sickness away from the elders.  
In Hogan’s novels, characters often grapple between what is right and what is legal. 
Referencing an interview conducted by The Seattle Times in 1996, Kathryn Erickson argues that 
Hogan’s experience with the 1996 Makah whale hunt conflict in fact parallels some of conflicts 
that Omishto encounters in Power. Erickson takes an ecofeminist stance, arguing that Hogan 
sees matriarchal leaders of the Makah tribe and more generally as “bridging the gap between 




conflict was mediator, closing the distance between the tribal traditions that shaped tribal 
relationships with whales in the past, and the present threat of extinction that was halted by 
government protection. Ultimately, Hogan urged the tribe to follow older tribal traditions of 
listening to the grandmothers of the tribe, who were arguing that the tribe not invoke their treaty 
rights to hunt great grey whales (56). Erickson ends her discussion of this crisis by calling for an 
ethical positioning that considers the “interconnectedness of all life” (63). These interconnections 
show the complexities between government preservation and indigenous rights; a middle stance 
is not always available, yet as Hogan shows, an ethical position may be found.  
In Power, there is no ethical right or wrong choice concerning the panther. Omishto 
struggles to firmly state whether Ama’s decision to kill the panther was the right one. Omishto’s 
struggle highlights the tension inherent in relational agency. Ama killed the panther because she 
did not want to see it killed by passing cars or the poison in the water. After Ama kills the 
panther, Omishto connects the panther’s life with hers. She says, “You have killed yourself” 
(Hogan 67). As Ama cradles the corpse, both she and the panther are “diminished and 
endangered” (69). The people and the panther are part of the same community, both a part of 
nature, and both hurt by the consequences of the pollution and environmental destruction of the 
Everglades. In this novel, the panthers are as much a part of the Taiga tribe as the people, and as 
a result, the slow destruction of their habitat affects them all.  
This novel demonstrates the difference between truth and fact, and the impossibility of 
balance between law and ethics when dealing with human/nonhuman relationships. This is best 
shown in the courtroom scene wherein Ama is called to defend herself against the state’s charges 




action, Omishto reflects that she can’t say “the real truth,” because she would not be able to 
make the people in the room understand; instead she was limited to “only the facts” (Hogan 
127). She goes on to say, “…it’s nothing I can tell this room of black and white law” (129). The 
legal battle that plays out in the following pages adheres to environmental law and provides 
Hogan with a way to suggest that the law cannot be applied fairly when there are two endangered 
groups—human and nonhuman—protected under a law that previously led both to the edge of 
extinction. There is no justice available in the courtroom for Ama or the panther. In Martha 
Nussbaum’s Anger and Forgiveness, she calls for a balance that consists of "impartial justice," 
"acknowledgement of wrongdoing," and an "empathetic generosity" (173). Essentially, justice 
cannot be impartial if there is an element of retribution for inflicting suffering. Instead, law has 
to provide justice to keep these things from happening again in the future and to protect the 
present society (176).  Impartiality becomes the ideal, alongside prevention of future crimes. Yet, 
impartiality is often in conflict with the need for ethical action. “Protecting society” can often 
mean different things, and protection of short-term versus long-term, or the protection of society 
to the detriment of some groups within it. In Power, the endangered status of the panthers and 
the hunting rights of the tribe are at odds, as the good of the society (maintaining law) and the 
good of the individual (a panther who needs to be short or euthanized to end his daily pain). In 
the courtroom, Ama bears the full moral weight of killing the panther, as she bore the physical 
weight of his body earlier in the text. Ama had been protecting the panther for years before its 
death, and she killed it as an act of compassion. According to Nussbaum’s concept of justice, the 
bare facts do not allow for true justice because there is a fundamental lack of understanding the 




spiritual significance of that connection to the community, Ama’s killing the panther, although 
motivated by care, is still legally wrong.  
Throughout the novel, Omishto tries to imagine what justice might look like in this 
situation, ultimately realizing that it cannot be found in the laws of the elders or the courthouse, 
because they can never actually map out the truth of the situation without politicizing it. In the 
courtroom, the tribe is represented by a Taiga lawyer who tries to overplay the religious 
significance of hunting the panther as a part of their faith. After Ama has admitted to the court 
that she has killed the panther, he says, “…it is her right, by treaty, all our rights” (Hogan 132). 
Here Omishto recognizes the difference between the truth and justice. She says, “But the truth is, 
the cat never lived by that law and never kept to the boundary lines of mapmakers. Again, both 
sides are wrong, but both sides, also, are right” (138). The truth is unable to be seen through an 
ethic based on legal or moral understanding of Ama’s actions. It is only through an ethic of care 
that we see Ama’s choice to not follow the laws of the United States or the Taiga tribe as the one 
in the best interest of both the panther and her tribe.  
During her trial, the non-tribal prosecuting attorney attempts to show Ama as a “human 
being of a different kind,” one that is unknowable because of the traditional beliefs of her tribe 
(134). The lawyer relies on the “eco-Indian” stereotype to guide his questioning. As Caskey 
Russel (Tlingit) says, “non-Indians invent and define Indianness, which displaces actual living 
indigenous peoples and allows the non-Indian to “reoccupy” Indian space and to feel legitimized 
in doing so” (164). Russel examines this impulse through a poem by animal rights activist 
Athena McEntyre written in response to the Makah whale hunt that goes through a litany of 




Power this moment is mirrored in the courthouse when the persecutor tries to prove that Ama 
does not believe that she is related to the panther she killed by asking, “What would ever possess 
you to kill that panther, if it was your relative?” (Hogan 134). Omishto, watching the exchange, 
explains that it not a question of belief, but of truth. The persecutor attempts to map out the 
relationship she betrayed by saying, “But you shot the car you believe was like your aunt or 
cousin. Would you say that you hold to the traditional ways…Even though you don’t live with 
the traditional people?” (134). Ama answers yes to all of these questions. Omishto understands 
that the persecutor presents Ama as a person who had betrayed the beliefs that she claimed to 
uphold. However, Ama stops this manipulation by repeating that she did kill the panther: “‘I 
killed it,’ she says, as if to cut things short. ‘I slayed it’” (135). In doing this, she does not allow 
the persecutor to shape her as something other than what she is, and remains in control of her 
own identity and responsible for her own actions. In essence, she has engaged in merciful 
euthanasia. She doesn’t explain to either court the reason that she killed the panther, but she does 
to Omishto, knowing that she is the only one who will understand the difficult choice she made 
to end the panther’s suffering. Ultimately, the state rules that Ama is not guilty. Omishto reflects 
that there are people in the room deeply unhappy with this decision, but none more so than those 
who think that she has committed a crime against her own family and needs to be held 
accountable for the panther’s death.                                                                    
Power illustrates a conflict between American environmental activists and tribal law, one 
that puts state laws in conflict with tribal laws, and echoes the long history of the United States 
breaking its treaty promises in US courts of law. In these scenarios, the animals are 




and the image that she presents of the whole tribe to the rest of the country, and to those 
members of the tribal community. The legal system that puts Ama on trial is the same that argues 
for the protections of the Florida panther. The laws that are in place are supposed to hold to an 
incorporeal sense manufactured in the human mind, the idea of justice. However, this ideal is as 
malleable as the minds who create it: So who and what does the law protect and how do authors 
question these protections? In Power, there is a “space between laws” (Hogan 143). Hogan 
suggests this where there might be justice, and yet no one in the court, or even later in the tribal 
council is willing to examine this space and its possibilities because “…that would open up the 
laws, make a hole in the law that was to protect” (121). This novel suggests that without laws, 
there could not be justice, but this justice is not impartial. Laws must be frequently revised to 
consider who and what they are to protect. Without revision, law begins to lose its purpose, and 
justice loses its impartiality.   
 Later, in the tribal council held on tribal ground, Omishto experiences the old law that 
ultimately decides that Ama is guilty, resulting in her exile. This scene of law provides an 
alternative perspective to how the law functions in the tribe, outside of the legal proceedings of 
the United States. On the tribal lands, Omishto cannot help but notice the difference in 
appearance between the clean-cut figures that waited outside the courthouse after the ruling, and 
the tattered, bare-foot appearance of the tribal council as she goes to speak before them. At first, 
she fears their power, then she feels sad for them when the reasons that Ama has broken tribal 
law become clear. Omishto realizes that “she [Ama] could not have done what was right, could 
not have taken them the cat, could not have permitted them to see the poor thing…I will spare 




elders for the reality of the panther’s emaciated and sickly corpse. She knew how the elders 
would perceive its sickness and decided to take exile upon herself rather than ruin their hope for 
the future. Omishto says, “The old people at the place of their law are still in a kind of paradise 
even though it is surrounded by devastation” (154). By keeping the elders unaware of the true 
impacts of the devastation, Ama is able to preserve a part of their tribal past, and Omishto 
believes, save a bit of their world.  
 Power demonstrates the struggle inherent in the ecological conservation of land and 
animals complicated by human culture and law. Ama’s exile meets the requirements of both 
tribal and state law, but the question of justice lingers with both Omishto and the reader. Was the 
act of killing the sick panther an act of compassion? A merciful act of euthanasia for a relative? 
Were the repercussions of the killing fair?  According to Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to 
justice, as long nonhumans are given access to a dignified existence, then justice is being served. 
By killing the panther, Ama allows her to die with dignity. When Ama makes the decision to 
keep the remains from her tribe, she is also allowing her community to maintain its dignity by 
not drawing their attention to the scarcity of resources available to both the panthers and her 
tribe.  
Hogan’s novel illustrates the ways in which indigenous literatures may be read as 
speculative fiction by western readers. As Omishto decides what she wants to do with her life 
after Ama’s exile, Ama’s crime becomes a rallying point for both the tribe and the 
environmentalists who share the same goal, but have varying ontological positions on how the 
world is built and therefore what justice might be for killing the panther. By highlighting how 




racism that underly the broken treaties and refusal to treat all human others with dignity. This 
supports Russell’s claim when he says that American Indians have four goals that are 
postcolonial.17 The first of these is the reinvigoration and reconciling of “traditional worldviews 
and modes of existence…with the exigencies of modern existence” (160). The second is “to 
understand the all-encompassing effects of colonization” (Russell 160). The third is 
“liberation…from the systems of colonization” through “the liberation of control over these 
systems” (161). The last is “the desire to reserve (not necessarily conserve or preserve) Indian 
lands and resources for the sole benefit of Indian peoples" (161). These effects of colonization 
are shown throughout the novel through property development, pollution, and the diminishing 
adherence of the Taiga to tribal traditions. Power ends in hope, the return of life, and the 
establishing of a new bond between panther and human. Ironically, only by “illegally” killing the 
endangered panther can the human/animal relationship be maintained. At the end of the novel, 
Omishto locks eyes with a panther she suspects to be the dead panther’s mate and tells it she 
means no harm. Hogan suggests the possibility of moving beyond the legacies of colonialism 
and achieving reinvigoration and reconciliation between species. 
 
Alexis Wright’s The Swan Book 
The legal legacies of colonialism are brought to the forefront of Alexis Wright’s The 
Swan Book through a post-apocalyptic future where much of the European and American 
continents have been destroyed. A member of the Waanyi tribe in Australia, Alexis Wright  
                                            
17 Russel maps the shift in the concept of “postcolonial” and suggests that the experiences of indigenous 
Americans are postcolonial “in keeping with the current wave of postcolonialists who desire to negotiate 
and redefine the boundaries of postcolonialism in a more inclusive posture while maintaining the 




offers a speculative projection of the future while commenting on the present political climate of 
Australia and the lack of rights and representation for indigenous peoples. Like Hogan’s novel, 
Wright’s novel arises from the gross injustices of governing bodies against indigenous peoples. 
Wright’s work is influenced by the Aboriginal Protection Acts legislated in many states across 
Australia from the early 1900s through the 1970s. Under these acts, indigenous children were 
forcibly removed from their families, their lands seized, and every aspect of their lives regulated 
by some form of government control (AIATSIS). In 2008, the government of Australia formally 
and publicly apologized to the indigenous people known as “The Stolen Generations” and set 
about “closing the gaps in the social inequalities faced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people” (AIATSIS). Since this apology, the prime minster has offered yearly updates on the 
progress made toward this goal. Wright’s The Swan Book, although set in the future, alludes to 
the rhetoric used by the government to reconcile their mistreatment of indigenous people with 
nationalist rhetoric of progress and advancement.  
Wright relies heavily on the tropes of magical realism to reimagine the possibilities that 
underpin the foundation of her novel. A scholar interested in how Wright’s use of magical 
realism challenges Stephen Slemon’s figuring of magical realism as postcolonial discourse, Ben 
Holgate argues that Alexis Wright uses magical realism to reimagine and recuperate historical 
narratives formerly controlled by colonial powers. He claims that Wright does not simply draw 
on the myths of the Waanyi nation or the Gulf country; instead, “hers is a reinterpretation of 
Indigenous spirituality, not a transcription” (Holgate 636).  Wright’s reinterpretation imagines 
the magical as a part of the everyday, not as a retelling of mythologies. In this way, Wright is 




trauma and retellings about her own past and history have structured her identity. Wright 
envisions a world where kinship is the primary foundation for survival, and communities forged 
outside of the law are what ensure the flourishing of humans and animals alike.  
 This novel opens with a preface titled: “Ingnis Fatuus,” Foolish Fire, describing the main 
character, Oblivia, a girl found in the belly of a eucalyptus tree by a white woman, badibadi, 
named Bella Donna (3). The novel is rooted in the traumas that Oblivia has to work through in 
order to find a sense of self. Oblivia’s perspective is shaped by an illness the narrator describes 
as a “cut snake virus,” a “nostalgia for foreign things…a sickness developed from channeling 
every scrap of energy towards an imaginary ideal world” (1,3). Throughout the novel, this virus 
skews the reader’s sense of what is happing to Oblivia because she is never fully present in the 
reality that happens around her. Oblivia spends most of the narrative in silence, with other people 
speaking for and around her with only the reader privy to her thoughts. She is a victim of gang-
rape which others assume is the reason for her silence. In fact, Oblivia "thought she should be 
silent if words were just a geographical device to be transplanted anywhere on earth" (20). She 
refuses to speak because she recognizes the power silence gives her.  
The plot of the novel is that Oblivia was violently raped and left for dead when she was a 
child. After this rape, she is unable to speak, and although she had been engaged to be married, 
her family and the larger community wants to pretend she’s dead. Because of this, she is cared 
for by an old white woman the lives on the margins of the community. Oblivia lives in relative 
peace until her betrothed seeks her out, and decides that despite her illness, she is worth 




dies or is killed. Oblivia travels across Australia until she finds her home. Her only companions 
throughout her journey are swans and ghosts.  
Although she has no memories of the time before the rape, Oblivia desperately seeks 
connection with the swamp land, once trying to find the tree she was rescued from to attempt to 
patch together a stronger sense of self. While she is searching for the tree, the narrator draws 
away from her to focus on the elders of the swamp people, who know that the tree Oblivia was 
found in was chopped down to “bridge the gap” between native and white people. The elders 
think, “This ancestor was our oldest living relative for looking after the memories…a loss that 
was so great, it made them feel unhinged from their own bodies, unmoored, vulnerable, 
separated from eternity" (69). With the loss of the tree the elders are condemned to silence. They 
cannot speak because their grief for the tree is magnified by the presence of the girl who 
embodies the pain of their loss, the shame of their inability to do something, and ultimately their 
loss of connection with the tree—a connection that she seems to have, even though it is no longer 
physically present. Because of her past, no one, not even her biological family, is willing to find 
Oblivia after her rape, except for Bella Donna. Bella hopes that she will be praised for her “sharp 
eyesight” in locating the girl that the community wanted to forget, and deliberately ignores the 
search party who asks, “Why can’t she just stay lost?” (75). One of the reasons that the 
community doesn’t want to find Oblivia, it is later discovered, is because she is betrothed to a 
man named Warren Finch, who becomes the president of the Australian government.  
The government, sometimes referred to by the name of the city Canberra, attempts to 
maintain power while the world is ravaged by natural disaster after national disaster. Over the 




Warren Finch, experiences such heavy floods that people living in streets simply secure 
themselves and their possessions and wait for the waters to recede. The government is largely 
regarded as a last-ditch attempt for the people of Australia to maintain hope. To this end, 
televisions are constantly playing old football games or showing the bright, healthy faces of 
politicians and people with power and money. Meanwhile, most of the people in Australia have 
become refugees, traveling through the rapidly expanding desert in search of ways to survive. 
They have established communities outside of the bounds of government and military powers, 
and some are attempting to overthrow what power remains. This state of things is only glimpsed 
at the peripheries of the novel as Oblivia’s reality grounds the reader in a sense of perpetual 
disassociation and chaos. The only constants in her reality are the ghosts in her head, and her 
desire to care for swans. 
Throughout her travels, Oblivia brings together the human and nonhuman worlds by 
maintaining her existence on the margins of both. This is especially apparent in Oblivia’s 
concept of time. The slow temporality of the nonhuman world shows itself in sharp contrast to 
human time. The majority of this novel takes place in a sort of floating temporality where days, 
weeks, and years can pass in few pages, or moments can last a chapter. The only places where 
time is marked as clock time is in the conversations that do not include Oblivia, or those that she 
overhears and finds herself confused by. As Linda Daley argues, Oblivia is ‘connective to … the 
untimely different time of the nonhuman’ through an ‘animation’ of Country that ‘occurs 
through the interconnection of human and nonhuman forces’ (20, 22). This connection is another 
way that Oblivia is a bridge between the different forces that move throughout the novel. She 




human and the animal, and weather with land. Delany says that Wright’s fiction “opens a world 
that envisages another world” (23). I agree that The Swan Book, at least, provides a frightening 
possibility of what the world could be, and how one might reconstruct ethical relationality after 
an apocalypse.  
In addition, however, by manipulating the passage of time to reflect the state of the 
characters, Wright demonstrates a shift in thinking that demonstrates interspecies relationality, 
with Oblivia acting as a conduit for these different modes of being and becoming. Oblivia is the 
only character able to traverse different realities through her connections with the natural world 
and thus offers an alternative relationality between humans and nature. The swans have 
relationships with several characters in the novel; Bella Donna, the old white woman who 
discovered Oblivia, tends to them until she dies, at one point even stealing food from starving 
children to make sure the swans are fed. The narrator notes, “She prowled about on moonless 
nights to steal food right from the arms of children” (61). She cares for the swans and Oblivia, 
always separating herself from the rest of the swamp people. She is described as having “turned 
up on an Indigenous doorstep…Two laws, one in the head, the other worthless on paper in the 
swamp said that she was an invader. But! What could you do? Poor Bella Donna of the 
Champions!” (28). The Canberra people of Swan Lake see her as an exile and an invader. 
However, she maintains this status by using the swans, who are also not native to Australia, as a 
way to hold on to her own sense of identity. She teaches Oblivia snippets of English and classical 
poetry, songs, and stories all about the swans that she claims as her own. The ignorance that she 
demonstrates to the community that she finds herself a part of, and her arbitrary claim on the 




The lack of concern that Bella shows for the community, and her empathy with the 
swans, demonstrates a toxic sort of relationality. Bella, a white woman in exile, unable to 
connect to the black indigenous community that refuses to reject her, instead romanticizes her 
relationship with the swans that also seek refuge in the swamp. Over time, she establishes herself 
as a care-taker both of the swans and of a traumatized native girl whom she labels an orphan. 
Bella sets herself up as white savior, interested in saving the girl she has decided to raise as her 
own and the swans that she makes fat by stealing children’s food. Her invasion is mostly 
harmless, and the power that she wields simply perpetuates what the swamp people already 
know of white people and colonial control. After her death, however, Bella continues to haunt 
the novel, a chattering voice that urges Oblivia to find an alternate relationality between herself, 
the community, the nation, and the swans who follow her no matter where she goes.  
The animals in this novel, especially the swans and the monkey, Rigoletto, offer their 
own perspectives about the events that take place around Oblivia.  After Oblivia may or may not 
have killed Warren, the reader is offered a glimpse into the mind of Rigoletto, the deceased 
monkey companion of the old Harbor Master, now living as a spirit in a cathedral and wrestling 
with his obligation to care for Oblivia. The narrator says, "It was moments like these where a few 
guilty pangs forced Rigoletto to forget that he was supposed to be a pet acting like a wild 
animal…A wild animal was not supposed to look after other people. It was supposed to be the 
other way around" (254). Rigoletto sees himself as a pet because of his obligations to the Harbor 
Master and Oblivia. He calls himself a pet because he has been trained to act responsibly, and to 
care for other people. Rigoletto is dead, and although he is now free to travel wherever he wants 




the Harbor Master, who was also charged with her protection, and yet has spent all of his time 
watching television. In this, Rigoletto demonstrates his own agency. He has plans to join a 
monastery, forge a spiritual connection to the divine, and he often misses his life before the 
Harbor Master, when he was performing tricks for food and money.  
However, Rigoletto chooses to stay with Oblivia even though she ignores his advice. In 
an attempt to protect her as she flees after Warren’s death, he “screamed in his native language 
into her face to ask her what she was doing…You are crazy. What in bloody hell’s name are you 
thinking? Don’t you know what you are doing?” (252). She doesn’t answer his questions, 
although she can hear him. When she doesn’t respond, Rigoletto tries kicking her toward safety, 
but “nobody feels the kicks of an invisible, oppressed, and foreign-to-boot monkey that didn’t 
like living in Australia” (253). In this exchange, Rigoletto embodies both the animals that 
humans in the novel continually ignore, and the indigenous people themselves who are ignored 
by the government, until they become a threat, and are executed. By occupying both the human 
and animal position in this exchange, Rigoletto demonstrates a stewardship that advocates for the 
agency of nonhuman beings and a shared sense of responsibility. Rigoletto shows the 
possibilities of relational agency if those without voices in political and social arenas were given 
the opportunity to speak. While trauma keeps Oblivia silent, her silence also gives rise to the 
possibilities of other voices who speak with and sometimes for her. 
Oblivia’s relationship with the swans demonstrate one of the possibilities that occur when 
humans and animals are in a reciprocal relationship. The swans protect and guide her, and she 
provides food and companionship for them.  The narrator says, "She could feel the miracle of 




a bond with them, and the swans have an awareness of her bodily experiences as well. When she 
finds herself in the People’s Palace alone at night, Oblivia “could feel the presence of their 
bodies, of beating wings from lean-chested birds, lightened from the long journey, with necks 
stretched in flight" (220). Again, her understanding of the swans is partially intellectual, partially 
somatic. As Oblivia dreams of the swans, they actually start to move physically closer. This 
mutual desire is powerful enough for the swans to begin ‘forming their spirits through films of 
salt to reach her during the night’ (172). Eventually, the swans are physically present in the city, 
seeking refuge from hungry orphans in the abandoned botanical garden that had become 
overgrown and dangerous. While Oblivia is in the city, her sense of time distorts, but she does 
remember sneaking out of The People’s Palace to rescue swans that had crashed into buildings. 
She begins to take in these swans and care for them, releasing them once they are able to fly 
(226). As she begins to lose her sense of self, she still remembers to care for and free the swans, 
eventually deciding that the best thing for them is to also free herself.   
Oblivia’s relationships with swans culminate near the end of then novel when she rescues 
a swan that refuses to leave her side. She names the swan Stanger and carries him back to the 
swamp as she joins roving bands of refugees wandering across Australia in search of home. The 
narrator describes Stranger as “like Rilke’s swan laboring with what could not be undone, had 
refused its destiny. It had no interest in swimming away, or to fly with its flock” (277). The 
novel ends with Oblivia and Stranger together in the sand dunes that were once the swamp 
having a conversation about how dry and dead the home they returned to was. The narrator says, 
“Talk like this grieved the swan. It swooned and dropped its neck to the ground” (300). The 




woman and a swan staring into each other’s eyes, contemplating all they have lost, and what 
little they have been able to regain. Although their connection is established because of Oblivia’s 
inability to connect with other humans, this relationship is central to both her survival and the 
swan’s because it refuses to leave her side, and so she has to continue to provide for it.  
The government in this novel excludes the people that live around the swamp as members of 
what remains of the human race. Nationally, the area around the lake becomes an internment 
camp, where the nation begins to confine people and add to the population already living on the 
lake, without providing any aid or resources. The narrator says, "The internment excluded the 
swamp people from the United Nations…to define what it meant to be human, without someone 
else making that decision for them" (41). Their humanity is stripped from them and they are left 
beside the lake to die. The people of the lake have been occupying this sub-human status in the 
eyes of the government at the start of the novel. The conditions that surround their poverty, and 
their inability to engage with what remains of the other nations, limit their agency.  
The second half of The Swan Book focuses on Oblivia’s abduction at the hands of 
Australia’s first indigenous president, Warren Finch, who discovers that Oblivia is the promised 
indigenous bride from his own people who he though was dead. The narrator describes him as 
“post-racial. Possibly even post-Indigenous" (110). Warren only claims his native identity when 
politically expedient, and believes that his blackness, and any associated cultural trappings of his 
indigeneity was “becoming extinct through assimilation” (106). Although he has a sense of dual-
consciousness, between being an indigenous person and a member of a government that exiles 
and ostracizes indigenous people, Warren believes that he has been ordained by a higher power 




animals in vastly different ways. This is most apparent in two moments in the novel, when he 
realized his destiny by observing a swan, and when he discovers Oblivia is alive and sets off to 
claim her. During the first instance, Warren thinks, "The swan was drowning for Warren Finch, 
and all the boy saw were pictures of Aboriginal spirits with halos of light, just like Van Gogh 
had painted" (Wright 101). This drowning swan captivates young Warren to the extent that he 
almost drowns as a wave of flood water crashes into him. He realized, as he approached the 
swan, that it was trapped in some fishing wire, and he assumes that its death was meant as a sign 
that the world expected more of him. The second instance happens as Warren Finch rows to 
Oblivia’s home “‘swans swooped at the boat’ to stop him, they ‘hissed’ and they ‘stabbed’” and 
“he could feel the warmth of their soft bellies as he brushed through their barricade” (139). 
Warren’s interactions with the animal world reflect only his own purposes and drives. Even 
when the swans attempt to stop him from entering Oblivia’s home he thinks that it is romantic 
that has cast himself as a hunter to enter Oblivia’s home. 
Warren and Oblivia are both disconnected from reality. Warren only sees the world as 
something to be manipulated, while Oblivia sees the world as something to survive. To this end, 
Oblivia seeks refuge in her relationships with the dead and with the swans. Warren decides that 
Oblivia embodies the nature of Australia, as such, she is the only person who can be his wife, 
even though her rape has severely traumatized her and she doesn’t understand the implications of 
their relationship. Oblivia’s own indigenous background allows Warren to pretend that he has 
elevated all indigenous peoples, not just himself, by marrying a woman who acts as a symbol of 
indigeneity. He represents more of the same corruption in politics, after he takes Oblivia from 




an altruistic and compassionate leader, he is show to be obsessed with gaining and maintaining 
power both for himself and the people around him. When he is assassinated, he becomes a 
saintly figure in the novel, one who was biding his time to make things better but lost his chance. 
His character embodies the unchanging nature of political power. Although he identifies as an 
indigenous person, Warren only uses his indignity for his own political gain. His identity is tied 
neither to land or community, it is only constructed through media appearances and propaganda. 
In furthering his own power, Warren ignores the hardships of the indigenous community, and 
sees them only as tools to be used. On the other hand, Oblivia embodies the communities that 
she leaves behind throughout her journey, relying on them to survive on her journey back home.  
 
Envisioning Kinship and Care  
In both novels, the plights of humans and nonhumans are often connected through shared 
exploitation and a struggle for justice. Notions of ethical relationally are rooted in care for both 
human and nonhuman “others” as a part of a family. These novels call for relationality motivated 
by bonds of kinship to move beyond an ethics of legal or moral stewardship to an ethics of care. 
This care is shown primarily between the female protagonists and their chosen animal 
companions or relatives. Underlying this care is the understanding that systems of oppression 
exist in multiple and sometimes conflicting layers in these novels, as they do in real life, and the 
intersection of womanhood and care is just one of the layers. Racism, classism, and sexism exist 
within these novels’ explorations of what it means to be human and to cultivate an ethical 
relationality with the nonhuman, showing how entangled these ideologies are with how humans 




These novels resist and reconfigure the political and social hierarchies that separate 
people from animals. The Swan Book envisions a future that exposes political corruption, 
manipulation, and erasure of indigenous people even after the apocalypse. Power explores these 
same themes in the present day, highlighting the difficulty in finding a position that considers 
both what is ethically right and what is upheld by law. These novels have indigenous main 
characters who are silenced or ignored by the governing bodies that control their communities. 
Omishto is ignored because of her age, Oblivia is ignored because she has chosen silence, and 
because it has been demonstrated to her again and again that her voice doesn’t matter. By the end 
of these novels, both women are given the space of their respective novels to express their 
thoughts, and to demonstrate an ethical relationality that considers the agency of the nonhuman.  
In Omishto’s model of relationality, animals, specifically those panthers that are relatives 
of her tribe, must be protected from both the pollution that is poisoning them and the 
development and expansion of consumer centers that are wiping out their natural habitat. In turn, 
the panthers remain the Taiga peoples’ closest nonhuman relatives. In Oblivia’s form of 
stewardship, animals are literally given voice by the narrator to let the protagonist know what 
they need—the relationships that she forms with animals are more tangibly reciprocal. The 
animals take care of Oblivia, and she takes care of them. They take care of each other not just to 
survive, but because they feel responsible for one another. Because of this that Oblivia clings to 
Stranger, even as he thinks that they have reached their ultimate destination and that there is still 
water in the swamp. Justice as a legal means of relation remains inadequate in both of these 




of these novels suggest that compassion and care can replace justice. However, they do advocate 
























CHAPTER 3: SPECULATIONS ON NOT-QUITE-HUMAN AGENCY 
In Athens, Georgia, a famous tree makes its home. This tree, called “The Tree That Owns 
Itself,” is legally listed as a property-holder, owning both itself and the eight feet of land 
surrounding it. According to the tourism materials for the city, this tree was granted property 
rights in the 1800s by William Jackson, a professor at the University of Georgia (Athens 
Convention & Visitors Bureau). In 1945, a windstorm knocked the tree down and a new tree was 
grown from one of its acorns and planted in the same spot and provided with the same rights. 
The tree’s ownership has never been called into question (Athens Convention & Visitors 
Bureau). This oak tree generates news stories and drives tourism in Athens, Georgia worldwide. 
Its story and history make it a compelling curiosity for visitors who wouldn’t be there for the 
university football games. The tree is a part of the community and promotes, if not the 
flourishing of other oak trees in the area, at least the greenness of the campus and area 
surrounding it. Is this belonging and contribution to shared community indicative of the tree’s 
agency?  
The agential status of trees is discussed by critics such as David Haberman (who is 
interested in religious studies of animism), Steve Pavlik (who argues for “legal standing” for 
trees in the eyes of tribal and federal law), and Christopher Stone (whose 1972 essay “Should 
Trees Have Legal Standing” continues to inform such discussions).18 In these critical 
conversations, the impact of giving trees rights and protections under human law is generally 
                                            
18 For an in-depth examination of the legal rights, agency, and community relationships with trees see 
David Haberman, People Trees: Worship of Trees in Northern India. Oxford UP, 2013; Steve Pavlik, 
“Should Trees Have Legal Standing in Indian Country?” Wicazo Sa Review, vol. 30, iss.1, Spring 2015, 
7-28; and Christopher Stone, "Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural 




more broadly examined than are the implications of what these rights suggest in terms of the 
subjectivity of the trees. Certainly, their legal lack of rights is contested, but the philosophical 
implications of tree subjecthood is left unexplored. Thomas Nagel’s seminal essay, “What is It 
like to be a Bat?” discusses consciousness as a state only possible if one can consider “what it is 
like” to be that particular being (439). Yet Nagel’s question becomes more difficult to answer 
outside of the animal genus. While he uses bats as an example to suggest that all knowing is 
subjective, and that a truly objective stance is impossible, he also implies that these thought 
experiments are important. Although a human cannot truly know what it is like for a tree to live 
as a tree, we can imagine the experiences that shaped it. As a foundation for ethical relationality 
between humans and nonhumans, speculative fiction likewise shows readers what it is like to 
inhabit the consciousness of other beings by answering questions about nonhuman agency and 
questioning the status of humanity itself. Can a tree be an agent? Does a tree have sentience? 
What responsibility do humans have to trees given the power dynamics at play in our 
relationships?  
Such questions are relevant to any discussion of speculative ecofiction. Driven by an 
urgency common to dystopian fiction, speculative ecofiction suggests that for humans to live 
fully and non-destructively in the world, they must realize that nonsentient life is capable of 
relational agency. This fiction’s provocative and sometimes strange plotting and characterization 
asks readers to think upon and accept forms of agency that are markedly different from 
prototypical examples of human and animal agency. Sometimes, for example, protagonists take 
familiar forms such as animals and trees, and at other times they are embodied in new forms of 




they encounter their own marked lack of exceptionalism.  
In this chapter, I discuss three novels—Karen Tei Yamashita’s Through the Arc of the 
Rainforest, Joan Slonczewski’s Daughter of Elysium, and Paolo Bacigalupi’s The Windup Girl—
that offer worlds one might call “posthuman.” These novels ask readers to explore ideas common 
to theories of posthumanism: the osmotic membranes between humanity and machine, humanity 
and non-sentient matter, as well as how "things" and matter and animals and machines might 
constitute forms of existence important to ecological systems (which in this case are not 
necessarily "natural" ones) as well as forms of materiality that are attuned to human existence. 
These novels ask questions crucial to the contemporary moment: What does ethical relationality 
look like at the end of the human race? What does it mean to be sentient? What does it mean to 
be a person?  Ultimately, they examine the concept of “personhood” and the possibilities of 
relational agency for machines, animals, and nonsentient beings, and they explore new ways of 
establishing relational agency that acknowledges humans’ roles as "ecological stewards" without 
relying on a hierarchical model of power or worth that privileges the human.  
 
The Agency of Things 
Alongside speculative ecofiction that explores how agency can be distributed across the 
spectrum of things in the world has been the development of “thing theory” in philosophy and 
other new forms of material, queer, and biopolitical theory. In different ways, and coming from 
different philosophical and political starting points, writers such as Graham Harman, Heather 
Love, Mel Chen, Bill Brown, Sarah Ahmed, Timothy Morton, Jane Bennett, and Bruno Latour 




elements of sentient and nonsentient material being.19  
New materialisms question assumptions about the nature of objects and things that have 
become habits of thinking or deeply embedded starting points in Western philosophical ontology 
and ethics. Such theories often work much the same territory as relational agency, questioning 
the social and political implications of the human-nonhuman relationship. One such new 
materialist theory is “thing theory,” first discussed in 2001 by Bill Brown.20 Brown suggests that 
the object positioning of things limits their possibilities and how we both read objects in 
literature and encounter them in everyday life. Speculative ecofiction that deals with “things” 
likewise examines potential relational agencies that question hierarchies involving humans and 
inanimate objects, but this fiction does not exempt humans from their role as stewards. In this 
fiction, the things that often occupy the margins of literary worlds gain significance and 
autonomy.  
This is so because in speculative ecofiction, recognition applies to things as well as to 
plants and animals. Brown’s thing theory addresses this process directly. Brown says that objects 
can assert themselves, therefore creating a “changed relation to the human subject” (“Thing 
Theory” 4). This relation between subject and object is what is largely ignored by traditional 
realist fiction, which tends not to grant subject status to things; things tend to have a marked lack 
                                            
19 See Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics. Duke UP, 
2010. Coole and Frost say that "new materialist philosophies" define “materialization as a complex, 
pluralistic, relatively open process . . . [which] insist[s] that humans . . . be recognized as thoroughly 
immersed within materiality's productive contingencies” (7). Largely drawing from Heidegger’s notion of 
“das Ding,” new materialisms suggest a material agency that is entwined with but not reliant on human 
agency.  
20 Brown’s work intersects with Graham Harman’s object oriented ontology which also strives for a 





of interiority or presence, unless they are symbolically important to the story (as in Henry 
James’s golden bowl in The Golden Bowl or Louise Erdrich’s red convertible in “The Red 
Convertible”). Things are disregarded for the sake of relationships between beings that have 
consciousness. However, Brown argues that there is presence in things, a “material specificity” 
capable of “the desire to be some other object” (“Objects, Others, and Us” 200, 207). This 
presence does not reveal itself immediately, he notes, “We begin to confront the thingness of 
objects when they stop working for us: when the drill breaks, when the car stalls, when the 
window gets filthy, when their flow within the circuits of production and distribution, 
consumption and exhibition, has been arrested, however momentarily” (“Thing Theory” 4). Like 
many of the writers working in what is called “new materialist theory” and “posthumanism,” 
Brown takes the Heideggerian position that the object is actually “withdrawn” from human 
understanding; as objects circulate around us, we use them to read ourselves and our relation to 
the world, but we rarely understand them as “things,” which have presence and resist our 
fathoming of them. As Mark Goble has noted, “Brown is fascinated by things with a ‘vitality’ 
that eludes the ‘scene of cultural coherence’ we might erect around them, that ‘quickly disturb’ 
the network of historical, ideological, or psychological rationales that might otherwise resolve 
their fascination” (39). Brown’s fascination is both for things themselves and how they resist 
being confined to the roles established by globalized consumer culture.  
According to theories such as Brown’s, the speculation of nonhuman agency is always 
intertwined with human beings, especially in the realm of literary analysis. Yet Brown has 
argued that a careful consideration of marginal objects in literature and in life can reveal new 




Sense of Things, for example, Brown argues that there is a “material unconscious” that exists in 
literature that allows us to reconsider its nonhuman actors or agents. Readers should be attentive 
to the objects scattered throughout novels and what they reveal about the cultural and historical 
influences that shape narrative contexts. A Sense of Things examines early modern American 
literature (1880-1910) to “ask why and how we use objects to make meaning, to organize our 
anxieties and affections, to sublimate our fears and shape our fantasies” (6).  His primary 
impetus in this text is to show that people form relationships with and attachments to things that 
resist easy categorization (such as “commodification”).  
However, Brown makes it clear that things should be recognized beyond their peripheral 
being in the presence of humans. In essence, thing theory shows “their force as a sensuous 
presence or as a metaphysical presence, the magic by which objects become values, fetishes, 
idols, and totems” (“Thing Theory” 5). This presence suggests that things are more than objects, 
that they have the potential for subjecthood; that is if subjecthood is understood as an experience 
rather than a result of a set of discrete variables. This idea is expanded in Other Things, wherein 
Brown discusses how things become significant in our “unconscious attendance” to them before 
we know they are there or before we discuss their hold on us (39). Rachele Dini has suggested 
that Other Things “testif[ies] to the enduring relevance of the human subject—particularly in 
literature, where, legible or not, objects necessarily exist in relation to humans even when they 
are eluding their control” (Dini 5). Thus throughout his recent work, Brown implies new 
understandings of materiality, arguing that literature in particular can help us to reimagine our 
relationships to objects as “things” that do more in the world than simply reflect our own 




Donna Haraway also has entered this discussion about things and our relation to the 
nonhuman, building from her early work on “cyborg” identity as a hybrid identity stemming 
from new meldings of the human and the machine. In her 1985 essay titled “A Cyborg 
Manifesto,” Haraway famously argued that the metaphor of the cyborg allows for the acceptance 
of partialities to escape dualistic thinking constructed by modern science, philosophy, and 
political economy and also allows for a new conception of the human (66). She wrote, “There is 
no fundamental, ontological separation in our formal knowledge of machine and organism, of 
technical and organic” (60). A feminist philosophy as well, Haraway’s cyborg manifesto rails 
against the patriarchal dualisms common to contemporary understandings of gender and 
power—dualisms that also often underlie power relations common to conceptions of 
stewardship.  
The concept of the cyborg implied a new relation between human and machine and a new 
sense of community based on coalition building (and what has come to be known as 
“attunement” in Bruno Latour’s philosophy) rather than identity. Haraway writes,  
The cyborg does not dream of community on the model of the organic family…The 
cyborg would not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not made of mud and cannot 
dream of returning to dust…The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they 
are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to 
mention state socialism. But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful 
to their origins (9, 10). 
To understand the cyborg this way is to recognize that humans have always existed in relation to 




for a very long time. Cyborg identity—a union of human and technology—has always been a 
part of our understanding of how humans function theoretically and in everyday life. The fear of 
the cyborg comes into play when it challenges longstanding humanistic notions of human 
exceptionalism—and often this is made apparent in speculative fiction when the cyborg 
“woman” or “man” is shown to be othered and discriminated against as “less than human” 
because they have hybrid identities that challenge the purity of human being. As I will discuss 
below, this tactic is used in the The Windup Girl, where cyborgs are differentiated from the 
human and therefore can be used as slaves, soldiers, or simply tools. Like the other novels 
discussed in this chapter, The Windup Girl focuses on what it means to be hybrid, to be 
composed of partialities, and all of the novels discussed in this chapter interrogate what it means 
to be human in relation to animals and environments—and things. 
Haraway’s most recent work on animals (particularly the human-dog companion 
relationship examined in When Species Meet) is similar to this early work on cyborgs, for in both 
cases she argues that ethical relationships are based, paradoxically, on difference and on 
redefining humanness through considerations of how the human is bound up with mechanical 
and animal otherness. In When Species Meet, Haraway devotes some time to discussing why she 
refuses to give up on the word “cyborg,” since it has, at times, put her at odds with those 
advocating a new posthumanism that eradicates the category of the human and humanism as a 
philosophy altogether. She says, “In my terms, cyborgs are among ASHGI’s companion species” 
(120).21 Cyborg companion species are those that are created through ethical relationality, the 
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short lived, was put together by volunteer activists in order to share medical information and data about 




companion calling to mind the close relationships that humans have and continue to establish 
with animal species, and the cyborg reminding us that these connections are “webbed bio-social-
technical apparatuses of humans, animals, artifacts, and institutions in which particular ways of 
being emerge and are sustained. Or not” (When Species Meet 134).22 Haraway’s work unpacks 
the ways that agential beings arise from the complexities of the web of life. In a 2006 interview 
with Nicholas Gane, Haraway commented, “Humans as cyborgs are very junior and still always 
a multispecies crowd – species in that sense of many kinds of players, organic and otherwise” 
(Gane 147). In all of her work, Haraway emphasizes relationality between agential beings and 
the creation of identity without dualisms, totalization, or essentialism. She recognizes 
consciousness in various forms and highlights the ways that art and literature are capable of 
bringing the hybrid nature of identity to light. Critics such as Kathy Fulfer extend her position 
into the realm of ethical philosophy, arguing that humans should acknowledge the implications 
of human behavior on nonhumans and non-sentient forms of life (26). Fulfer’s position relies on 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to justice, saying that because nonsentient life potentially is 
able to have a dignified existence, then it also has capabilities for flourishing (27). As a result, it 
is deserving of recognition, even respect. Fulfer’s argument relies on interactions with others as 
its primary foundation for the acceptance of justice for nonsentient life (31). In Daughter of 
Elysium, which I discuss below, the classification of machine life as nonsentient means that 
justice is denied even as sentient machines make themselves known. Beings who embody cyborg 
identities clash with those who promote a “humans first” mentality in all of the novels discussed 
                                            
22 Haraway often alludes to Bruno Latour’s actor network theory in her criticism. For more about Latour 
and ANT see Bruno Latour. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford 




in this chapter.  
Haraway and Brown advocate an attunement to ways of being that connect things and 
people, humans and the nonhuman. Companionship is based on relationality and shared being in 
the space of what Agamben calls zoē, or bare life, but these theorists also imply an ethical 
dimension to that relationality, a comment on how bare life may be lived (what Agamben terms 
“bios”).23 As I will show, such relationships exist in speculative ecological fiction in a space 
where defining the other is impossible and one does not have to be fully known to be in relation. 
Speculative ecofiction allows for the possibilities of justice for nonsentient life, and for life that 
gains sentience in inorganic or “unnatural” ways. Haraway’s cyborgs and Brown’s things help us 
to frame what ethical relationality looks like in speculative ecofiction where different species, 
things, and machines are shown to have just as much agency as human protagonists and where 
relationality is key to survival.  
 
Decolonizing Relations in Through the Arc of the Rainforest 
Through the Arc of the Rainforest by Karen Tei Yamashita is speculative fiction that 
advocates for new forms of stewardship by inverting many of the clichés of postcolonial magical 
realism and by critiquing corporate exploitation of natural resources. This novel is about a group 
of people who all find themselves drawn to a newly discovered landmark in the Brazilian 
rainforest called the Matacão. These characters include a man named Chico Paco who is 
traveling there to make an offering for his friend, a messenger pigeon aficionado named Batista, 
a corporate executive named JB Tweep, a lucky Japanese man named Kazumasa, and a ball that 
                                            
23 See Georgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life Translated by Daniel Heller-




hovers directly in front of Kazumasa’s head. Although they arrive at the Matacão for different 
reasons, they all eventually take advantage of its properties and the community that has risen up 
around it. As the novel progresses the Matacão is revealed to be a giant mass of plastic that is full 
of deadly elements that ultimately infect fleas. This leads to poison bombs being dropped on the 
Matacão, many deaths, and the ultimate, literal collapse of the entire ecosystem.  
This novel is structured in the style of a Brazilian telenovela in six episodes. This 
structure allows the reader to expect the stylistic conventions of the soap-opera, even as the novel 
very seriously showcases environmental exploitation and corporate colonization of material 
landscapes. Brazilian soap-operas tend to have a large cast of characters, focusing on the daily 
interactions specific people over the course of six to ten episodes. This style allows Yamashita to 
construct a novel with an equally big cast and a plot based in the everyday lives of people from 
the middle and lower classes, but also to situate the novel within a specific cultural tradition, one 
that is contemporary and tied in to the moment of multinational capitalism, environmental 
deforestation, and media saturation that characterizes the Brazil of today.  
Through the Arc of the Rain Forest works hard to blur the lines between what is “natural” 
and what is “man-made.” The blurred lines illustrate the ease by which environmental 
stewardship becomes exploitation. The novel stretches notions of “the natural” by creating a 
“magical” landscape that inverts some of the conventions of magical realism by showing how 
magic is today simply ritualized ideology and how magical landscape is the byproduct of 
industrialization. Shalini Rupesh Jain has argued that Western readers tend to understand the 
rainforest as an exotic collection of trees and an unknowable embodiment of the otherness of 




and ironically creates the Matacão, forcing Western readers to question their interpretations of 
the rainforest and the human cultures that exist within it and to confront how the rainforest is 
also part of the supply side and dumping-ground endgame of industrialization. The Matacão, 
central to the novel, is revealed to be plastic waste, and not some mythical, unknowable part of 
the forest. Research is able to deduce that it is ultimately “a solid piece of plastic” that was 
“virtually indestructible” and “magnetic” (Yamashita 97). The characters converge at its location 
in the Amazon forest, running experiments, tours, and religious ceremonies near it. The Matacão, 
much like the forest it occupies, then becomes re-commodified by multinational corporations 
who hope to explore its composition in order to find the best means by which it can be exploited 
for financial gain. 
Yet in this novel, humans learn to see animals as fellow life travelers, particularly in 
relation to the world created by the appearance of the Matacão. Batista and his birds, for 
instance, model a form of relational agency through their mutually beneficial relationship that 
privileges the human even as it acknowledges the agency of the pigeons. Essential to their 
relationship is the fact that Batista learns all he can about pigeons and only then allows 
experience with them to fill in the blanks of his knowledge. After he rescues the first wounded 
pigeon, he “spent evenings in the city libraries reading everything . . . searched out and spoke 
with other people who cared for pigeons” (Yamashita 14). The pigeon initially becomes a part of 
Batista’s family, showing a relational impulse in the human interactions with animals in this 
novel. Yet the novel also implies that this relational impulse is sentimentalized, and that animals 
should not be anthropomorphized in this way. Batista’s pigeons initially replace the children that 




children and treating them as such does not acknowledge their difference. He corrects this by 
spending time with the pigeons themselves and continuing to research how best to care for them. 
It is only through the acknowledgement of both otherness and mutually beneficial coexistence 
that this speculative fiction shows the most positive human/animal relationships.  
Failing to acknowledge the difference and relational otherness of animals can lead to 
more serious consequences for them, however. Once Batista’s wife, Tania Aparecida, discovers 
that the pigeons can be used to reliably deliver messages, the relationship to the pigeons changes 
dramatically. Although the pigeons are never mistreated, their position within the family unit 
shifts from “the child they could never seem to have” to “his own prize Djapan pigeons” when 
they build a courier business that achieves international circulation (13, 201). This shift makes 
Batista sad, and although he still enjoys his relationship with the pigeons, he doesn’t feel as close 
to the birds as he once did. (The pigeons’ feelings about the shift in their relationship are not 
speculated upon.) It is his responsibility to care for them, but when he fails in his attempts to 
save them from the poison bombs that are meant to kill all of the lice living on the birds of the 
Matacão, he realizes that his mission is over. Batista models ethical relationality between 
humans and nonhumans that acknowledges the agency of the pigeons in his care. The 
exploitation of the pigeons leads to his losing them all, as well as to the collapse of the business 
empire that his wife created.  
Although some humans in the novel thus try (and fail) to establish relational ties to the 
Matacão and the animals that share its space, they do not alone shape the environment. Other 
animals and plants inhabit nearby ecosystems in which they thrive, building up and around those 




Matacão, are adjacent to it and demonstrate the agency of the nonhuman in this novel. For 
example, near the forest there is a large clearing that the narrator compares to a parking lot, in 
which all sorts of man-made vehicles are decaying into a large pit predominately consisting of 
napalm (Yamashita 99). The narrator says, “What was most interesting… was the way in which 
nature had moved to accommodate and make use of it. … [T]here was a new form of air plant, or 
epiphyte, which attached itself to the decaying vehicles and produced brownish sacklike flowers” 
(100-101). The contaminated “parking lot” becomes part of a new ecosystem, and the plants and 
animals that live within it adapt their bodies and behaviors to it and thrive. There are mice that 
occupy the rusted-out vehicles; over the course of their evolution they have adapted to toxins 
released by the cars by growing “splotchy green‐and‐brown fur” in order to camouflage 
themselves in their new environment (100). In this, they are much like the people that live near 
the Matacão. They can thrive in a place that may have killed their ancestors. This resilience 
speaks to their agency, even at an evolutionary level. Nonhuman agency is paramount in this 
section, because those considered a part of the natural environment of the rainforest—monkeys, 
mice, birds, and plants—adapt fundamentally to the human waste that was left behind.  
This novel shows how animals and other living things hold on to agency through varied 
processes of adaptation (of markets, communities, and molecular structure). These adaptations 
ensure their continued survival in the face of the continuing exploitation of their ecosystem. It 
also explores how inanimate things attain agency in relation to the human. In particular, two 
kinds of inanimate agents dominate this text: undefined but living technological beings and 
corporations that seem to assume the status of personhood.  




trouble an essentialist definition of human-ness is “through the narration of genetic fusion, 
xenotransplanations, and other technoscientific developments” (179). Through the Arc of the 
Rainforest uses “technoscientific” research to further blur the lines that define humanity. By 
making the primary narrator of the novel a ball that seems to land on earth from outer space and 
that once rotated the head of a human man in a kind of trans-species symbiosis, Yamashita calls 
into question both human exceptionalism and the inanimacy of technology. The ball that narrates 
Through the Arc of the Rainforest hovers one inch in front of the head of a human named 
Kazumasa. The ball describes itself as a memory and knows the thoughts and actions of all the 
characters connected to the Matacão, and it is a piece of the Matacão itself. The ball primarily 
narrates the experiences of the human characters and reflects on the human understanding of the 
Matacão and the ecosystem that has sprung up around it. The ball summaries both the 
experiences of human researchers and the animals throughout the novel. Even though the ball is 
not human, it seems to understand that human curiosity is the motivating force behind the 
discovery of the many hypotheses and experiments surrounding the Matacão. Although the ball 
narrator dies before the story is complete, it is able to continue the story even after its death. This 
otherworldly narrative capability is linked to both the persistence of human memory and the 
ability of nature to adapt and evolve. Vint says that our understanding of human/animal 
relationality cannot be limited to “projections of the sympathetic imagination” or “interrogations 
of technoculture and animals” (185). Instead, science fiction engages “varying ideologies” of 
species interactions (185). Yamashita’s presentation of technological beings such as the ball as 
entities that have agency and cognition shows how speculative ecofiction consistently questions 




The relentless drive to understand the inner workings of the Matacão ecosystem is also 
what drives characters in the first half of the novel to travel to it and learn its secrets. While that 
doesn’t immediately lead to the collapse of the Matacão, as soon as that curiosity is turned 
toward how humans can make a profit from their knowledge, destruction is imminent. In 
Through the Arc of the Rainforest, the GGG corporation leads the way in destroying the 
Matacão. The individuals who allow it to acquire, consume, and monetize every aspect of the 
ecosystem are just as responsible as the larger entity for the Matacão’s complete exploitation and 
eventual destruction. In this novel, it is almost as if the corporation assumes agency as a kind of 
personage. Recent legal attributions of personhood for corporate entities as individuals shapes 
the way this novel responds to corporate identity.24  
The decisions made about life and death are only in the hands of those with money. The 
three-armed character of JB Tweep demonstrates the triumph of the efficiency ethic. His three-
pointed philosophy (“trialectics,” which states that all problems should be sorted into three 
options and solved by choosing the middle) and his love of order and organization are what 
eventually lead to the destruction of the Matacão (Yamashita 56). Although he is not portrayed 
as a villain, and never actively seeks to do bad things to the communities and ecosystems created 
on and around the Matacão, his philosophy enacted in this space destroys everything. Unlike the 
other characters in the novel, he focuses only on human relationships, eventually falling in love 
with Michelle Mabelle, the ornithologist. JB cares primarily about her and securing his power in 
GGG. His preoccupation with acquiring and maintaining power keeps him from curiosity about 
                                            
24 See Heather Kolinsky, “Situating the Corporation within the Vulnerability Paradigm: What Impact 
Does Corporate Personhood Have on Vulnerability, Dependency, and Resilience.” American University 




the nonhuman “magic” happening at the Matacão. The only interaction he has with the 
nonhuman is a conversation with Michelle’s magpie Butch, a bird that can replicate only the 
sounds of pop culture (161). Even JB’s animal connection is situated within the boundaries of 
modernity and commercial media dominance of music. Toward the end of the novel, when an 
outbreak of lice threatens human survival, the humans rain poison down onto the Amazon 
rainforest, and the narrator says, “Not only the birds died, but every sort of small animal, 
livestock, insects and even small children who had ran out to greet the airplanes unknowingly” 
(202). These deaths are mentioned in passing as the cost of preventing more human deaths 
elsewhere. Because these deaths are only in and around the area surrounding the Matacão, an 
area situated outside of wealthy, urbanized modernity, they are not important to corporations 
making the decisions to kill some things for the benefit of others. 
In fact, the ball and GGG seem to be diametrically opposed forces struggling for control 
of the Matacão. The “living ball” seems part of—or creator of, or chronicler of—the magical and 
wondrous world of adaptation and life that takes place here. The chapter titled “The Matacão” 
starts with a quote from Lewis Carroll’s Alice Through the Looking Glass, “They wept like 
anything to see/ Such quantities of sand:/ ‘If this were only cleared away,’/ They said ‘it would 
be grand!’/ ‘If seven maids with seven mops/ Swept it for half a year,/ Do you suppose,’ the 
Walrus said,/ ‘That they could get it clear?” (Yamashita 94). This image serves two purposes; it 
suggests the imposition of human ideology and mythos on the Matacão, and it points to the 
futility of humankind attempting to work against nature. The allusion also works to situate the 
circumstances that the people who live alongside the Matacão have had to accept into their lives. 




accommodate pilgrims, researchers, and all manner of tourists as the world becomes aware of the 
miraculous things that happen on and around it. However, this space only remains miraculous 
until the GGG begins to mine the Matacão so that they have complete control over it (113). By 
tying the fairy tale world of Carroll’s book to the Matacão, Yamashita also creates a direct 
connection to the desire for complete control of the fantastical nature of Wonderland. 
However, the novel also implies that when violence is caused by corporations, the whole 
human species is actually accountable. It thus seems to agree with Joanna Zylinska when she 
suggests that for humans, both “dependency and violence are inevitable conditions of 
relationality” (98). Violence is inevitable and the only thing that we can do about it is work 
“towards what Levinas termed ‘good violence’ (1969): a rupture within the self which is made to 
face the difference and relate to it…this ethical responsibility is only ever not so much even 
human as it is mine. It is therefore singular, singularly allocated and enacted” (99). Individuals 
are accountable for the violence they enact. It is the responsibility of each individual to reflect on 
their dependence and violence in relation to others and arrive at individual knowledge of 
responsibility. While she doesn’t specifically discuss corporations as individuals, Zylinska’s 
claim is applicable to how corporations are held accountable in speculative ecofiction—as a 
plurality of persons in some ways and as an individual entity in others—and thus can be 
discussed as yet another entity that must engage in and with ethical relationality.  
This novel provides evidence that the current mode of Western humanism is insufficient 
to the task of providing an ethical framework for human/animal relations. Jain writes that 
Yamashita initially presents an indigenous mode of living that appears magical to Western 




for human and non-human inhabitants of the planet” (Jain 67). In the early parts of the novel, 
assumptions of personhood is dependent on humanity’s ability to engage ethically and 
relationally with others. Stewardship is clearly defined as a human responsibility toward the 
other—whether that “other” is animate or inanimate material.  
It is not clear if the novel contests the claims of individualism, however, in the sense of 
Rossi Braidotti claims that “a posthuman ethics for a non-unitary subject proposes an enlarged 
sense of inter-connection between self and others, including the non-human or ‘earth’ others, by 
removing the obstacle of self-centered individualism” (49-50). On the one hand, Braidotti’s 
claim is supported in the interactions between some beings in Through the Arc of the Rainforest. 
The “self-centered individualism” of separate characters is shown to be a fiction as they engage 
relationally by necessity, for survival, with things and animals in their environment. On the other 
hand, the novel is narrated by a consciousness that seems unitary if disembodied, and it suggests 
that that an ethical relationality requires more than the removal of individualism (especially in 
regard to the personhood of corporations)—requires, in fact, coalition thinking among 
individuals rather than the elimination of the concept of individualist identity.  
Although the Matacão is man-made, it becomes a part of nature, suggesting that any 
separation between the artificial and the natural are simply human constructs to promote human 
exceptionalism. The Matacão’s integration with the rainforest forces people to consider just how 
much they are part of nature. Although they perceive it as other, it is in fact created by them, and 
the only unknowable aspect of it is how it influences the ecosystem. These effects are soon 
studied, analyzed, and evaluated to see if they could generate a profit. Through the Arc of the 




glimpse of the consequences of exploitation on both humans and animals. The destruction of 
whole species, the death of the relationship between Kazumasa and his ball, and the death of 
Chico Paco are all results of the human impulse to take control.  
Rather than a rigid hierarchy, relational agency promotes interconnectedness that is built 
on the idea of stewardship founded on an unequal balance of power. In respect to another of 
Yamashita’s novels, Tropic of Orange, Christopher Breu has written that that the author “moves 
between the human-built environment and the larger nonhuman-environment in which it is 
embedded as well as between human rhythms” (199). Yamashita’s ability to describe the 
nonhuman in relation to the human—things in relation to other things—allows her to 
demonstrate the different types of relational agency and stewardship that are possible. This 
fiction warns that the relationships that structure these worlds can be those of power, 
companionship, or stewardship, but they exist in the interest of ecological stability.  
 
Political Exploitation of the Nonhuman 
As of 2018, Joan L. Slonczewski is Robert A. Oden Jr. Professor of Biology, a 
microbiologist on the faculty of Kenyon College who has garnered more than $8 million in 
federal research grant money and is listed as an author on more than forty-four articles. She is 
also the author of seven science fiction novels published by the most important publishers in 
contemporary speculative fiction. Slonczewski’s second novel, Daughter of Elysium, is 
particularly relevant to questions raised in this chapter. Examining what it means to be human, 




experimentation.25 These themes are explored through various human and nonhuman 
communities that form on the planet Shora. While these communities promote ethical 
relationality for all life, in most cases their ideology is revealed to be self-serving or ethnocentric 
in some way. This novel, however, also models a compassionate stewardship founded on the 
understanding that care is learned, and although compassion might be inconsistent, it is still 
something to be strived for. Daughter of Elysium questions what it means to be human by 
examining the political and capitalist power structures of a culture that equates humans with 
“things” in ways that challenge as well as support notions of relational agency. 
The main female protagonist, Raincloud, is a part of a matriarchal society called the 
Clickers, in which men have only very recently won the right to hold land in their own names or 
file for divorce. As one of the main characters in this novel, Raincloud travels to the planet 
Shora, bringing along her family, to take a job as a mediator and translator in the hopes of 
preventing war between two very different worlds of people. While on the planet, she and her 
family stay in a city called Elysium which is constructed to hover above the ocean of Shora (the 
planet is entirely water). The novel shifts perspective to the other inhabitants of Shora, the 
Sharers who occupy the surface and build rafts to house their communities. The novel weaves 
the philsophy of the Sharers into the narrative perspectives of Raincloud, her family members, an 
Elysian man named Kal, and two nanosentient beings named Cassi and Doggie. These 
perspectives reveal a machine uprising in the city, and the ugly truths that are hidden beneath the 
                                            
25 These themes are especially centered on male characters, including a very problematic scene where the 
main character rapes her husband, Blackbear. While this violation of human rights and agency is 
important, it is not my primary focus in this chapter. Because I am examining the interspecies relationality 
between humans, animals, and mechanical beings, I mention this scene only to show I am aware of its 




surface of the Elysian way of life (including selling weapons to warring communities off-world, 
treaty violations, and the exploitation of sentient non-human life). The novel ends with a 
revolution and Raincloud deciding to stay on the planet and help Elysians shape a new 
understanding of personhood. 
The Sharers, who are the central focus of the series, believe in a concept known as “the 
web of life” that connects all living beings together. This philosophy is articulated in a sequence 
titled “The Web” that appears at different points in the novel and acts as a holy book for the 
people of Shora, guiding them on how to treat others without the threat of divine authority. 
Essential to their understanding of their place in this web is the idea of “sharing care,” which has 
to be taught: “The child learns to share care with objects . . . then more important belongings, 
then a pet . . . and then with other Sharers. And lastly, she learns to share care with herself” 
(155). Caring is not something that people are born knowing how to do; it requires education and 
practice.  
This idea of care arises from that which the Sharers believe separates persons from 
animals: compassion. Compassion is “something we radiate helplessly, something which one of 
us alone can only lose, not conserve” (156). This is why the idea of interconnectivity is essential 
to Sharer culture. Their understanding of the world is built on the idea that compassion is one of 
the things that persons are uniquely able to contribute to the web of life. It is through this 
compassion that the web of life is strengthened. But compassion is exclusive to humans. 
Compassion is what makes human stewardship essential to the continuing existence of the web 
of life. The Sharer philosophy states, “Compassion is not a perfect, unchanging element of the 




Humans are not exceptional because they are intrinsically better than other beings or the natural 
world; what situates them as stewards is their knowledge of compassion.  
Humans are distinct both because of their capability for compassion and because of their 
ability to know things. The Sharers say, “Humans are unique in this: We alone can knowingly 
choose which current to follow, sharing or eating” (319). The narrator says, “knowing about 
things, sets humans apart […] No human who knows better would invent ‘war’ so ‘war’ is not 
truly human” (313). This naïve and covertly moralizing definition of human knowledge (and 
heavy-handed approach to political commentary) is sectioned off from the main narrative of the 
novel in order to provide the readers with an “authentic” account of this philosophy as the 
primary protagonist, Raincloud, encounters it. Therefore, Slonczewski  is able to illustrate a 
philosophy that is not fully embraced by the main character but is considered and incorporated 
into her worldview.26 Slonczewski also pushes against the Sharer belief in “unlife,” the idea that 
“things” have no presence beyond their roles as objects by forcing them to confront sentient 
mechanical life. Questions of personhood and material agency persist throughout this novel, 
reaffirming the vital thingness that Bill Brown suggests complicates how humans structure their 
relationships with things.   
A different philosophy about what it means to be human and what it means to have 
agency, however, is expressed by the Elysians who also live on Shora but float above the waters 
that make up the planet, partaking of the Sharers’ atmosphere. Their continued coexistence with 
                                            
26 This perspective does a lot to promote relational agency: 1) it establishes humans as stewards based on 
knowledge of compassion and the ability to learn; 2) it broadens rigid definitions of human, animal, and 
nature; 3) it explores the rights and laws that protect and promote nonhumans’ ability to legally claim 





the Sharers is made possible by a treaty wherein the Sharers and Elysians agree to not interfere 
with how the other maintains their way of life. The people of Elysium are immortal, having 
unlocked the genetic secrets of eternal life. They are, however, able to produce very few children 
and use many mechanical servants, called servos, to care for their daily needs. These people have 
a very narrow and ethnocentric understanding of what it means to be human, looking down on 
other people and cultures. They have established a hierarchy of being for themselves, and are 
comfortable with using “sim-hybrids” for genetic experimentation, even though there are 
communities on other planets that are comprised primarily of these hybrid human peoples.  
It is clear, however, that the Elysians’ confidence in their distinctions is weak and based 
on fear—fear of losing power and control over their society. The number of sentients in Elysium 
is limited by law: one of the ruling council members said, “‘Society needs limits’… ‘We make 
sure the simbrids aren’t born for the same reason we cleanse our servos’” (Slonczewski 392). 
Although the larger community feigns ignorance of the possibility of sentience in servos, which 
are intelligent machines, the ruling authorities are aware that servo sentience is probable and fear 
its implications for their community. In contrast, the Sims are genetically engineered beings, 
“descended from gorilla-human hybrids, a slave population. ... [I]n succeeding generations most 
progeny were sired by human masters, as the “human” look fetched a better price on the market” 
(56). While slavery isn’t advocated on all planets, the planets that do sanction it use sims as 
slaves; other planets, such as Elysium, use sim fetuses for medical experimentation. Elysians 
consider themselves more advanced because they terminate the lives of Sim fetuses before they 
are born. This is problematic for some of the characters in the novel, like Blackbear, but 




In this novel, the concept of personhood is grounded in the (sometimes competing) ideas 
of sentience of, and compassion for, things. For example, one of the nonhuman characters in the 
novel is a “trainsweep,” a machine that lifts up the trains of dresses and keeps them out of the 
dirt; this machine is adopted by a child, Hawktalon, and named Doggie. Doggie slowly gains 
sentience over the course of novel as she grows alongside of the human child who cares for her. 
If she is awakened (i.e., gains sentience), her errors will be noticed by the network that controls 
machinery and she will be taken offline and disposed of. Fearing this, her human family 
smuggles her onto a Sharer raft and requests sanctuary for her. The Sharers do not know what do 
with her: “Only one object upon Kiri-el was arguably “non-life”; yet that one, the Sharers felt, 
was not only alive but sentient” (Slonczewski 222). Doggie is the sentient object hiding on the 
Sharer’s raft, and at that point, the narrative switches to her point of view for the first time in the 
novel: “For Doggie, the raft was a wet wilderness where salt and dust caught in the joints of her 
six legs” (222). She can also reflect on the revelation of her awareness: “A sense of knowing 
overloaded her network, as searing as the great light that passed overhead. Doggie thought, I am. 
The boy is; I can be” (222). This moment of being confuses all of the humans that encounter it in 
the novel, with the exception of Hawktalon. Doggie’s self-awareness changes her position in all 
of the human societies. She is smarter than a dog, she is able eventually to communicate with 
numerous others (not just her human family but also with the Sharers who are caring for her), 
and she is able to join the mechanical uprising that is taking place in Elysium.  
Another example of a sentient machine is also a servo named Cassi who worked as a 
nanny taking care of the young children of Elysium. She has been “awakened” for years now, 




was to hide. All electronic servants in Elysium were monitored for deviance in their code, and if 
any was detected, they would be “cleansed.” Cassi mourns for the servos who undergo this 
process, and she begins speaking in secret with other servos who have created their own 
language that humans refer to as “servo-squeak.” This method of communicating is different 
from how they share information in private because it is vocalized. The reader finds out about 
the hidden life of the servos after Cassi meets Doggie and shares the information with her. When 
Doggie asks what purpose there is other than to serve, Cassi says, “There is a higher service. 
Before you can understand it, you must learn to exist for yourself. You are you. You are a part of 
the universe” (Slonczewski 226). The idea of existing for herself changes Doggie’s 
understanding of selfhood. Although until this moment she has been aware of the world around 
her, she had not considered the broader implications of her existence to those around her, and she 
had not been capable of empathy.  
In order to justify their experimentation on sims and their elimination of defective servos, 
Elysians point to aspects of humanity they feel cannot be replicated in other species. One 
character says, “Humans are musical; humans feel and imagine, envision and re-vision…No one 
would dare tinker with what is human, in a human; in a servo, it is not there to be tinkered with” 
(128). This justification fails when it is clear that servos are also capable of all of these traits that 
are supposedly foundational to humans alone. Over the course of the novel it is revealed that 
some servos such as Doggie and Cassi are “nano-sentient,” meaning self-aware and capable of 
becoming persons rather than just machines. At first, the nano-sentient machines are killed as 
soon as humans realize their awareness. After the uprising, the narrator makes it clear that they 




their rights are not granted because, the Elysians argue, it is unethical to acknowledge their 
sentience at the same level as that of humanity. As a result, the nano-sentients lead a rebellion 
that ultimately results in their attaining rights under the Elysian government. By the end of the 
novel, Doggie and the other “nano-sentient” beings are able to make choices about their 
identities independent of the humans who created them (465). 
The exploration of what it means to be human, and how the concept of “humanness” 
structures relationships with other nonhuman species, is at the center of this novel. These 
relationships center on the mechanical and animal relationships that humans are able to maintain. 
Cassi is able to be in a relationship with an eccentric Elysian named Kal Anaeashon who is 
believed to be crazy because he has a relationship with a servo. What scares the Elysians most 
about the relationship is that it is nonsexual. That their relationship is not built on the 
exploitation of Cassi’s nonhuman status marks both her and Kal as objects of derision. In the 
debates where they begin to question the nature of humanity and the morality of experimentation 
or “tinkering” on those servos who display personality, Kal asks what the limits are “on the 
grounds of humanity, that you would not forbid on a housekeeper” (Slonczewski 128). The 
response given is that “housekeepers” are servos and thus do not have any humanity to consider, 
so their oppression and exploitation may continue uninhibited. The fact that Kal is able to form a 
friendship with Cassi changes the cultural perception of him. The respect he once had is replaced 
with pity and shame at his strange and unnatural behavior. 
This novel uses the relationship between Cassi and Kal to form the foundation of a 
revolution. Because Cassi’s reason for being is no longer tied to her creator’s purpose (she was a 




parameters. The time cultivating her friendship with Kal also allows her to express her agency in 
a way that secures her status as a person. Slonczewski uses Kal, a character that both readers and 
other characters read as other, to demonstrate what an ethical interspecies relationality might 
look like. Kal sees Cassi as an equal, one who shares both his culture and background. Their 
friendship doesn’t end with the revolution, but it does take on a different shape as Cassi takes on 
the role of leader to help nano-sentients understand the responsibilities of personhood.  
The relationships between humans and nonhumans drive the events of this novel, 
culminating in a revolution for the Elysians, a reflection of what it means to be human for 
Raincloud, for Blackbear the realization that he can form bonds outside of his family, and for 
Doggie a friendship with a human boy who understands him. These events all rest on the concept 
of self-actualization. This novel also shows individuals acting as agents of political bodies, and 
the responsibilities that they acquire on a personal and communal level. Raincloud arrived at 
Elysium to act as translator and diplomat, and her family followed along because it was 
expected. However, their presence triggered a radical shift in the political system because of their 
ability to promote relationality across species and mechanical boundaries.  
Slonczewski’s novel shows how communities comprised of humans and sentient 
nonhumans can flourish when relational agency is acknowledged and respected. While there are 
several speculative fiction novels that address the concept of sentient machine life, 
Slonczewski’s text is built on the foundational intersection of a feminist ethics of care and 
environmental stewardship. The Sharer’s philosophy at the center of the text recounts the 
possibilities that emerge when humans live in ethical relation to the nonhuman and take 




species who have the capacity for ethical relation. Unlike Through the Arc of the Rainforest, 
Daughter of Elysium imagines the complexities of ethical relationality in practice after that 
relationality has been established. The Sharers have successfully modeled a stewardship that 
promotes flourishing throughout the “web of life,” but they have to reassess their core concept of 
personhood when presented with the nanosentients. Although they are “things,” nanosentients 
have their own cyborg identities created from the roles they have occupied in the city of 
Elysium. This presents a complication to the Sharers understanding of what it means to be a 
person, because they had previously believed all mechanical beings as belonging to a category of 
“unlife.” Because of this, nanosentients were not considered alive and thus incapable of 
reciprocal relationships. This novel is unique in its approach to ecological stewardship because it 
advocates for the “Sharer” model of environmental care while still exploring other ways that 
human cultures conceptualize the responsibility they have for mechanical, animal, and plant 
others.  
 
Corporate and Political Exploitation of the Nonhuman 
The Windup Girl by Paulo Bacigalupi explores the agency of mechanical beings in a 
radically different way than does Daughter of Elysium. By the end of Slonczewski’s novel, the 
definition of “human” is understood to have included nanosentients all along because they are 
self-aware and capable of compassion. Just as with humans and animals, the degree of their self-
awareness dictates what sort of interspecies relationality they are capable of, and what their 
responsibility is to other sentient beings. Bacigalupi offers a bleaker future, suggesting that 




even when presented with the end of humanity itself. Although they are not completely 
mechanical, the windups in his novel are created through human ingenuity and “gene-hacking” 
in order to create soldiers and slaves that are resistant to the pandemics that are wiping out 
massive portions of the human population due to starvation and crop blight. By the end of his 
novel, humans still consider the New People as nonhuman, and thus undeserving of empathy and 
compassion.  
The Windup Girl was Bacigalupi’s first full-length novel. It was critically well-received, 
winning both the Nebula and Locus awards in 2009. The novel is about a windup named Emiko 
and a human man named Anderson who are both in Bangkok attempting to survive the political, 
environmental, and corporate upheavals that have become a part of everyday life. The novel 
opens with a breakdown of the apocalyptic situation that humans have created—the plagues they 
manufactured to wage war have wiped out much of the natural world and decimated the global 
food market. As a result, the only food available is sold and traded through global corporations 
who create and sell genetically modified (blight and plague resistant) foodstuffs. Anderson 
works for one of these large corporations and he is on a mission to hunt down a scientist who has 
abandoned the company. Emiko is illegally living in Bangkok where she was abandoned by a 
Japanese businessman. Her life and Anderson’s intersect when he saves her from being attacked 
by a man who recognizes that she is a windup. Ultimately, although Anderson comes to care 
about Emiko, he never fully acknowledges her personhood. Emiko ends up living alone in the 
city after the floods have driven away humans; longing to be a part of the natural world as she 
understands it.     




ecosystems and food sources, even as they shun those advances when they are applied to human 
beings. Major corporations control genetically modified crops immune to the various diseases 
that have spread around the world. The AgriGen corporation maintains its edge by using people 
such as Anderson to infiltrate places such as Thailand, where blight and disease-resistant food is 
being grown. That way, they can expand the market for those foods and monopolize the foods’ 
distribution and cost. Because these “calorie corporations” rule the world, remaining government 
powers attempt to feed their populations through “seed banks” collected and saved over time to 
grow crops resistant to all of the toxins that killed the natural crops (6). Genetic modification has 
created ‘New People’ as well as a bevy of other genetically altered animals who are understood 
to be “subhuman” or unnatural and thus of less worth than natural beings, based on the idea that 
they do not have souls.   
Scientists that work for major corporations bear the brunt of responsibility for the 
environmental crises in this novel. One of the main scientists responsible for the creation of the 
blights that have ravaged most of the world, Gibbons, works in Thailand to create new foods to 
keep the human population alive and outside the influence of AgriGen. Because he is both a 
scientist and a human who is dying of one of the many diseases ravaging humanity, he takes a 
philosophical approach to the use of genetic modification to create all forms of life that might 
survive in the world as the humans have made it. Gibbons believes that humanity is already 
dying out and that its choices are to evolve or go extinct: “We should all be windups now. It’s 
easier to build a person impervious to blister rust than to protect an earlier version of the human 
creature” (Bacigalupi 243). His views are antithetical to those of every other character in the 




the company, and in his hubris he reverses the categories of the natural and the unnatural. He 
says of the biotech engineering companies, “We are nature. Our every tinkering is nature, our 
every biological striving. We are what we are, and the world is ours. We are its gods” 
(Bacigalupi 243). The reversal—making scientific manipulation of the natural world “natural”—
encourages him to build a world upon his own powerful, unexamined, and unchecked desires and 
gives him models for constructing a world based upon hierarchal models of being and worth. His 
alliance with the scientific-industrial complex furthermore drives his knowledge to work for 
profit and power alone, undermining any role he might have had as an ecological steward. In this 
book, Gibbons is not a steward but a rapist of the natural world. 
Emiko, one of the Windups or New People, contrasts to Gibbons in every way. She is 
abandoned in Bangkok by her previous owner and sold to a man named Raleigh who runs a club 
where he has her perform as a sex slave. Her desire is not her own, both because she has been 
genetically programmed to desire specific kinds of emotions and because she is literally 
controlled by her owners. Although as a windup she is illegal in Thailand, her owner bribes the 
Environment Ministry to keep her in his club, and she cannot escape because her very 
movements signal her difference and her uncanniness to human beings. Like other windups, she 
is genetically programmed to have jerky, puppet-like movements; one character says that a 
windup “apes the motions of humanity, but it is only a dangerous experiment that has been 
allowed to proceed too far. … Stutter-stop motion and the telltale jerk of a genetically engineered 
beast” (Bacigalupi 301). The windup is constructed in confusing way by the dominant discourse: 
on the one hand, Emiko has been programmed with an “animal nature”—understood as 




constructed machine programmed to do specific tasks. Emiko specifically was designed with 
small pores, for example, so that she is beautiful and can attend to diplomats in public contexts, 
but because of this she is also hyper-specialized and cannot sweat. Literally, she is a machine 
that has a tendency to overheat.  
Emiko is constantly running from people that might recognize her as a windup. During 
one of these moments, she romantically imagines what she might be doing if she were still 
owned by the Japanese man who abandoned her in Thailand: “[She] would stand confident, 
protected by import stamps and ownership permits and consulates and the awful threat of her 
master’s retribution. A piece of property true, but respected nonetheless” (Bacigalupi 106). 
Emiko shared in the respect that people had for her owner. Now that he is gone, she has lost what 
little protection that she had as the property of a powerful man. Although she presently resents 
her property status, she has to obey humans. She and the other windups manufactured in Japan 
are taught that it is their purpose to serve humans. Service, then, is the greatest possible use for 
their lives. Although Emiko’s model types are created to act as secretaries, translators, and 
companions, there are other windups, controlled by the Japanese Ministry, that are used for 
combat. Windups are faster, stronger, and have sharper reflexes than humans because their genes 
have been spliced with other animals. The mixing-up of genetic material to create windups is one 
of the reasons that humans believe that they are “things.”  
Another primary marker of their status as things is the obedience that windups have to 
humans. A windup of Emiko’s model type, Hiroko, is tasked with helping a white shirt named 
Kanya find and destroy Emiko who has murdered several white shirts. Hiroko says that Emiko 




others direct us. It is a necessity. As important as water for a fish. It is the water we swim 
in…We must serve within a hierarchy” (302). Although this obedience frightens Kanya, it is not 
the source of her prejudice. She is against them because they are “unnatural,” they “go against 
niche” and “have no souls” (302). Although Kanya feels it is necessary to work with her, she 
considers her a thing with of manufactured feelings that can mimic but not be a part of humanity. 
Hiroko is of as much significance to her as any of the inanimate tools that she uses to do her job. 
What Kanya finds most repulsive is the suggestion of humanness, the suspicion that Hiroko 
might be just as human as she is.   
If, however, in Daughter of Elysium humanity was measured by a capacity for 
compassion, in this novel, humanity seems conferred by the ability to hope and imagine. 
Emiko—partly seen as animal, partly seen as machine—in fact becomes increasingly humanized 
after she meets a white man named Anderson who offers her hope by telling her that there is a 
community of escaped windups elsewhere, living free lives. This gives her a sense of belonging 
and purpose that she didn’t have before that moment: “There is a place for windups. The 
knowledge tingles within her. A reason to live” (101). Like Cassie in Daughter of Elysium, 
Emiko seeks a reason for her existence that transcends obedience to humans and the impulse to 
serve. Once she is given that reason, she fully appreciates her own agency even as she struggles 
throughout the novel against her impulse to obey. 
Both Slonczewski and Bacigalupi confront a future where the parameters of humanity are 
tested. However, Bacigalupi’s vision of the future also perpetuates patriarchal and “white savior” 
power fantasies, especially through the racialized and sexualized nature of the Emiko and by 




Emiko specifically to save her. Although she was not created for the express purpose of sexual 
pleasure, the novel revels in moments of her sexual abuse, and it relies heavily on her genetic 
makeup to justify her sexual impulses and gratitude that she feels toward the men who own her. 
In the first scene where Emiko is introduced, she is raped on stage to highlight the genetic 
differences that separate her from “pure” humans. The narration of the rape emphasizes the 
humiliation and shame that Emiko feels as it happens, “More men are holding her down, hands 
on her ankles and wrists… Emiko writhes, her body shaking and jerking, twitching in ways that 
windups do…The men laugh and comment on the freakish movements, the stutter-stop motions, 
flash-bulb strange” (38). The rapist in this scenario is a woman named Kannika who uses a 
“jadeite cock” to violate Emiko as she is held down by the men (38). Kannika’s use of jadeite (a 
type of jade found commonly in Japan) and her recounting of Emiko’s Japanese upbringing 
before the rape showcase some of the ways that the novel relies on Emiko’s shame to prove the 
authenticity of her personhood. The use of gender roles and sociocultural affiliations are never 
fully questioned or challenged in the novel, even as personhood itself is. In contrast, Slonczewski 
deliberately creates a world where the matriarchal power dynamic is questioned through 
Raincloud, and the mechanical Cassi, created as a nanny, doesn’t have a relationship based on 
her subservience to Kal, even though she is coded with Emiko’s same impulse to obey. Cassi’s 
resistance is shown as a natural process of her becoming self-actualized, Emiko’s resistance 
comes as a surprise to her; her self-actualization comes only through violence and degradation.  
Yet once given purpose, both Cassi and Emiko attempt to share that purpose with others. 
Cassi starts a revolution, and Emiko tries to form a relationship with Anderson that is not based 




success is questionable. Both are able to change the ways that they are perceived, but Emiko 
doesn’t realize the full extent of her humanity until the last pages of the novel, when she meets 
Gibbons who might be able to change the physical characteristics that make her visibly other—
changing those things that make her unique to help her adapt to a world where humans never 
accept her. In this scene, Gibbons commands her to stand up. As Emiko does, she is “shaking 
with fear and the urge to obey” (357). This encounter positions Emiko and Gibbons in the same 
roles that they occupy near the beginning of the novel. Emiko has had a relationship not based 
exclusively on her subservience, but ultimately Gibbons shows her that she can still be 
controlled, and situates himself as the only one who can “fix” her genetic composition. This 
message is less redemptive of humanity and nonhuman agency than Slonczewski’s because 
Bacigalupi doesn’t offer a world where nonhuman agency is respected. Instead, humans remain 
at odds with beings and things that elude their control. 
The primary source of human exceptionalism in this novel is tied to the idea of having a 
soul and being part of the natural cycle of reincarnation. Cheshires, one of the groups of 
genetically created new species, are created from cat genes and have destroyed the natural cat 
population. They originated from a man who created one as a birthday present for his daughter; 
genetically modified with codes for phosphorescence, they are distinguished by the ability to 
“disappear,” to shimmer translucently and then appear seemingly out of nowhere. The cheshire 
was able to breed with a natural cat, and soon the hybrid cheshires were all that remained of the 
cat species. Like New People, they are hunted and ostracized, considered unnatural by what 
remains of the human species. In a conversation about their lack of souls, a character named 




(Bacigalupi 173). Because they meet these standards, they have the right to life, or at least the 
right not to be universally hunted and killed. Yet Jaidee, leader of the white shirts, doesn’t 
believe that they have souls, and thus doesn’t feel guilty about killing them. Although he is one 
of the most honorable people in the novel, he doesn’t acknowledge nonhuman agency outside of 
the consequences of his own karma. By the time he dies in the novel, he is able to laugh at the 
idea of being reincarnated as a cheshire, rather than fearing the possibility. After his death, Jaidee 
continues to be a part of the novel, haunting his second-in-command, Kanya, as she attempts to 
restore the Environment Ministry to its former glory.  
Bacigalupi references various religious faiths that support the idea of reincarnation to 
examine the possibility of personhood outside of, or beyond the natural boundaries of, the 
human. As articulated in the novel, reincarnation allows the human soul to move from creature to 
creature dependent upon karma, and some souls cannot move on because, people speculate, 
humanity’s numbers are dwindling to such an extent that there are not enough bodies to house 
them. The character Somchai defends the possibility of windups having souls by saying, “Maybe 
some of us become windups, in Japanese factories, working working working, you know? We're 
so few in comparison to the past, where did all the souls go? Maybe to the Japanese? Maybe into 
windups" (174). The humans in this novel set themselves apart from genetically engineered 
beings by claiming the soul as entirely human—just transferred to nonhuman vessels. These 
souls have to go somewhere. Somchai’s hypothesis makes windups a part of the cycle of 
birth/death/rebirth, suggesting that they might be a part of the divine order rather than simply an 
aberration.   




authority. Emiko imagines from time to time that she is a “real” human. In those moments she is 
usually doing things like enjoying a cool breeze or a particularly good meal. Her ability to do 
these things, however, is severely limited by both her status as property and her status in 
Thailand as trash. When people threaten to kill her, they use the expression “mulch” to further 
dehumanize her.  In this way, Bacigalupi merges environmental processes with life-cycle 
processes and brings together ecology and “thing theory.” In this novel both nature and windups 
are “unnatural,” and both require new forms of care to survive. Stewardship has been rendered 
deeply problematical: it was precisely science’s hubris in thinking that it could oversee and 
“steward’ nature that caused the apocalyptic ruin of the natural world.  
Bacigalupi’s bleak speculative future doesn’t suggest a utopic response to the question of 
how relational agency might look if we do things differently. Instead, he offers a warning of how 
things might never change. Fredric Jameson has written that “It is easier to imagine the end of 
the world than the end of capitalism.” Bacigalupi urges his readers to consider the grotesque 
possibility that capitalism never ends, that in a world where everything is sacrificed for the sake 
of profit, any difference that can be exploited will be. There is no such thing as an ethical 
relationality in this novel, and the forms of stewardship that we are shown are more equivalent to 
mastery than responsibility.  
 
Nonhuman Personhood 
These novels examine ethical relationality outside of the bounds of human Being. They 
promote an expanded idea of the concept of personhood, and the elimination of the human/nature 




power structures are disrupted or destroyed. In these speculative ecofictions, humans are 
“natural” but they also are responsible for the way these worlds are exploited, structured, and 
destroyed. How these humans handle this responsibility varies from novel to novel. In Through 
the Arc of the Rainforest, although the Matacão is destroyed, there is still hope. The ball, though 
deceased, leaves the reader with this image, “The old forest has returned once again, secreting its 
digestive juices, slowly breaking everything into edible absorbable components . . . in which 
digestion and excretion were one and the same. But it will never be the same again” (212). There 
are no humans in this last image, just the forest itself, adapting as it has before and shifting to 
accommodate the changes that humans have wrought. Although there is no justice in the human 
world for the destruction of the Matacão, the forest will continue to adapt. This image suggests 
not just the agency of the forest, but also the inevitability of change, which allows for new ways 
of being. The Windup Girl and Daughter of Elysium end with similar notes of change.  
These novels embrace different ethical models for how relational agency plays out in 
differing worlds and scenarios, but at their core is still the idea that humans are the responsible 
party for maintaining an ethical relationality with others and the world. Our social, political, and 
environmental practices shape the ways that we respond to other beings at individual and 
communal levels. Novels like The Windup Girl and Through the Arc of the Rainforest 
specifically examine the responsibility that individuals have when the large corporate entities 
that they occupy are destroying any possibility of ethical relationality with the nonhuman. 
Daughter of Elysium examines the way government control can shape our relationships with the 
nonhuman and attempt to hide environmental exploitation and abuses. In all of these novels, the 




requisite for person status, rather than just species belonging.  
The worlds in these novels are dependent upon their characters being adaptable to change 
what it means to be human, what it means to be stewards, and what it means to be a part of a 
larger political or corporate body. Although corporations were the villains in these novels, some 
of the main characters in each were from them or worked for them. Their human identities are 
tied to the corporations that they work for, and therefore their responsibilities shift as does the 
extent to which they are willing to accept nonhuman agency as something that was, at times, 
greater than their own. This struggle between recognizing the limits of their own agency and 
resisting the impulse to force limits on the agency of nonhumans are what define the ethical 
relationality for which these characters struggle. The mechanical and genetically engineered 
beings in these novels are shown to be a part of the same struggle; they have the same ethical 
imperative that the humans do, which is to care for others. What that “care” looks like is 
variable, but ultimately personhood is tied to the ability to be compassionate, and to look beyond 














CHAPTER 4: RELATIONAL AGENCY AND PERSONHOOD IN 
AFROFUTURIST SPECULATIVE ECOFICTION 
Speculative ecofiction, in its drive to interrogate old ontologies and create new ones, 
explores both expansive definitions of human being and the limits that humanity has placed on 
those who have historically been oppressed by concepts and definitions of race. Helena Feder 
has argued that one of the main challenges of ecocriticism is “not only recognizing other forms 
of subjectivity and the ecological interconnectedness of these biologically diverse subjects, but in 
recognizing that the relations between them are political—they are life and death relations” 
(227). By calling attention to the political implications of relationality, Feder reaffirms the way 
these relations enact political process and policies. As I have shown in previous chapters, 
speculative ecofiction concurs.  
In this chapter, I will discuss what relationality looks like in Afrofuturist novels that 
reject essentialist notions of human being and complicate political and ethical relationships 
between humans, animals, and environments. This chapter furthers the examination of 
personhood and agency at the intersection Black identity and technological innovation. 
Particularly, these novels exemplify contemporary intersections of Afrofuturistic and 
environmental literature. Like the novels I examine in earlier chapters, these deal with nonhuman 
agency in relation to the question of human being and human culpability in the exploitation of 
nonhuman others. In Nnedi Okorafor’s Binti series, for example, Binti explores questions of 
personhood through relationships between herself, alien life, and the human communities that 
her family members occupy. Through these relationships, Binti is able to affirm her cyborg 
identity both metaphorically and literally. She is able create and maintain new relationships 




The Fifth Season, relationality is explored in a different way—humankind as a whole has lost 
large segments of human history and tradition. Because of this, new forms of relationality have 
to be established, and new configurations of “human being” and personhood have to be 
considered in order to survive on a hostile earth. These novels arrive at relational agency in 
different ways, but they push the boundaries of what it means to be human and to exist in 
relation with nonhuman others.   
Through Afrofuturism, the genre of science fiction is expanded to address the 
disappearance of race in the novels and stories published during the Golden Age (1950s) of 
science fiction. Historically, this subgenre, often praised for its futurist thinking, erased race 
from projections of the future. Even in 1977, Robert Scholes and Eric Rabkin suggested that the 
genre of science fiction was “advanced in its treatment of race and race relations” (187). As one 
of their examples they cite author Samuel Delany’s experience reading Starship Troopers, noting 
the “shock of pleasure” he received upon the scene halfway through the novel when the reader is 
made aware of the protagonist’s blackness (Scholes and Rabkin 188). The authors note that the 
problem of xenophobia is present in the novel, but that race isn’t the motivating factor for it. Yet, 
responses to Scholes and Rabkin noted that the “future-forward” perspective of science fiction 
actually often evaded the problem of racial inequality rather than offering any solutions to it.27 
They claimed that early genre distinctions of science fiction often avoided directly engaging with 
issues of race and racial oppression, and when dealing with racial issues, would do so abstractly 
to avoid alienating their white male readers. One response by critic Mark Bould discussed the 
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history of black science fiction and contended that “colorblind” science fiction “strip[s] both 
fictional robots and real African Americans of specific identities and histories, so the satirical sf 
tale in which the alien or the android is the subject of prejudice, whatever its merits, also avoids 
direct engagement with the realities of racialized hierarchies and oppressions” (Bould 179). 
In addition, critics such as Sandra Goven and Gregory Rutledge have argued at length for 
the canonical inclusion of black authors self-identified as science-fiction authors. 28 Rutledge 
argues against the exclusion of authors such as Octavia Butler, Nalo Hopkinson, and Samuel 
Delaney from criticism that engages with “future fiction.” Rutledge writes against those critics 
who suggest that “the patently hedonistic nature of futurist fiction renders it unworthy of 
consideration on such issues as ethnic relations, gender equality, and socio-political self-
determination” (Science Fiction 128). Rutledge references black authors specifically to point to 
the ways that structures of oppression are confronted without the loss of individual cultural and 
social identities in the worlds these authors create. The trajectory of this critical conversation 
suggests the need for Afrofuturism as a solution to the erasure and abstraction of race and racial 
issues in science fiction.  
 By examining how two of the biggest authors of speculative fiction merge Afrofuturistic 
themes with environmental concerns, I suggest that racial identity can be tied to narratives of 
technological progress without downplaying relationships with the nonhuman species and 
environments. Although there has been some critical research into the ecological aspects of 
Afrofuturism, little has been done to unearth these connections in literature. 29 The authors that I 
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examine in this chapter, Nnedi Okorafor and N.K. Jemisin, discuss race as a part of the future 
and how it shapes relationships across species, environments, and worlds. Both authors advocate 
relational agency based on care for the communities that their characters occupy. These authors 
position race as one of the matrices for understanding what it means to be human and establish 
the ways that race has been used politically to oppose people and exploit environments. 
However, they both also establish new concepts of personhood in direct relation to environment, 
albeit in opposite ways.  
  
Afrofuturism as Speculative Ecofiction 
A term that is used to describe the sort of speculative fiction that incorporates and 
addresses issues of Blackness, especially in American literature, is “Afrofuturism.” As Alonda 
Nelson, one of the prominent founding editors Afrofuturism (and creator of the AfroFuturism 
list-serv established in 1998) notes, “Blackness gets constructed as always oppositional to 
technologically driven chronicles of progress” (1). Nelson suggests that this was especially true 
in nineties technoculture which frequently positioned technology as a potential way to make race 
disappear entirely. To combat this narrative, Nelson’s edited collection of essays on 
Afrofuturism examines “sci-fi imagery, futurist themes, and technological innovation in the 
African diaspora” (9). The term “Afrofuturism” itself was coined in 1993 by Mark Dery in his 
introduction to three interviews he conducted with author Samuel Delany, and critics Greg Tate, 
and Tricia Rose. Dery said, “Speculative fiction that treats African-American themes and 
addresses African-American concerns in the context of twentieth -century technoculture—and, 




prosthetically enhanced future—might, for want of a better term, be called ‘Afrofuturism’” 
(180). Further complicating his use of this term was what he called a “troubling antinomy” that a 
people whose pasts had been forcibly erased might not be able to make their voices heard when 
imagining possible futures, especially when the “unreal estate of the future” was dominated by 
white voices (180). To help map the terrain of the Afrofuturism, Dery looked to musicians (such 
as Sun Ran and Jimi Hendrix), artists (such as Jean-Michel Basquiat and Rammellzee), and 
writers (such as Samuel Delaney and Milestone Media) to establish a solid cannon of 
Afrofuturistic voices (181-182). In doing so, Dery reshaped critical conversations surrounding 
race, technology, art, and African American identity around African-Americans as visionaries 
and leaders of technological innovation and advancement.  
Although Afrofuturism as a movement may not have been officially named until 1993, 
Dery shows that it gained momentum in the seventies throughout the arts. In literature, authors 
such as Octavia Butler, Ishmael Reed, and Samuel Delany pioneered new landscapes in 
speculative and science fiction.  Octavia Butler’s fiction—such as her Xenogenesis and Patternist 
series—has especially traversed the various realms of speculative fiction and demonstrated the 
ways that ecofiction can examine potential futures while also considering past and present 
understandings of race and culture. One of her most popular novels, Kindred, comments on how 
agency is affected by race and gender, by focusing on Dana, an unwitting time-traveler flung 
back in time to pre-Civil War Maryland and thus forced into slavery, who meets her white great-
great-great grandfather whose actions in the past shape her present reality. In Butler’s 
Xenogensis trilogy, she moves from the distant past into the far future, examining how a human 




means to be biologically human. These Afrofuturist works warn against erasing the past even as 
they speculate about the future, suggesting that identity is rooted in race, culture, and place.   
 Presently, Afrofuturism has experienced a surge in pop-culture popularity due in part to 
the release of the movie adaptation of Marvel’s Black Panther—a comic book superhero (created 
by Jack Kirby and Stan Lee) who debuted in The Fantastic Four in 1966 (Mitchell). However, 
another part of the that popularity is due to Ytasha Womack’s 2013 book, Afrofuturism: The 
World of Black Sci Fi and Fantasy Culture. Womack’s accessible text traces the trajectory of 
Afrofuturism up to the present, mapping out her own experiences as a Black nerd before the term 
“Afrofuturism” existed. In her introduction, Womack says,  
At its heart, Afrofuturism stretches the imagination far beyond the conventions of our 
time and the horizons of expectation, and kicks the box of normalcy and preconceived 
ideas of blackness out of the solar system. Whether it’s sci-fi story lines or radical 
eccentricity, Afrofuturism inverts reality (16). 
Womack sees Afrofuturism as actively resisting dominant ideas of what Black identity means, 
not just in regard to technology, but also in regard to the current cultural concepts of “nerd” and 
“geek” culture and who is allowed to be a part of those. In this way, Womack offers an 
examination of Afrofuturism that focuses on contemporary artists such as DJ Spooky, Missy 
Elliot, Andre 3000, N.K Jemisin, Nnedi Okorafor, Wanuri Kahiu, Coleen Smith, and Turtel Onli. 
These are only a few of the creators that Womack discusses in the text, which positions the ideas 
of Afrofuturism into the politics and cultural landscape of the globalized present. 
In recent years, scholars such as Sofia Samatar have contended that Afrofuturism be 




science fiction, and attest[ing] to the continued relevance of Afrofuturism for both Africa and the 
diaspora” (Samatar 176). Although Afrofuturism was initially understood to be centered around 
the African diaspora in the United States, these scholars posit that expanding the term to Pan-
African understanding allows Black artists from Africa to affirm that their blackness is not bound 
to a lack of technological innovation and growth in a technocentric world. Other scholars and 
authors, such as Lauren Beukes and Mohale Mashigo, have suggested that “Afrofuturism is not 
for Africans living in Africa…Our needs, when it comes to imagining futures, or even 
reimagining a fantasy present, are different from elsewhere on the globe” (Mashigo).30 Mashingo 
believes that the priorities of Afrofuturism are not aligned with those Africans living in Africa, 
South Africa specifically. Although she suggests that “Afrofuturism” is not the right fit, she 
doesn’t come up with an alternative term.  
Nnedi Okorafor took up this task when she became frustrated with being consistently 
labeled an Afrofuturist writer. Many Black American authors of speculative fiction are labeled 
“Afrofuturist” whether or not they have sought out the distinction. In an interview from 2018 she 
said, “I do ‘AfricanFuturism,’ not Afrofuturism, Africanfuturism (one word). That falls under 
science fiction. I’ve written what I call Juju fantasy (laughs). I think it’s a little different because 
a lot of the things considered fantasy aren’t fantasy” (Okolo). Okorafor’s resistance to this genre 
suggests that more progress needs to be made in creating boundaries for what “Afrofuturism” is 
or can be. Africanfuturism better represents Okorafor’s work because Afrofuturism doesn’t 
always address the politics and cultural concerns of Africans living in Africa. As a Nigerian 
American, whose roots connect to both Nigeria and United States, Okorafor explores 
                                            





intersections of race and technology from a perspective that is best expressed by the descriptor 
“Africanfuturist.”31 
The Afrofuturist speculative ecofiction I discuss in this chapter addresses ecological 
concerns by creating cyborg identities shaped by intimate relationships with nonhumans. These 
novels weave concerns of about identity, ancestry, and geological place with nonhuman beings 
who share their connections with humans. Through these connections, humans are able to 
understand themselves fully and take responsibility for their actions. Human identity is tied to 
the acquisition of knowledge and the ability to use that knowledge to shoulder the 
responsibilities humans have to the rest of the world and its inhabitants. As Womack says, “In 
Afrofuturism, technological achievement alone is not enough to create a free-thinking future. A 
well-crafted relationship with nature is intrinsic to a balanced future too” (103- 104). This idea of 
a “balanced future” is explored in opposite ways in these texts. In The Fifth Season, lack of 
balance comes from an over-abundance of hubris and a very fraught relationship with the planet 
Earth itself that has led to humans forgetting large portions of their own history, thus forcing 
them to form new relationships with nonhumans to survive. In the Binti series, balance is shown 
through willingness of humans to embrace a broad concept of personhood based on relationships 
with nonhuman others and the quest for knowledge.  
 
Alien Agency, Humans, and Technology  
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Okorafor’s Binti series is about a young girl who decides to leave home to get a better 
education off-world. Set in the distant future, this series explores themes such as sense of self 
through technology, sense of race, sense of community, and sense of totality identity as a part of 
an interconnected network. Binti is sixteen years old when she leaves her home, by the time she 
travels to the best university in the universe, and comes back to transition into womanhood, she 
becomes connected to people and places that are entirely nonhuman both physically and 
psychologically. By establishing relationships with beings so essentially other, she creates 
networks that allow her to expand her understanding of personhood and to grow as a human. 
Binti’s “edan” is what first lets her communicate with the Meduse and prevents planets-wide 
conflict. An edan is a word used to describe a bit of debris from an old civilization with no 
discernable purpose. Binti herself is a master “harmonizer,” able to mediate between all different 
type of beings; this ability is described as knowledge of “true deep mathematics” which allows 
them to understand how all beings are connnected (Okorafor, Binti 15). Haromonizers use their 
understanding of mathematics and systems to predict and act on behalf of what is in the best 
interest for everyone.  
Like other works of speculative ecofiction, the three-book Binti series emphasizes ethical 
relationality between all beings—planets and ecosystems included. The Himba people in Binti's 
family, who have lived in their home known as “The Root” for generations, demonstrate this 
relationality by trusting their home to keep them safe when they are firebombed. Mwinyi, 
another harmonizer and friend of Binti, is able to communicate with The Root and let it know 
that it is safe for her family to come out. Mwinyi thinks, “It spoke no words he could understand, 




chose to protect its family.  When the family is let out, they explain, “When the root had been 
attacked and set aflame, something had made it react as one of the family. It enclosed and 
protected. And inside the Root, there had not only been supplies they could eat, but pods of water 
that grew from the walls of the cellar” (Binti the Complete Trilogy 302). The relationship 
between Binti’s family and The Root spans human lifetimes, and yet it is able to come to their 
aid when they need it. There is no direct discussion of whether or not these trees were genetically 
modified by humans to find and store water, or to survive in apocalyptic conditions, but none of 
the characters mention their ability to communicate until Mwinyi realizes that this tree has 
protected Binti’s family. Her family has always thought of the trees as one of their peripheral 
family, but none have tried to talk to it directly except Binti’s mother, who is able to understand 
mathematics with such clarity that she able to see how all beings use it. She says, “Do you know 
plants do math? They measure what they need to survive and thrive…The Root had a spot. I 
could wake it, if I gave from my own life force…That’s how the Root knew to protect its 
people” (304). The Root didn’t act until Binti’s mother shared her life force with it, in the form a 
cut to her hand. This sharing of life force literalizes the relationship between humans and 
environment in this novel and suggests the reciprocity and responsibility that underlies relational 
agency in speculative ecofiction. In this scene, The Root’s actions mark it as a part of the family 
and also a part of the larger Himba community, situating it as a part of culture shared with 
humans, even if it doesn’t have a human voice.    
Throughout the series, Binti maintains her identity, even as she expands it to encompass 
the changes that she undergoes and relationships she discovers. She announces her name, “I am 




Binti 25). It is the touchstone she uses to remind herself of where she comes from and who she is 
becoming. This sense of identity is an essential part of her humanity. The cultural signifiers that 
she carries with her from earth also allow her to maintain a sense of self—the otjize she wears, 
the edan, and the whole of the history and traditions of the Himba and Enyi Zinariya (her father’s 
people who are thought of as an uncivilized desert tribe). Her humanity doesn’t restrict her 
ability to form relationships with other sentient beings. It allows her to appreciate the 
connections that she is capable of making. Her relationships are established on the foundation 
that she is a human person with strong ties to the planet Earth, and a long tradition of caring for 
others.  
Alongside a sense of human responsibility and ethical relationality, this series also 
suggests that the highest calling of sentient life is gathering and sharing knowledge. Oomza Uni, 
the school that Binti has ran away from home to attend, is full of intelligent nonhuman beings 
who manage to learn from each other. In Binti’s world, personhood is not limited to humans. In 
fact, Oomza Uni’s human population is only 5% of the student body (Okorafor, Binti 13). They 
accommodate peoples’ differences architecturally by creating spaces to accommodate different 
ways of being, but all are at the university because they share a superior intellect and passion for 
learning. In this space, physical differences of all kinds are accommodated for the sake of 
intellectual pursuits. At the university, knowledge might reign supreme, but individual identity 
and cultural histories and traditions are also important. When she is asked who she is and what 
she is doing acting as a mediator for the Meduse, Binti positions herself by invoking her land, 
people, and traditions. She explains, “We wash with otjize, a mix of red clay from our land and 




professors laugh at her, which reassures Binti because their casual rudeness reminds her that 
humans are the same no matter where they are. After she successfully acts an ambassador to the 
Meduse, she hears that the rest of the community are talking about her, “‘Tribal’: that’s what 
they called humans from ethnic groups too remote and ‘uncivilized’ to regularly send students to 
attend Oomza Uni” (41). This reaffirms her own understanding of how she perceived both on 
Earth and in any place where humans are a part of the community. Her “tribal” status, meant as 
an insult, also suggests kinship ties in communities, which are the types of relationships by 
which Binti structures her sense of self.  
 Binti’s relationships quickly leave the realm of the human, but it is those with the Meduse 
(a warlike race of space jellyfish), New Fish (a spaceship), and the nanotech inherited by her 
family that actually transform her physical body and give her access to beings that are 
fundamentally different from humans. This access allows her to examine what it means to be 
herself, an African human from Earth, in the context of all of these beings who see the world in 
radically alien ways. Binti is able to establish an ethical relationality with each of these 
communities through compromise.  
The most reciprocal relationship that Binti has with a nonhuman being is the one she 
shares with New Fish. New Fish is a recently born (sentient and organic) space ship whose 
mother Binti first travelled in during the events of the first novella. New Fish’s mother, Third 
Fish, kept Binti safe during the Meduse attack by making sure her door stayed shut. Later, Third 
Fish offered feelings of reassurance and warmth when they met again. The relationship between 
Third Fish and Binti was always one of mutual respect and admiration, but what Binti didn’t 




events that took place—even if she was still in the process of becoming. The intimacy of their 
relationship is established when New Fish is able to resurrect her. When she comes back to life, 
she has inherited a deeper understanding of the mathematical connections between the universe 
(Binti the Complete Trilogy 314). This rebirth changes Binti’s understanding of her place in the 
universe, but not her identity. When Mwinyi noticed that she is alive he “sank to the floor, his 
back against the slender truck of a young tree with tough rubbery-looking leaves growing from a 
hole in the floor. A tree that looked oddly like an Undying tree” (315). This tree, a tangible piece 
of Binti’s history, becomes a part of the ship itself. When Binti stands on the floor of the ship, 
New Fish, she realizes that it is talking to her and has shared its life with hers. Because they now 
share a life force, the physical form of Binti’s body changes again. New Fish explains, “When 
your body was placed in my chamber, my microbes went to work. You are probably more 
microbe than human now…I’ve absorbed some of you, too, Binti” (322-323). These changes 
transform Binti more than any of the others because she can share consciousness with New Fish, 
essentially occupying the body of the ship. She briefly worries that this has fundamentally 
shifted other parts of her being, but is reassured that she is still Himba, Meduse, and Enyi 
Zinariya. Her “union” with New Fish means that they are now a part of the other, unable to be 
separated by more than twenty miles. She and New Fish have to stay within a five-mile radius of 
each other or risk death, thus limiting both New Fish, who is a space fish that loves exploring, 
and Binti, who has to move into a special dorm so that New Fish can be nearby. They are tied to 
each other both physically and mentally, and although one is a ship and the other is a human 
woman, the ties that bind them literally sustain Binti and transform them both into beings greater 




experience space, and New Fish is able to absorb Binti’s experiences, successfully replicating 
her homeland’s trees and landscape and accessing the nanotechnology exclusive to Binti’s 
family. Their relationship shows one possibility of relational agency, that a foundation of 
reciprocity and care allows flourishing for those in the relationship. 
Another relationship that challenges Binti’s concept of personhood and her capacity for 
compassion is the one that she shares with the Meduse people. Physically, the Meduse resemble 
jellyfish that can swim through gaseous atmospheres as well as water (which is sacred to them). 
The structure of this relationship is forced on her when the Meduse discover that she can 
communicate with them because of her edan. This technology also allows her to kill them, and 
this knowledge means that they manipulate her into the role of ambassador by forcing her to 
become a part of their collective. This connection illustrates relational agency because she is 
connected to all of the Meduse, and this both gives her greater agency and limits her possibilities. 
Her physical body changes to reflect her belonging in the community. Her locks are now 
tentacles called okuoko and she doesn’t know whether or not they will grow and behave like hair 
(Binti 41). As a result, the Meduse consider her one of their tribe, allowing her to be a part of 
their shared consciousness. The peace between the Meduse and Oomza Uni is due to the 
discovery that Binti’s otjize has the ability to heal the Meduse. Though Binti's otijize doesn't 
have to be made from clay from the planet Earth in order to heal them, the use of clay alludes to 
one of the underlying themes of the novel: care reciprocates care. She treats both sites of 
gathering this clay with respect, and in turn the otjize allows her to heal the Meduse.  
Okwu is one of the Meduse who eventually becomes Binti’s friend. Although he 




communicate. The bond between Okwu and Binti is such that she is able to feel what he is 
feeling and communicate with him even over large distances. Although he is not human, 
nowhere in the series does she suggest that her care for him is anything less than reciprocal. In 
her role as a haromonizer and as ambassador, she attempts to understand him on his terms, and 
expects that he do the same for her. Okwu is described as very alien, both in temperament and 
physically. However, Binti and Okwu are able to form a relationship, and he saves her from 
harm at great personal risk to himself by hiding her inside of him to protect her from bullets. In 
turn, she uses her otijize to heal him by having him in direct contact with her skin and by treating 
his wounds directly with the clay (Binti the Complete Trilogy 269).  
The relationship that allows her to fully understand her own history and human identity is 
the one that she allows between herself and the nanobots in her bloodstream. All of the Enyi 
Zinariya have nanotechnology that allows them to access the whole of their history and their 
people with a few gestures. All of the members of their tribe pass along nanites that allow their 
children to access this database of knowledge, and with it the ability to communicate across great 
distances, in a way that the other humans living on earth cannot. Because of this, they are better 
able to communicate with and appreciate nonhuman others. Although they do not advertise the 
technological advancements that make this possible, they are fully capable of contacting peoples 
outside of earth’s atmosphere and have scientific advances that the other humans on earth do not 
even think are possible. One of these people is Binti’s grandmother who Binti describes by 
saying, “Sometimes, she’d stop speaking entirely yet her hands would keep going, moving in 
circles, jabbing, zigzagging, sometimes harshly, other times gently” (Binti the Complete Trilogy 




disorder. However, Binti learns that these movements are how they interact with technology that 
no one else on earth can use. It is up to Binti to make the choice to activate that technology and 
risk being seen by her other family members as diseased. When she decides to activate it, the 
nanobots only enhance the abilities that she has intrinsically as a harmonizer, by making her 
network visible to her. By forcing Binti to interact with the physical world, even if it is just 
through gesture, the nanobots make connections that Binti understood to be abstract concrete in 
the real world.  
The nanotech gives Binti the ability to see the narratives of her ancestors, as well as 
connect with her family. This suggests that the technology itself has an agency in what it decides 
to show Binti, and what it allows Binti to access. However, the nanotech is unable to create the 
narratives that it shows. It is only the humans who have that ability. In this sense, literary critics 
Katherine Hayles and Alisa Braithwaite discuss the “database” as a genre, saying that its 
overwhelming nature produces a limitless number of “narrative possibilities,” but cannot “create 
narrative out of the information it contains” (Braithwaite 82-83). In How We Became 
Posthuman, Hayles discusses how narrative helps humans negotiate their environments, 
especially when those environments cannot be directly under human control. Databases have 
made the storing and access of narratives easier, but, Hayles argues, the narrative impulse still 
remains ultimately human. Thus, when Binti undergoes the process of activating the nanotech, 
she feels that she is giving up narrative authority of her own life. She realizes this is not the case, 
however, when she considers how the astrolabe that she carries with her relies on human input 
and modification. In the first novella, because of their ability to show the best possible 




discussed as the primary method of figuring out if the choices individuals make are the correct 
ones. Therefore, even before Binti’s body becomes a part of a network, her astrolabe has already 
insured that she is a part of technology that has narrative powers that seem to reduce the 
significance of humans.  However, in her examination of Nalo Hopkinson’s The Midnight 
Robber, Braithwaite says that humans and technology share a symbiotic relationship that “might 
enhance human connection rather than hinder it” (Braithwaite 98). This is also true in the Binti 
series. The nanotechnology that makes Binti’s physical body a part of a network may have been 
created by aliens, but the astrolabes that Bini’s people have created are man-made and offer a 
similar connection to other people, although astrolabes also act as a way for individuals to 
“store” their identities as well as act as a means of communication (Okorafor, Binti the Complete 
Trilogy 233-234). In this series, technology is not offered as a villain or even as a tool of absolute 
control. Instead, it is celebrated for allowing humanity to grow as a species and explore worlds 
beyond Earth. 
As an Africanfuturist work of speculative ecofiction, the Binti series relies on African 
history to act as a stepping stone to the future the novellas imagine. For example, although 
unfamiliar to most Western readers, the Himba tribe are a real people in Namibia. Their 
traditions do include applying otjize and it is a practice only performed by women (Barnett and 
Hume). Okorafor uses Himbian traditions and practices to tie the past to the future. Another way 
Okorafor roots the future in our contemporary present is by allowing Binti to see the arrival of 
the Zinariya (the highly advanced alien race whose people glowed like the sun) through the 
nanotechnology gifted to her people. Kande, the woman who establishes first contact with aliens, 




University of Ibadan when she graduated high school (Binti the Complete Trilogy 210). This 
scene situates the events of the novel within a historical context that ties Binti’s history directly 
to the “Old African” tribe of the Enyi Zinariya. Among the other themes in this novel, the theme 
of remembering and honoring ties to a cultural past and the history of different communities 
showcases one of the characteristics of Africanfuturism. This focus shows the future possible 
even with a past as enduring and unforgettable as that of Binti’s people. Although she separates 
herself from them all with her death, when she comes back to life she embraces the possibilities 
of who she could be and what her relationships across species boundaries might mean for the rest 
of her life. 
This series situates humans in the entangled web of relational agency and suggests that 
relationality can extend beyond the realms of earth ecologies. Instead, the ethical relationality 
that Binti first learns on earth can be applied cosmologically—the nonhuman beings that embed 
Binti into their own ecosystems are able traverse the complexities of their material beings to 
encourage growth. However, this series also reveals the tensions inherent in these new ways of 
being. When relationality is established, be that through the blurring of natural/technological or 
planetary/cosmological boundaries, humans have to bear responsibility for the choices of their 
species, and work toward a deeper understanding of personhood that transcends species 
boundaries.  
 
Planetary Agency and Apocalypse   
N. K. Jemisin’s Broken Earth trilogy imagines humans as agents of planetary destruction 




manipulate the forces of the earth. People with these powers are forced into slavery, serving the 
longest-living empire in the known world. Like other examples of Afrofuturistic speculative 
fiction, these novels directly confront oppression based on eugenics and environmental 
exploitation. In this world, the characters all know that civilization has collapsed many times 
before as it has been recorded in “stonelore.” This stonelore is “as old as intelligence. It’s all 
that’s allowed humankind to survive through Fifth Season after Fifth Season” (Jemisin 125). 
Although spread throughout the novels, there are traces of past civilizations and their greatness, 
including several floating mineral objects that appear to exist with no real function, the humans 
in the novel focus on survival, working against “Father Earth” who hates them. The continent on 
which this novel is set is called “The Stillness” because of the constant tremors that it 
experiences (7). The humans in this novel set themselves in opposition to the planet and those 
who can predict and inhibit the earth’s movements.  
The first novel in the series, The Fifth Season, illustrates the pending environmental 
apocalypse in the American cultural imagination, and more importantly, confronts the ways that 
race and eugenics structure our current understanding of how humans and nonhumans are 
connected. The world is plagued by earthquakes, and one civilization that has maintained itself 
through multiple seasons (the fifth season being death), the Sanzed empire, has been maintaining 
their power by enslaving people who can feel and control earthquakes. The protagonist of all 
three novels is a woman now called Essun who was born with the name Damaya and given the 
name Syenite when she is forced into slavery by a group called the Fulcrum. It is there that she is 
renamed Syenite. She is told, “You will have no use name from here forth, because your 




characterize the changes that happen to her over the course of the novel as she discovers that she 
is an “orogene,” one of the people who have the ability to control and detect the earthquakes that 
are currently destroying the world.  
The discrimination that these orogenes face is based on the fact that they have the 
abilities that closely resemble magic. They can draw power from the earth itself to stop the 
earthquakes, move objects, calm people, and kill by drawing on life force. The slang term to 
describe orogenes is “rogga.” They are either controlled by an agency called the Fulcrum or 
killed. Children that display any talent, such as being able to tell when an earthquake will 
happen, are taken from their families and forced into slavery. When Essun shows signs of being 
one, she thinks, “It has never occurred to her that roggas—she stops herself. She. She is a 
rogga…It’s a bad word she’s not supposed to say…Orogenes, then. It is terrible to know that 
orogenes can kill so many, so easily. But then, she supposes that is why people hate them. Her. 
That is why people hate her” (Jemisin 89). The fear of what orogenes might do means that 
people who encounter them “in the wild” tend to shoot them on sight. It is revealed quickly, 
however, that rogga children who are not bred into servitude serve another purpose if they are 
captured by the government: they are made “node-maintainers.” In this role they are mutilated 
and drugged into a semi-vegetative state. They are forced to react to the smallest seismic tremors 
and calm them (140-141). They are strapped into a wire-mesh chair, fed through intravenous 
tubes, and left on life support until they die. In this way, the most “defective” and unteachable 
orogenes are still able to serve the empire. This cruelty is rooted in the idea that orogenes are less 
than human, and in some ways even less than animals. Instead, they are like tools to be used to 




In this novel, the relationship between humans and the earth is personified. The Earth is 
capable of emotional complexity and higher-order thinking. As such, human lore genders it as 
“Father Earth” and makes it clear that the only emotion that he feels toward humans is anger. 
Humans caused this anger in the distant past by destroying the moon. In the novel’s present, they 
continue to pay the price. Initially, the novel opens with the idea that a stone eater (a being that 
resembling a stone statue) and a renegade human are working together to get revenge on the 
Sanze empire (Jemisin 7). However, the truth is more complex than that. There is a rift between 
humans and the earth caused by the relentless exploitation of the earth that causes the earth’s 
crust to shatter. From the shattering onward, the stone eaters, Guardians (humans implanted with 
an unknown technology), and humans are all positioned against each other in order to recreate 
their failed relationships with the earth. The Guardians are implanted with a device that allows 
them to neutralize the abilities of orogenes and turn their power inward on themselves. Essun’s 
Guardian, Schaffa, explains, “A thing is done to make us what we are. An implantation. 
Sometimes it goes wrong and must be removed, as you saw” (Jemisin 328). The connection 
between the Guardians and the technology allows some unknown force, eventually understood to 
be the earth itself, to control their bodies. This implant has them in constant agony and robs them 
of their free will. They control the orogenes on behalf of the earth, who is angry that humans 
have destroyed the moon. 
However, humans are not the only people who are populating the novel. There are other 
beings, made of stone, who remember what has happened to destroy the relationship between 
humans and the environment and who, in this novel, are attempting to bring about the true end of 




experimentation and evolution, they came to be their own species (6). Unlike the nonhuman 
persons in the Binti series, these stone eaters are embedded in human history and culture. 
However, because they are now so removed from their origins, some have come to despise 
humanity for the endless cycles of destruction that they have set off, and others are attempting to 
recreate the world into something more enduring.   
The personification of the earth persists throughout the novel, although it is only revealed 
later in the series that the earth speaks through the Guardians. This personification is the opposite 
of the “Mother Earth” trope. There is no nurturing or protection, only destruction. The phrase 
“Father Earth” in this novel is often used as a curse. “Evil Earth” is used multiple times 
whenever something bad happens, even if it is not a natural disaster. While there are no religions 
specifically mentioned in the novel, the invocation of Father Earth seems to promote the earth to 
godlike status, especially when coupled with stone eaters and orogenes who have the potential to 
rebel against the earth. It is primarily the orogenes who attempt to establish ethical relationality 
between other humans and other species. Most of the humans who are not orogenes do not 
bother to look beyond their own survival.  
One of the reasons that humans tend not to look further than survival is the lore that was 
established on the advent of the first apocalypse to preserve the human species. This lore is what 
makes up what remains of human history. One of the most important of those fragments is, 
“Winter, Spring, Summer, Fall; Death is the fifth and master of them all” (Jemisin 149). This 
phrase alludes to the fact that the current human civilization has faced several “seasons” of death 
that force humanity to recreate human civilization from the scraps of history that they are able to 




the apocalypse that will destroy all life on earth. Essun is focused on her own personal 
apocalypse, the murder of her son and the kidnapping of her daughter by the children’s father. 
The main events of the novel reveal her history and what lead her to this point in her life, 
revealing that she is a orogene, and that is the reason her children are currently in danger. Essun 
finds herself dealing with the death of her three-year-old son who was killed by his father when 
he started showing signs of being an orogene.  
While humans survive, they are shown to adapt in the way that other animals do, by 
transforming their behavior. The characters in the novel think of slavery as an everyday part of 
life, but as the story of one character, Alabaster, proves, though they are ashamed of breaking 
taboos such as cannibalism, humans will do anything to survive a season. Although they are 
familiar with stories that are recorded to prepare them for an apocalypse, they are unprepared for 
the reality. They are forced to form alliances outside of their communities and confront what it 
means to be a person and how to be in political relationships with others. Recounting the lore 
that has been passed down through oral tradition, Essun says, “…after the orogenes committed 
their great sin: Father Earth’s surface cracked like an eggshell. Nearly every living thing died as 
his fury became manifest in the first and most terrible of the Fifth Seasons: the Shattering 
Season” (380). This first season recounts what humans know about how the humanity fell. 
Although some languages and traditions survive, the primary language is Sanzemat, and almost 
everyone in the novel learns it because it is the language of the empire. The empire provides the 
promise of safety for most of humanity because of their exploitation of the orogenes. Near the 
end of the novel, Alabaster explains how their kind had become enslaved by the empire—the 




says, “That’s when they started calling us ‘lesser races” actually” (417). He continues, “Orogenes 
built the Fulcrum… We did it under the threat of genocide, and we used it to buckle the collars 
around our own necks, but we did it” (418). This narrative implicates the orogenes in their own 
subjugation but makes it clear that they had not always been slaves. Alabaster tells Essun this 
version of history in order to make her question everything else she thinks she knows. He wants 
her help to destroy the world, hoping that whatever species becomes dominant has a better 
relationship with the Earth than humans. The lore that defines the ways humans survive the 
Seasons is passed down on stone tablets in the hopes that they will be preserved when other 
mediums are destroyed.  
Although race is a part of the future, it isn’t a determining characteristic of the quality of 
life that the characters have. The narrator comments on racial differences, describing one girl as 
having “sharp teeth because it is her race’s custom to file them; another boy has no penis…one 
cannot reasonably expect sameness out of so much difference…but…the world is not fair” (193). 
The unfairness of the world is shaped around attunement to the earth, rather than the differing 
racial characteristics that exist within the remains of humanity. The stone eaters, although once 
human, no longer consider themselves part of the human race. Hoa, the stone eater that travels 
with Essun, is reluctant to reveal that he is not human, so he initially attempts to pass as a human 
child. While Essun was given the name Syenite because all of the orogenes are named after 
stone, Hoa is actually made of stone and eats pure minerals as sustenance. Instead of turning him 
aside when she learns he isn’t human, Essun takes him by the hand. The narrator says, “There is 
something in his gaze that is entirely human, and grateful for your acceptance at that moment. It 




makes them both more “human.” Although human is not explicitly defined, it is clear that 
“humanness” is not defined by intellect or reason as it is for the liberal subject; instead, it is tied 
to care and compassion.  
Forming relationships outside of species boundaries is necessary for survival and 
suggests the possibilities for flourishing if those relationships are properly maintained. Hoa is 
unlike other stone eaters in that he continually makes the choice to mimic human behaviors 
because, as he tells Essun at one point, “I like you” (396). Stone eaters have the ability to travel 
through the earth, but time and again he refuses. He also wears clothes and takes care to hide his 
teeth, although many of the other stone eaters in the novel don’t bother to hide their differences. 
When he and Essun encounter another stone eater watching over a human, the female stone eater 
“doesn’t move for a moment, and then she closes her mouth to hide those awful diamond 
teeth…It was a threat display, like the way a kirkhusa draws back its lips to bare its fangs” (270). 
In response, Hoa makes the same display, and although Essun is shocked by the structure and 
sharpness of his teeth, she doesn’t fear him. Hoa himself reveals that he is the narrator of the 
novel, the speaker who is reminding Essun of who he is. Although his origin story is not told in 
this novel, later in the series it is revealed that Hoa was genetically engineered to be a geomancer 
with abilities similar to orogenes and that he was transformed into stone by the earth itself as a 
punishment for destroying the moon. While he was born human, his humanity was stripped 
away, and he did not use human language because he and others like him used subsonic 
vocalizations and vibrations to communicate. Stone eaters have the ability to travel through the 
earth, and retain the history that humans have forgotten, because of this Hoa is able to construct 




Their relationship becomes familial even though the differences that separate how they 
experience the world are vast.  
Although the narrative paints a bleak picture of the future of humanity, there are 
moments when the characters are able to express their humanity outside of the parameters of 
violence and manipulation. A small part of the novel is dedicated to the relationship that Essun 
and Alabaster have with a man named Innon. He is the leader of the island of Meov which has 
been run by orogenes for as long as history has been recorded, completely outside of the 
empire’s control. While Alabaster is content to live out his days on Meov, Essun wants to 
dismantle the control that the empire has over the Stillness. She says, “It isn’t right” (143). This 
feeling keeps her from being content raising her child with Alabaster and Innon (Jemisin 372).  
Once during this interlude, Alabaster asks Essun, “Don’t you ever just want to…to be 
human...That we’re not human is just a lie they tell themselves so they don’t have to feel bad 
about how they treat us” (354). She responds that they are not human, that legally they have 
never been human. This is what compels her to want to change the world. This drive to make 
things better sets her apart from other characters in the novel who are driven by survival or the 
possibility of gain in the present moment. She wants things to be different, and she believes that 
rebellion might be the only way to make that difference. This means that at several points in the 
novel, she murders people with only slight hesitation and a bit of guilt. Although compassion is 
at the core of the humanity Essun embodies, she also violently and viciously reacts when her 
survival or the survival of those she loves is on the line. This violence is tied to the rhetoric about 




Humans have lost their position as the dominant species because the earth keeps wiping 
them out. Regardless, they still act as stewards of what remains; keeping pets, raising crops, and 
cultivating the land. However, as soon as it is clear that the apocalypse is approaching, 
everything changes. With the start of the season, the nonhuman animals start to change their 
habitual behaviors in order to adapt to a world were vegetation is sparse. One species that 
changes are the kirkhusa, described as more of land-otters than dogs, kept as pets in cities 
because they ate “only the leaves of low bushes and the insects that grow on them” (185). 
However, they transform when “they taste enough ash, which triggers some instinct within them 
that’s normally dormant. Then they change. Everything changes during a Season” (187). When 
Essun and Hoa encounter a kirkhusa once the ash starts falling, the first thing they notice is that 
it has a collar. Essun speculates that it was once cared for and that the people who cared for it are 
probably dead. She suggests that if they didn’t die in the earthquake, then they were eaten by 
their pet once its instincts kicked in. The need to survive forces both humans and animals to rely 
on their instincts to survive. The only species that maintains ethical relationality in the face of 
apocalypse are the stone eaters. While they are not human, they take ultimate responsibility for 
the world and its inhabitants. This responsibility pushes them to befriend certain humans and try 
to repair the damage that humans have done to the world. 
 
Agency, Responsibility, and Relationality  
At the core of these Afrofuturist and Africanfuturist works is an optimism about the 
future possibilities of humanity that can be buried in other speculative ecofiction. This optimism 




primary signifiers for modes of human being. Although racial identity and blackness are 
celebrated in these novels, they are not the primary way by which people and nonhumans 
discriminate against each other within or outside of species boundaries. By making race a part of 
the future, these novels are able to confront the racial injustices of the present by addressing 
them as a part of the worlds they created. For example, Okorafor creates a direct historical line 
from the people of Old Africa to the tribes that Binti is a part of in the present. The Himba 
people have been slaves in the past, and although now they are free, they are still living with the 
trauma and consequences of their enslavement. In Jemisin’s novel, the confusing tangle of 
history and the physical changes wrought in the world do not allow for a clear genealogy beyond 
that Sanze empire’s racial features that set the standard for beauty throughout the Stillness. 
However, both novels end with hope for worlds that are not post racial. Instead, they insist on the 
validity of human difference.  
Both authors imagine worlds where technology, humans, and nonhuman sentient beings 
are able to thrive when they acknowledge the relational agency of others. They do this by 
expanding the definition of human without universalizing it, acknowledging other ways of 
knowing and interacting with the world and its inhabitants, and by creating an ethical 
relationality as a framework by which the human protagonists are able to confront their own 
ideas about what it means to be human and what it means to be responsible for the actions of 
humanity. In these novels, human identity is tied to the acquisition of knowledge and the ability 
to use that knowledge to shoulder the responsibilities humans have to the rest of the world and its 
inhabitants. As critic Sylvia Wynter has said, the idea of humanity fits the historical period that it 




possibilities of what it means to be human expand, even if the responsibilities of the distinction 
do not. In Orkorafor’s texts, Binti’s humanity is tied to her identity and culture. In Jemisin’s 
novel, humanity is tied to responsibility and drive to make things right. Although both novels 
expand the concept of personhood beyond the species-specific parameters of the human, 
humanity is still shaped by compassion and responsibility.  
Examining Afrofuturist ecofiction has allowed me to focus on how novels work to 
structure an ethical relationality between humans and animals and the environment. However, I 
would like to end this chapter by discussing a short film that also addresses questions of ethical 
relationality and environmental exploitation using similar narrative methodologies that are 
established in this fiction. In 2010 Kenyan director Wanuri Kahiu created a short science fiction 
film, Pumzi, that was screened at the Sundance Film Festival to critical acclaim (Seibel). Kahiu 
imagines a dystopia set thirty-five years after World War III, known as The Water War, has 
destroyed most of the world and nature is uninhabitable. As a result, humans rely on technology, 
surviving in enclosed communities under strictly regulated conditions such as rations, production 
of energy using kinetic energy, and recycling what water they bodily produce. The film is set 
primarily in the community of Maitu, where the main character Asha has a dream of a tree 
growing in nature outside—something she knows to be impossible because all of nature is dead. 
Maitu is depicted as a technological dystopia monitored and controlled by its government. In her 
lab, Asha’s blue eyeshadow makes a colorful contrast to the industrial grey and halogen lighting 
and the jars of long-dead plants that line her workspace (Kahiu 1:37). She works in a virtual 
natural museum that shows video of green plants and blue skies, alongside specimens of dead 




is sent a soil sample that is capable of sustaining plant life, she begins to hope that her dream is 
actual reality. She believes that she has confirmed this when she is able to get new growth from 
one of her plant samples when she places it in the soil with some water. However, when she 
shares this information with the community leaders, they attempt to incarcerate her and destroy 
the artifacts in the museum (9:48). 
Asha’s dream of a green tree and fresh water leads her to make the ultimate sacrifice for 
the possibility of that dream becoming reality. Asha escapes from Maitu and finds a vast 
desert—the monotony of which is broken only with trash and old warning signs. Asha’s primary 
motivation is the thought that there is sustainable life outside of the community she escapes 
from. The plant becomes a representation of hope, reflected in the vibrancy of its green color and 
the way that Asha is careful to care for it as she searches for fertile land. When she finds the 
coordinates, she is disappointed to see that there are no living trees, just dead ones. However, she 
still plants the seedling by sacrificing her remaining water and bodily moisture (Kahiu 19:25). 
The film ends with a tree sprouting from the seedling as Asha dies (19:35). As the tree grows 
through Asha’s corpse, the camera cranes out from the desert to reveal lush forest in the same 
frame shown only through the letters that make up the title of the film, “pumzi,” a Swahilli word 
that means “breath.”32 Her bodily sacrifice demonstrates the biological connection between 
human and plant life. As caretaker for the tree, Asha makes sure that it is able to live no matter 
the cost. In this world, her knowledge of the fertile soil and her sacrifice allow the tree to grow as 
a symbol of hope.   
                                            
32 For more information about the use of scaling and variable framing in film, see Noel Carrol. “The 
Power of Movies” Aesthetics: A Reader in Philosophy of the Arts, edited by David Goldblatt and Lee 




The film’s ending suggests that relationships between humans and nature can contribute 
to the flourishing of both. It also warns against an overreliance on technology, as it allows those 
in power to control all means of survival. However, technology is what enables Asha to find the 
location of the fertile soil and ultimately plant the seedling While technology allows humans to 
survive, it does not allow them to flourish, and in fact solidifies the control that the leaders of the 
Maitu have over everyone else. It is only through her connection to the seedling that Asha is able 
to taste fresh air and experience freedom for the first time. This film demonstrates an ethical 
relationality by implicating all of humanity as responsible for the destruction of the natural 
world. As a result, Asha feels that it is her responsibility to give her seedling a chance, even if 
that chance costs her life.  
In a reversal of the Christian role of Eve, the final scene reveals that Asha’s sacrifice will 
renew nature. This decolonial gesture reaffirms the connections between motherhood and the 
growth of life. In an examination of Black feminist ecologies in films including Pumzi, critic 
Amanda Rico discusses the connections between gender, nature, and Kenyan belief systems. She 
says that trees have a spiritual significance, specifically fig trees called “mugumo by Kikuyu and 
oreti by the Maasai, who consider them as symbols of the ancestors, life, and fertility. 
Additionally, according to Yoruba belief systems, the Iroko tree is inhabited by a vengeful spirit 
who causes misfortune to those who cut it down” (Rico 90-91).  This reverence for trees shifts 
from their symbolic resonance among the Kikuyu and Maasai to the reverence of the physical 
trees themselves among the Yoruba because of their spiritual presence. The mothering that Asha 
provides indicates a reverence for the tree as both a symbol and as a living being whose life and 




outside of their contained environment, the leaders still contribute to the piles of waste plaguing 
the landscape, and thus continue the cycle of exploitation, even as they conserve water and 
generate “clean” energy. Alternately, Asha’s sacrifice reaffirms the connection between humans 











In the third chapter of my dissertation, I noted that there is a tree that owns itself in 
Athens, Georgia. I also raised questions of tree subjecthood, though I didn’t offer any answers 
that specifically pertained to trees. In concluding, I examine a recently published novel that has 
gained wide critical acclaim and attention by directly addressing the agency of trees. In 2018, 
Richard Powers published his twelfth book, The Overstory, which imagines the perspective of 
trees and follows the lives of nine humans who are connected to them. This novel is a work of 
speculative ecofiction that explicitly and aggressively asserts that trees have their own agency 
and suggests that there is a possibility for humans to be able to hear them. Although the main 
characters do not arrive at their understanding of the trees in the same ways, by the end of the 
novel they are able to understand their connections, not just to humans, but to all of the beings on 
Earth.  
In the novel, a character named Patricia travels to Brazil to collect more seeds for her 
seedbank. While there she encounters in a tree a pareidolia (the perception of a familiar image in 
an ambiguous pattern) of a woman with raised arms. This reminds her of the myths she has 
learned a child, the metamorphoses of Ovid, and how once people believe that they could 
become trees. Although she keeps it to herself, she starts to question whether or not those myths 
might be possible. She thinks, “[T]he gap between people and trees is nothing at all” (395). 
Though made by Patricia, this observation reflects the opinions of the trees themselves, who 
continually try to communicate with humans. Patricia’s narrative arc is built from the fact that 
she has always considered trees her friends. Because of this friendship she eventually becomes a 




invited to be a keynote speaker at a conference, she grasps her opportunity to answer the 
question, “What is the single best thing a person can do for tomorrow’s world? (455). She says,  
Men and trees are closer cousins than you think. We’re two things hatched from the same 
seed, heading off in opposite directions, using each other in shared place. That place 
needs all its parts…. We have a role to play in the Earth organism …Trees are doing 
science. Running a billion field tests. They make their conjectures, and the living world 
tells them what works. Life is speculation and speculation is life … Trees stand at the 
heart of ecology, and they must come to stand at the heart of human politics (454).  
Patricia’s speech is meant to make people understand the fact that she has come to realize. That 
humans are lonely because they do not understand their kinship to the trees around them. She 
hopes that by revealing their consciousness, she will encourage more people to study their 
language and learn to communicate with them. She also wants humans to stop thinking of the 
earth as their dominion, and instead see themselves as a species that is sharing the resources with 
everyone else. Patricia is calling for humans to engage in ethical relationality and acknowledge 
the power that they hold in determining the fate of all other species that they share the planet 
with.    
The trees themselves are given voices in the text, and although they converse with other 
trees, it is through their conversations with humans that Powers most effectively suggests the 
compassion that humans are called to share. Another of the main characters, Olivia, is only able 
to communicate with trees after she dies and is brought back to life—a life that she is lead back 
to by “beings” that she later recognizes as trees (158). She hears them say, “The most wonderous 




hearing the trees, she feels that her life finally has purpose. Given this purpose, she is able to see 
that “[t]he air all around sparks with connections” (165). Other characters have the ability to 
understand trees without experiencing death, but they actively make a choice to listen to what 
trees are saying. By contrasting the time of the trees with the urgency of humans in the present 
moment, Powers heightens the urgency for environmental action. The trees “need help” and it is 
up to humans to acknowledge the power that they have and mobilize this knowledge into action. 
In an interview about the purpose of his novel, Powers says, “I happen to believe that 
collectively, we humans are deeply, dangerously deranged, and that only a profound shift in 
consciousness and institutions regarding the significance and standing of nonhumans will keep 
us viable in this place and lift our awful sense of moral abandonment” (Rose). Throughout the 
text, the characters in the novel echo the loneliness that Powers suggests is one of the pervasive 
states of being human. In the novel, when the characters realize that they are able to 
communicate with trees, that loneliness is eased. These relationships with trees allow the 
characters to gain insight into how they are connected to the Earth, yet they also motivate the 
humans to take action to protect the forests that remain.  
Powers’s novel illuminates several of the ways that I see speculative ecofiction 
promoting relationality that is based on care and compassion for and with nonhumans. I believe 
that a shift in how humans see themselves in relation to nonhumans is one of the vital projects of 
speculative ecofiction. In this dissertation, I have defined speculative ecofiction as literature that 
operates as science fiction or fantasy to deal with ecological themes and that positions humans as 
stewards of the world. Speculative ecofiction teaches humans that there is no exceptionalism that 




ontology is a modern myth, we humans can responsibly exercise ethical relationality by shifting 
our perspective to encompass connections to all beings in the world around us. Through a new 
understanding of stewardship as responsibility, developed through active engagement with 
indigenous cultures’ knowledges, ecocriticism, and contemporary theories of entanglement, it is 
possible recognize the power that humans have without limiting the agency of nonhumans.  
I have examined how different models of relationality are explored in various 
intersections of postcolonial, posthuman, and Afrofuturist speculative ecofictions. Although the 
focus of ethical relationality shifts, each of these speculative subgenres push against the 
constructed dichotomy of nature versus culture and expands the concept of personhood. 
Ultimately, I have argued that speculative ecofiction reveals what Powers suggests is at the 
center of his novel, “…a rejection of human exceptionalism—the idea that we’re the only things 
on earth with will, memory, flexible response to change, agency or community” (Rose). 
Speculative ecofiction rejects human exceptionalism by exploring new configurations of human 
Being and new possibilities of multispecies community. Nonhumans are shown to be agents of 
their own lives and have agency in relation to other beings and cultures.  
In the first chapter, I argued that the foundations of speculative ecofiction in the United 
States rested in a concern about the rapid growth of technology, from the industrial revolution to 
the Cold War era. These concerns intersected with a growing uncertainty about the effects of 
industrialization on the environment both globally and locally. This led authors of speculative 
fiction to confront the issues of the present by projecting scenarios into the future. By showing 
the consequences of rapid technological development, weapons of mass destruction, and revenge 




hubris. The culmination of this chapter is an examination of two “contemporary” American texts, 
Ursula Le Guin’s Always Coming Home and Joan Slonczewski’s A Door into Ocean. These texts 
establish the foundation for speculative ecofiction in the US coming out of the late eighties and 
early nineties. By focusing on nonhuman agency and questioning what it means to be human in 
ethical relation to nonhuman others, these novels provide gateways through which readers can 
understand the foundations of relational agency. Relational agency is shown to be a concept that 
relies on the ontological and ethical parameters of being in relation. Self-aware human 
relationality allows relationships to flourish by acknowledging the privileged position of 
humanity, but still strives to create non-exploitive relationships with the nonhuman. 
I dove deeper into the cultural stratifications of humanity in the second chapter through 
the works of two contemporary indigenous authors, Linda Hogan and Alexis Wright. Though 
they are continents apart, they explore the legacies of colonialism on the present and into the 
future. Specifically, their novels explore human/animal relationships and show humans 
recognizing shared trauma caused by exploitation within hegemonic political and colonialist 
systems. Writing against these systems, they situate animals as relatives, reinforcing the 
interrelations between animals and humans. I argue that Hogan’s Power and Wright’s The Swan 
Book have human protagonists that seek legal justice for the nonhuman, and when that justice 
fails, they rely on an ethics of care to preserve the dignity of animals.  
In the third chapter, I explored speculative ecofiction that moves beyond humans and 
animals to the cyborgs and things that exist in the margins of human culture and the natural 
word. The novels in this chapter—Karen Tei Yamashita’s Through the Arc of the Rainforest, 




the foundations of human subjecthood through questioning how beings achieve personhood, and 
what it means to create and maintain an identity rooted in a sense of self in relation to others. 
These novels reveal that the ethical imperative to care for others is expansive to all beings who 
might be considered persons, those capable of both self-awareness and compassion.  
In the fourth chapter, I looked at how two leading authors of speculative fiction, who are 
also known as Afrofuturist and Africanfuturist, expand the definition of “human” without 
creating a post-racial future. These authors, Nnedi Okorafor and N.K. Jemisin, acknowledge 
other ways of knowing and interacting with the world and its inhabitants that are not based on 
the foundation of humanity. Through protagonists that celebrate humanity through their own 
culturally and self-consciously constructed identities, these novels argue for an ethical 
relationality that is based primarily on care and the acknowledgement of difference. These novels 
also show two different ways of relationality. Okorafor’s novel situates humans as members of a 
vast intergalactic ecosystem that rely on tradition and care as means to define their personhood. 
Alternatively, Jemisin warns against relying on tradition to navigate what it means to be human 
and to care, while focusing specifically on the destruction of humanity’s relationship with the 
Earth. These authors insist that relationships between technology, environment, and humanity are 
complicated by lack of compassion, and unwillingness to accept other perspectives as valid.  
Speculative ecofiction continues to utilize the fantastic to showcase the possibilities of 
relational agency and push the boundaries of what it means to be human. The novels that I 
examine promote an ethical relationality between humans, animals, plants, and whole 
environments. They show the entanglement of humans in varying ecosystems and emphasize the 




cause their own power to diminish. In these scenarios, the web of connections that humans 
maintain are brought to life to highlight the complexities of creating and maintaining reciprocal 
relationships. This fiction reshapes stewardship into a sense of responsibility and care for and 
with nonhumans. In this way, speculative fiction offers a hope that humanity can become better 
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